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2010年3月11日 星期四

Arbitrage (and accounting) in the time of crisis

Here they are — two examples of risk-free and profitable trades (really) courtesy of the Bank of England’s financial stability guru, Andrew Haldane.

It’s just a shame no one bothered to exploit them:

The first one is the difference between an index of CDS contracts and and a self-built portfolio of the same CDS contracts. From October 2008 onwards, the values of the two diverged by as much as 60bps. Even with transaction costs taken into account, the divergence persisted.

The second chart shows the difference between two pretty much identical money market bets — forward rate agreement spreads and forward rates implied by the Libor spreads, both of the same maturity. Over the same period, these differed by as much as 250bps.

Where were the canny arbitrageurs to sniff out these potentially riskless trades?

And perhaps more importantly, why is Haldane highlighting them?

Here’s what he says on the first point:

So why were the bets not placed and the arbitrage opportunities exploited? First, money is needed to place even a riskless bet. That was the scarcest of commodities after the failure of Lehman Brothers in October 2008. Second, placing a bet also requires a trustworthy bookmaker. They too were thin on the ground in the midst of crisis. In their absence, arbitrage may be more “apparent” than real. Market prices are likely to deviate from fundamentals due to liquidity and counterparty premia.

And on the second point — the above are examples of Efficient Markets Hypothesis gone awry, and Haldane presents them in a paper all about the hot-button issues of fair value and accounting reform.

The point is that if EMH was true all the time, there’d be no reason to debate the need for mark-to-market accounting — the prices at which assets are accounted for would be identical to their real value.

As it is though, you get situations like the above.

The whole paper is worth a read, but here’s something which also struck us:

It is interesting that there was evidence of financial markets making their own switch in valuation convention during the course of the crisis. As funding maturities shortened, the probability of asset liquidation rose. It became rational, then, for investors to begin valuing even banking book assets at market prices, as in Chart 7. For a time, this process appeared to generate its own downward dynamic, with shortening maturities and falling asset prices eroding the impliedly mark-to-market solvency position of banks in a liquidity/solvency loop. Some have argued this downward dynamic itself justifies switching-off fair values. But the perils of doing so are clear. Persisting with an inappropriate valuation metric may give an inaccurate picture of banks’ true solvency position. It will also reduce banks’ incentives to adjust funding structures to guard against such a dynamic. It is precisely such risk management incentives that appear to explain the relative success of some firms, including Goldman Sachs, during this crisis. Therein may lie a lesson.

In other words liabilities — not just assets — also matter when it comes to the mark-to-market debate.

And who’s most likely to show asset-liability (maturity) mismatches?

The banks.

Related links:
Banks don’t just have an asset problem… - FT Alphaville
A smooth IASB and an impairment change – FT Alphaville
Good news for banks, IAS 39 edition – FT Alphaville

2009年12月22日 星期二

Basel was faulty

Published: December 17 2009 14:22 Last updated: December 17 2009 17:55

When push came to shove in the financial crisis, banks’ ordinary equity was too sparse and their prodigious amounts of quasi-equity could not take the losses. Now, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has proposed a comprehensive shake-up that aims to correct such faults. Although it gives few hard numbers, first impressions are of a punitive regime. Investors sold off bank shares around the world on Thursday on fears they may soon have to raise bucketloads of fresh capital.
Yet investors should welcome the Basel committee’s emphasis on beefing up permanent capital. Funny money hybrids will be phased out. The capital proposals are appropriately targeted: banks trading in derivatives, for example, will have to hold extra capital against counterparty risk. Furthermore, a leverage ratio – the preferred measure in the US – will be introduced as a supplementary dial on the regulatory dashboard. While many European banks already report such a ratio, it will be “harmonised internationally” to cater for differing accounting treatments around the world. In a nod to Spanish measures, the committee also wants to curb pro-cyclicality, requiring banks to bolster capital in good times. A minimum liquidity standard for internationally-active banks provides further protection.

Capturing the zeitgeist, there is a populist measure buried at the end of the proposal: a cap on bonus and dividend payments or share buybacks for banks if their capital drops nears a new, minimum level. This headline-grabbing recommendation is a reminder that regulation is a political game with many rival players, including the G20’s Financial Stability Board, each one jockeying for position. It is also just a framework, with actual ratios not set until late next year, with a view to adoption two years after that. Now the real lobbying by banks will begin.

