2010年1月5日 星期二

Sovereign debt crises 2010, an RBS sapling

What is the `Tree of Truth’?

According to RBS, it is a Binary Recursive Tree Approach aimed at selecting explanatory variables and critical threshold levels that best discriminate between sovereign debt crisis and non-sovereign debt crisis states.

In basic terms it’s a flow chart, showing which countries in Central Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa, the bank (using criteria from a 2005 IMF working paper by Nouriel Roubini and Paulo Manasse) thinks are potentially vulnerable to a sovereign debt crisis.

And RBS has just updated its Tree of Truth chart for 2010.

The result is below, click to enlarge.

treeoftruth2010small

If you want to compare and contrast with the 2009 version, created in June, the chart is here.

We can tell you that the model identified 14 economies at risk in 2010, compared with 13 for 2009. In the words of RBS’s CEEMEA specialists Tim Ash, Imran Ahmad and David Petit-Colin, that means that “… despite the general improvement in global sentiment, the analysis suggests a more lasting impact from problems faced by the global economy over the past year or so.”

Specifically, Hungary, having dropped off the list of vulnerable credits in CEEMEA in 2009, re-enters in 2010, along with Romania. Having added some new states to the model mix for 2010, RBS also identifies Bahrain, Iceland, Lebanon and the UAE as crisis-prone this year.

The majority of at-risk states are still, however, within emerging Europe.

Here are some select excerpts:

* The results are broadly in line with current market risk perceptions as in recent years Emerging Europe has generally suffered from wide current account deficits and excessive foreign borrowing and hence large external financing requirements/relative to FX reserve positions. Rigid exchange rate regimes, predominant through the region, add an extra vulnerability, suggesting a very hard landing for these economies, with pass thru to banking sectors via rising [nonperforming loans].

* None of the major EM economies in Asia and Latin America surveyed appear vulnerable to crisis as per the IMF definition/methodology. The latter two regions’ much better external financing positions, particularly reflect the maintenance of current account surpluses and relatively light external debt burden while the accumulation of healthy stocks of FX reserves during the “good years” provide an added degree of insulation.

* The analysis clearly has its limits as it only reveals “ability to pay”. As recent debt crises (e.g. Argentina and Ecuador) in Latin America and perhaps even Dubai in CEEMEA, in particular, have shown, “willingness to pay” is also critically important, but difficult to model. Countries could perhaps use the “cover” of the global crisis to manage their external liabilities lower by restructuring liabilities.

Full paper in the usual place.

(H/T the FT’s Chris Flood)

Related links:
`Rules of Thumb’ for Sovereign Debt Crises - IMF working paper
Moody’s sees sovereign states a suffering – FT Alphaville

MergerMarket’s M&A rankings

Investment banks like these things — and when the latest deal league tables show Goldman Sachs being knocked off the top spot by Morgan Stanley we can treat it as bona fide news.

From MergerMarket, an FT sister company…

League Table of Financial Advisers to Global M&A: Value - Merger Market

We should add, however, that MOST only head the 2009 list because of this…

Europe: Top Announced Deals Year End 2009 - Mergermarket

The full 37 page Mergermarket report can be found here.

Related links:
Brief respite from brickbats
– Reuters DealZone

Delinquent CMBS, the `C’ stands for climbing

Behold, what looks to be the biggest monthly increase in delinquent CMBS in 2009 (so far).

Delinquent CMBS for Nov. 2009 - Realpoint

Realpoint has released its CMBS delinquency report for November 2009.

With the exception of June 2009, when the temporary late payment status of some General Growth Property loans helped push total delinquent CMBS to $28.85bn, it looks like November saw the biggest monthly gain over the last year — rising $5.38bn to $37.93bn.

That’s a delinquency rate of 4.706 per cent, up from the 4.013 per cent posted in October.

About $3.5bn of that increase was caused by a single loan — the Extended Stay Hotel LLC loan from the WBC07ESH transaction. Still, the ratings agency expects that loan to continue to be delinquent “in the near-term” and thinks the overall delinquency rate will rise to between 5 and 6 per cent in Q1 2010.

The good news though: Realpoint thinks the various government programmes put in place to bolster the commercial real estate sector (the Talf, CRE loan workouts, etc.) might yet make an impact:

On the other hand, as three new issue deals have closed in the past two months and more new issuance is expected to come to market in 2010, some of the delinquency growth we have experienced month-over-month in 2009 may yet be offset somewhat by any new issuance’s speed to market in 2010. In addition, liquidations of severely distressed defaulted loans have picked up speed in the latter half of 2009, while modifications and forbearance at the loan level continue to be discussed between borrowers and special servicers that may also result in a delinquency “leveling-off” period.

Related links:
US CMBS delinquencies hit 4.5 per cent, Moody’s says – FT Alphaville
All roads lead to retranching in CRE crunch – FT Alphaville

The defining feature of 2010 will be…

… Reverse repos.

That’s according to Morgan Stanley’s chief European strategist Teun Draaisma, who reckons the moment the Fed starts to drain excess reserves from the system will be the point at which a 10 per cent equity market correction begins.