Securitisation rules

Published: December 21 2009 09:26 Last updated: December 21 2009 09:26

Grappling with unintended consequences is like stuffing the proverbial genie back in its bottle. Accounting rule changes in June, which will see US banks bring securitisations back on balance sheet at the turn of the year, prompted concerns that those assets could be commandeered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as part of resolving bank failures. Loss of so-called “safe harbour” protection, warned rating agencies, could mean downgrades of bank-originated securitisations and deter new issues. So this week, the FDIC confirmed that assets securitised before the end of March would remain safe from seizure. Meanwhile, it wants feedback on possible rules that would determine whether future deals are protected.
Rather by the backdoor, then, the FDIC adds another voice on reform of securitisation markets. Coordinating its elaborate list of possible conditions with the US legislative process is a priority, as should be ensuring consistency internationally. Differing standards could drive securitisation activity from deposit-takers to non-bank or non-US institutions. The preliminary nature of the FDIC’s thoughts reflects, too, some disagreement between regulators, meaning an extension to the March deadline appears likely. Prolonged uncertainty is not ideal. But for consumer credit-backed securities, at least, the FDIC’s possible rules chime with what has been proposed elsewhere.
However, new FDIC suggestions – which may be restricted to only residential mortgages – include a six-tranche limit in capital structures, a requirement to hold loans for 12 months before they are securitised, and a portion of deal fees paid over time. True, the mortgage-backed securities market spawned the most complex structures and worst performance of pre-crisis issuance. But these strictures could make securitisations less viable in a market that, still, remains closed. They also smack of rear view regulation, before the new rules are in place to prevent the next one.

2009年12月21日 星期一

Banks and the FSR


The Bank of England’s Financial Stability Report (FSR) was released overnight and the focus, as one would expect, is on capital and liquidity.

But Jonathan Pierce, Credit Suisse’s banking analyst, says the most interesting thing is the suggestion (repeated several times in the 74-page report) that banks should use stable markets to issue more, non-guaranteed wholesale funding and to raise capital externally.

From the FSR:

Banks should take advantage of favourable market conditions.

Despite inevitable short-term costs, there is a strong case for banks acting now to improve balance sheet positions while conditions are favourable. Retaining a higher share of current buoyant earnings could significantly increase banks’ resilience and ability to lend. If discretionary distributions had been 20% lower per year between 2000 and 2008, banks would have generated around £75 billion of additional capital — more than provided by the public sector during the crisis.

It is also an opportune time for banks to raise capital externally, extend the maturity of their funding, and develop and implement plans for refinancing substantial sums as official sector support is withdrawn.

Taking advantage of current favourable conditions would help to repair balance sheets and thereby insure banks against future adverse developments. Given their balance sheet vulnerabilities, banks remain exposed to any future deterioration in macroeconomic and market conditions, which could substantially raise the cost of funding and capital raising in the future.

Coming hot on the heels of Thursday’s report from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, this means the capital debate will continue, says Pierce, who has also done some quick maths on the Basel III consultation paper.

Applying the new Basel definitions, he thinks Barclays’ equity Tier 1 capital could fall by 300 basis points, Lloyds by 360bps and RBS 450bps.

Which leads Pierce to conclude:

Capital and liquidity remain big challenges and shareholders are likely to be subordinated in the interests of stability for quite some time, in our view. Indeed, we think that the various papers from the FSA, BIS and BOE in recent weeks support our view that, structurally, the UK banks will struggle to generate ROTE much above 10-12% in the medium term.

Small wonder then, that UK banks stocks are under pressure this morning.

—–

Other highlights from the FSR:

  • Banks will face higher capital requirements on trading assets and securitisations from 2011 — of around £33bn for financial institutions in the United Kingdom.
  • Over the next five years, UK banks also need to refinance over £1 trillion of wholesale funding, including funding that has been supported by the public sector.
  • Improving balance sheet structures may be costly. In retail markets, competition for funding has raised retail bond rates to around 200 basis points above risk-free rates, compared with a spread below zero in 2005. And, in wholesale markets, longer-term interest rates are well above short-term rates. Based on those rates, the cost to the industry of increasing the maturity of funding, while replacing Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS) and Credit Guarantee Scheme (CGS) support and acquiring low-yielding assets to meet regulatory requirements, could be significant.
  • Outstanding loans to the commercial property sector were over £250bn at end-September 2009, nearly six times their level a decade earlier. The major UK banks have lent around £200bn to the sector and have additional contingent exposures of over £30bn in the form of undrawn credit facilities. In addition, the largest UK banks have gross exposures of over £18bn to securities backed by domestic and foreign commercial real estate loans.
  • In the United Kingdom, past falls in commercial property prices have raised average loan to value (LTV) ratios above 100 per cent, according to industry estimates. Around £160bn of loans are scheduled to be refinanced between 2009 and 2013

Related links:
Bank calls City’s bluff on regulation – FT
Digesting the Basel reforms – FT Alphaville
Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector – BIS
International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring
– BIS

All hail the Basel banking regime change

For it is — after much speculation and hand-wringing — here.

And here’s the summary of what the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which sets the supervisory standards for many of the world’s banks, is suggesting to strengthen the sector:

First, the quality, consistency, and transparency of the capital base will be raised. This will ensure that large, internationally active banks are in a better position to absorb losses on both a going concern and gone concern basis. For example, under the current Basel Committee standard, banks could hold as little as 2% common equity to risk-based assets, before the application of key regulatory adjustments.