Now, the New York Fed conducted its first test of reverse repurchase agreements — selling assets such as Treasuries to dealers for cash with an agreement to buy them back later at a slightly higher price — last month.

And Draaisma thinks the Fed will go live in March, at which point it will be time to put on the tin hat and rotate into defensive stocks:

There always is some sort of equity market correction around the start of tightening post US recessions. The average such correction has been 13% over 6 months, typically starting around the first Fed rate hike, sometimes earlier (such as in 1976 & 2004). In the aftermath of secular bear markets, the start of tightening leads to an even more severe and longer correction.

This time around, we expect this period of market weakness will start around the time of the start of liquidity withdrawal early in H1 rather than around the first Fed rate hike in H2.

Here is all of that pictorially (click to enlarge):

Equity corrections after Fed rate hikes - small

And this is how Draaisma is positioning himself for this equity market squall.

We are increasing Staples from +2 to +3% OW, Healthcare from +1 to +2% OW; Consumer Discretionary from -2 to -1% UW; reducing Materials from +2% OW to neutral; Financials from -2 to -3% UW by lowering Banks from -1 to – 2% UW (Financials tend to suffer during ‘start of tightening’ phases). After these changes, we are playing our themes of reliable growth / inflation hedges / start of tightening through: OW Energy +3, Consumer Staples +3, Health care +2; Neutral Industrials, Materials, Telcos; UW Tech -1, Consumer Discretionary -1, Financials -3, Utilities -3.

Related links:
[Outlook 2010] The deluge begins – FT Alphaville
The interest rate disconnect - FT Alphaville
Reversing the repo constraint – FT Money Supply

Consolidating the US, UK gov’t bond sell-off

With the holiday season finally over, it’s probably a good time to contemplate the period’s more excessive and illiquid market moves. Among them the rather sudden and acute sell-off in US and UK government bonds. Was it rational?

As the following charts depict, British government bonds ended 2009 with their worst monthly performance since the start of the year.

US Treasury notes, the 10-year yields of which were approaching their highest level since June on Monday, registered the worst sovereign debt performance of 2009 according to Bloomberg:

US 10-year Treasuries - Bloomberg

10-year Gilts - Bloomberg

As far as the UK is concerned, even upbeat manufacturing and lending data was unable to reverse the sell-off in any decisive fashion on Monday. As Reuters reported:

LONDON, Jan 4 (Reuters) – British gilt prices were little changed on Monday despite upbeat manufacturing and lending data as investors assessed the sustainability of sharp price falls during thin trading over the Christmas period. At 1247 GMT the March long gilt future was flat at 114.45 in thin trade on the first trading day of 2010, when most dealers were back after two weeks of thin markets due to the Christmas and New Year holidays.

Meanwhile, Pacific Investment Management, aka bond-fund Pimco, fuelled further jitters after announcing it was planning to cut its holdings of US and UK debt due to the countries’ record borrowing levels.

According to Bloomberg:

Pimco is “more cautious” on corporate bonds and holds fewer mortgage-backed securities than the percentages in the benchmarks it uses to gauge performance, wrote Paul McCulley, a portfolio manager and member of the investment committee, in his 2010 outlook.

The company is also underweight Treasury Inflation Protected Securities, according to the report on Newport Beach, California-based Pimco’s Web site. “This all leaves us with portfolios that appear, more than at other times, to be hugging the benchmarks with no bold positioning,” McCulley wrote. “We’re making a very active decision to run light on risk.”

Which presumably suggests the bond sell-off was justifiable after all?

Related links:
After the decade of debt: A course to chart
- FT
Our wall of gilts is casting a long shadow over 2010
- FT

Citi sells its electronic FX platform

There’s been some consolidation in the world of FX electronic trading platforms on Monday.

According to a statement released by foreign-exchange platform FXall, Citigroup has reached an agreement with the company to sell it its LavaFX foreign-exchange electronic trading platform for an undisclosed sum.

The statement reads:

4 January 2010 – FXall, the world’s leading institutional multi-bank electronic foreign exchange platform, today announced an agreement to purchase LavaFX from Citi. The acquisition is the latest addition to FXall’s offering as it continues its long established program of investment to create the best platform for clients. With LavaFX, FXall grows its institutional client base to nearly 1,000 of the world’s largest hedge funds, CTAs, banks, broker-dealers, corporate treasurers and asset managers and adds capabilities to give clients an edge at every phase of the transaction lifecycle.

Citigroup had invested in developing cutting-edge algorithmic order processing optionality for LavaFX, including the ability to timeslice orders and dictate market conditions for order placement.

It had also hoped the product would successfully break into the interbank market — to date dominated by Reuters and EBS.

According to a 2004 Lava press release, the group launched its FX arm in October of that year, hoping to revolutionise electronic global currency trading.

So what prompted Monday’s deal?

From Citi’s perspective, it already has a successful equity and derivative-focused ECN in the form of Lava Trading. Accordingly, selling off LavaFX won’t see Citi lose out on the overall algorithmic flow game.