Second, the risk coverage of the capital framework will be strengthened. In addition to the trading book and securitisation reforms announced in July 2009, the Committee is proposing to strengthen the capital requirements for counterparty credit risk exposures arising from derivatives, repos, and securities financing activities. These enhancements will strengthen the resilience of individual banking institutions and reduce the risk that shocks are transmitted from one institution to the next through the derivatives and financing channel. The strengthened counterparty capital requirements also will increase incentives to move OTC derivative exposures to central counterparties and exchanges.

Third, the Committee will introduce a leverage ratio as a supplementary measure to the Basel II risk-based framework with a view to migrating to a Pillar 1 treatment based on appropriate review and calibration. This will help contain the build up of excessive leverage in the banking system, introduce additional safeguards against attempts to game the risk based requirements, and help address model risk. To ensure comparability, the details of the leverage ratio will be harmonised internationally, fully adjusting for any remaining differences in accounting. The ratio will be calibrated so that it serves as a credible supplementary measure to the riskbased requirements, taking into account the forthcoming changes to the Basel II framework.

Fourth, the Committee is introducing a series of measures to promote the build up of capital buffers in good times that can be drawn upon in periods of stress. A countercyclical capital framework will contribute to a more stable banking system, which will help dampen, instead of amplify, economic and financial shocks. In addition, the Committee is promoting more forward looking provisioning based on expected losses, which captures actual losses more transparently and is also less procyclical than the current “incurred loss” provisioning model.

Fifth, the Committee is introducing a global minimum liquidity standard for internationally active banks that includes a 30-day liquidity coverage ratio requirement underpinned by a longer-term structural liquidity ratio. The framework also includes a common set of monitoring metrics to assist supervisors in identifying and analysing liquidity risk trends at both the bank and system wide level. These standards and monitoring metrics complement the Committee’s Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision issued in September 2008.

The full Basel paper is available here, and the liquidity supplement is here.

And the market reaction for selected banks:


Related links:
Bank capital rules face overhaul – FT
A Basel breather heard ’round the world – FT Alphaville
A Basel round-up for bonus-bugged bankers – FT Alphaville
Counting the costs of more bank capital – FT Alphaville

How the IRS sort-of-saved Citi

Who says the IRS isn’t, umm, understanding?

The US tax authority exempted the Citigroup, and some other bailed-out companies, from rules which would otherwise have led to the troubled bank losing $38bn worth of tax credits.

Citi had planned to repay the US government’s Tarp stake, and under IRS regulation, companies that encounter a change in ownership lose these tax credits. The rule is designed, according to the IRS, to prevent profitable companies from buying loss-making ones to evade taxes.

The rule-change has nevertheless raised eyebrows. From the Washington Post on Wednesday:

The federal government quietly agreed to forgo billions of dollars in potential tax payments from Citigroup as part of the deal announced this week to wean the company from the massive taxpayer bailout that helped it survive the financial crisis.

The Internal Revenue Service on Friday issued an exception to long-standing tax rules for the benefit of Citigroup and a few other companies partially owned by the government. As a result, Citigroup will be allowed to retain billions of dollars worth of tax breaks that otherwise would decline in value when the government sells its stake to private investors.

The “quietly agreed to forgo billions of dollars in potential tax payments” is a bit of a red herring, bit it has sparked quite a bit of outrage from the Washington Post’s taxpaying readers (all available for perusal on the paper’s dot.comments blog).

The issue here is that these tax credits — Deferred Tax Assets (DTAs) — make up a significant proportion of Citi’s capital. Yanking them because of a change in ownership, one caused by the bank repaying the Tarp no less, would have defeated the purpose of them paying back the Tarp in the first place, and probably ended up costing the US taxpayer more US taxpayer in terms of lost Tarp monies and potential support costs.

Reuters columnist Rolfe Winkler, who’s been following the Citi capital debate for some time now, posted a good illustration of the problem:

US bank TCE ratio with and without DTAs - Rolfe Winkler, Reuters

To be sure, there’s a degree of moral hazard involved here. The US government has just changed the rules to reflect very specific circumstances, with the effect of, as one Republican staffer put it “[inflating] the returns that they’re showing from the Tarp.”

The market’s not stupid, however. It knows Citi still has problems — notably it could still lose some of its DTAs if there’s a regulatory crackdown, or if the bank’s future profitability is less than expected. That’s one of the reasons DTAs make such shoddy capital — they’re only really useful when a bank is making (enough) money.

In any case, Citi’s Tarp repayment fittingly fell through on Wednesday after investors demanded a lower price ($3.15) for the stock than the government paid ($3.25) when it acquired its stake.

Related links:
Citigroup’s share sale under fire – FT
What’s up with Citigroup? – The Baseline Scenario
The rise of deferred tax assets in Japan – University of Chicago paper (via SSRN)