What’s more, as Citi’s Jeff Feig, global head of G10 foreign exchange notes in the press release (our emphasis):

Jeff Feig, Global Head of G10 Foreign Exchange at Citi, added: “LavaFX is an innovative force in the industry, having built an excellent platform with talented staff. Citi believes a multi-bank platform is best owned by a multi-bank provider, making the sale of LavaFX to FXall the right strategy for its continued growth. As a shareholder and long standing liquidity provider to FXall, Citi is confident LavaFX clients and employees will benefit from this transaction. Citi will continue to support LavaFX and contribute to its future success as a part of FXall.”

In other words, it looks like the move is designed to support FXall’s general bid to dismantle Reuters and EBS from their interbank dominance.

Rather than competing with FXall on flow, Citi is perhaps opting to support the multi-bank-owned endeavour with the sort of liquidity (not just surplus flow that it itself cannot offset) that could very well make a difference in who eventually wins out.

FXall today is owned by 16 banks including Citi, having been formed back in 2000 by seven founding participants.

Interestingly, Citi was previously part of the consortium of 13 banks that sold EBS to Icap in 2006.

Related links:
FXall to buy forex platform from Citi
– FT
FX is changing
- FT Alphaville

2010年1月4日 星期一

Japan's two lost decades - An end to the Japanese lesson

Dec 30th 2009
From The Economist print edition

Japan has taught the world a great deal about coping with the financial crisis. Now the West is on its own

Illustration by S. Kambayashi

“NEW Year rally expected on Tokyo market next week.” That was a typically boosterish Japanese newswire headline on December 29th 1989, the day that one of the world’s biggest ever asset-price bubbles reached bursting point. Exactly 20 years later the Japanese are still paying the price for such hubris (see article). The Nikkei 225 index, which peaked at 38,916, now languishes at just over one-quarter of that level (though once again there is talk of a New Year rally). Japan’s economy has barely grown in nominal terms after two “lost decades”, and is again suffering from deflation. Where Japan was once bearing down on America, it now feels the hot breath of China on its neck. Remember “Japan as Number One”? These days the country’s chief claim to fame is having a gross government debt burden approaching 200% of GDP.

For the Japanese this has all been deeply troubling. But in the past two years, as the Western world has faced many of the same problems that Japan has been grappling with since 1989 (the collapse of asset prices, a surge in distressed debt and a looming threat of deflation), Japan has provided some useful lessons on how governments should, and should not, tackle potentially systemic financial meltdowns.

Thanks to the precedent set by Japan, many of these lessons were quickly put into practice. Acting far more swiftly than the Japanese authorities did (the Japanese had the misfortune of having to learn through trial and error), Western policymakers provided liquidity to their banks and forced them to rebuild capital, while pumping in generous doses of fiscal stimulus to offset the collapse in private-sector demand. And like the Bank of Japan, they slashed interest rates and took extraordinary measures to try to keep credit flowing. The efficacy of these steps has led to growing optimism about the world economy.

So what is the Japanese lesson now? In many ways, the analogy is no longer terribly helpful. That is partly because the pupils are in a worse pickle than the teacher ever was. The most vulnerable countries, such as Greece, now face a risk that Japan never did: that markets will lose faith in their creditworthiness. Japan, for all its woes, has benefited from a huge pool of domestic savings and investors happier to keep their money at home than abroad. Meanwhile, the scale of the global upheaval makes Japan’s problems, which had little impact overseas and took place against a backdrop of global growth, look small by comparison. And with huge deficits in so many nations, the risk of a sudden loss of fiscal credibility is more acute than it ever was in Japan.

But there are other ways in which the pupils are in better shape. That is partly because they have less rigid systems. In the more adaptable Western economies there has been less resistance to structural changes in order to maintain productivity. There are also usually fewer political barriers to dealing with bad private-sector debts than there were in Japan. Moreover Westerners are also reaping the rewards of having acted more decisively than the Japanese did—especially when it came to pumping money into the economy and cleaning up financial balance-sheets. With fewer zombie banks, fewer signs of entrenched deflation and much earlier signs of growth, the West is in uncharted territory: it has arguably already got to a stage that Japan never really did.

Nothing more will I teach you today

That makes it very difficult to keep on drawing particular lessons from Japan’s sad plight. It does, however, still leave a general lesson common to all economic disasters: don’t be suckered by false signs of economic recovery. In Japan’s case, such hopes have led it repeatedly to tighten fiscal policy before private demand was strong enough to sustain a recovery. That entrenched deflation. Japan also left its banks too short of capital to cope with subsequent shocks.

Policymakers in the developed world still have an enormous task on their hands. Many banks have huge write-downs to make on their loans, economies are burdened with excess capacity and households’ debt levels remain high. It would be disastrous to tighten policy too soon, as Japan’s example shows. But Japan provides no useful guidance on when the right time would be. For that, there is only trial and error. And the more errors there are, the more the West’s next decade may look like Japan’s two lost ones.