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2010年10月5日 星期二

獨立股票分析平台滿足高淨值客戶投資需要

過去數月,宏觀經濟數據未如理想,不少人擔心下半年仍然面臨一定的經濟下滑威脅,而亞洲私人銀行業不免受到影響。然而,法國興業私人銀行對前景依舊感到樂觀,主要原因是來自中國的需求,將繼續為高淨值客戶市場帶來支持。為此,他們開展了一系列的服務,包括法興獨有的環球股票分析平台,為區內以至全球客戶提供各類的投資建議。

2010年的整體經濟環境出現放慢跡象,法國興業私人銀行香港及北亞區行政總裁馮為佳認為,全球去槓桿化(deleverage)的過程正由個人及家庭層面,蔓延至國家政府層面,故此市場仍然有一段時間需要面對由此帶來的負面影響。政府透過注資刺激經濟,勢必為國家的資產負債表帶來壓力,投資者會繼續區別國家的評級(如西班牙及挪威)及企業營利的前景,而中國預期能夠維持穩定和合理的增長。

中國中產迅速崛起

馮為佳指出,目前亞洲的私人銀行業正受惠於中國的財富創造及中產崛起引發的需求,對各類型的交易方案有相當大的需求,法興私人銀行會因應客戶的投資策略,開發及提供適合的方案。他強調,法興私人銀行不主張推銷產品,故此客戶經理沒有產品銷售配額,他們主要的工作是就着客戶目標和風險系數提出建議。

整合發放獨立評論

與一般的投資者或客戶不同,高淨值客戶非常注重投資和資產配置,所以銀行需要開發相關的配套支援。馮為佳說,針對亞洲的私人銀行傾向交易主導的情形,法興私人銀行除了擁有專注不同資產類別的全球專業知識中心,在股票研究分析方面,亦設有獨立的股票分析平台(Distribute Equities Research for Better Investment,DERBI),藉此把銀行跨國的分析研究整合,並與客戶及公司內部分享。

負責亞洲區DERBI環球股票投資分析平台的法興亞太區投資研究主管蔡頌禮說,自2008年底起開展的DERBI,目標是透過有系統地整合及發放法國興業私人銀行的股票分析研究觀點,讓客戶可以作最佳的投資決定。

他指出,DERBI的分析報告完全客觀獨立,主題包括各個投資區域、主題以至個別股票,照顧個別客戶的要求。DERBI團隊由資深股票分析師組成,平台模式更已經獲得法國證券監管機構AMF認可。為了令DERBI的投資研究及建議更見完善,股票分析師可以透過平台交換意見和互相參考,突顯了在全球一體化下,不同經濟及金融體系互相影響對投資決定的重要性。

內地經濟活動強勁

針對亞洲區內的經濟發展及投資前景,二人認為中國的經濟活動保特強勁。事實上,內地最近公布的經濟活動數據支持這個觀點,工業生產反彈和借貸需求仍然很大。另外,適當政策和擴大私人消費令亞洲區較不受金融海嘯影響,並且重整環球增長的秩序,新興經濟體成為受惠的主要對象,而亞洲是當中的表表者。在亞洲股市中,他們較為看好台灣和韓國股市。兩個市場可以較清楚地預視收益,估值亦十分吸引。 此外,亞洲債券市場包括主權和公司債券,比成熟經濟體的發債人相同等級的債券,更能夠提供吸引的機會和更高的收益率。

短線風險不容忽視

然而,他們同時提醒投資者對短期走勢應採取較為審慎的態度,主要是由於成熟經濟體系的增長放緩,最終可能會打擊亞洲出口。其次,資產膨脹以及相對較小程度的消費物價通脹,需要額外的貨幣緊縮政策,新的加息將全線降低股票估值和收縮市場流通量。 最後,由於市場普遍有較大的避險情緒,增持股票投資未必是合適的做法。
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Not sure if it refers to the independent research advisor Ji-Asia that formed an agreement with SG ...th

2010年3月24日 星期三

‘Some useful things I’ve learned about Germany’s hyperinflation’


That’s from Dylan Grice — über-bear Albert Edwards’ sidekick at Societe Generale.

He’s done a review of inflation during the Weimar Republic inflation in his latest `Popular Delusions’ note. Prussian central banker Rudolf von Havenstein developed a habit of monetising Germany’s debt during the First World War, eventually leading to massive bouts of hyperinflation:


Amazingly, von Havenstein got away with the move largely because a school of economic thought at the time held that increasing money supply had nothing to do with the rate of inflation. Instead Germans were told the high rates of inflation were all down to external factors; foreigners to be exact, and the reparations Germany had to pay them. Oh, and a hefty portion of blame was laid on speculators too.

It’s an interesting historical economic rundown, but you can probably see where Grice is going with it:

I don’t want to overplay the parallels. In fact, there is one very clear difference between the hand Von Havenstein had to play then and those today’s central bankers have to play now, namely the stability of today’s political climate. Clearly this can change, but the class warfare, nationalistic xenophobia and revolutionary spirit poisoning the political atmosphere of 1920s Germany is at the very least dormant today, and certainly not meaningfully visible across the political landscape. But let’s not ignore the parallels either: as is the case for today’s central bankers, Von Havenstein was faced with horrible fiscal problems; as is the case for today’s central bankers, the distinction between fiscal and monetary policy had blurred; as is the case for today’s central bankers, the political difficulty of deflating was daunting令人怯步的;使人氣餒的; and as is the case for today’s QE-enthralled central bankers, apparently respectable economic theory reassured him that he was doing the right thing.

One might think that the big difference is that today we have a greater expertise. Surely we understand what happens when deficits are financed with printed money, and that it is only backward and corrupt states that don’t know any better, like Bolivia and Zimbabwe? But just a few years ago didn’t we think that it was only backward and corrupt states that suffered banking crises too?

And anyway, how could Von Havenstein not have known that the continued and escalating printing of money to fund government deficits would cause inflation? The United States experience of unrestrained money printing during the Civil War had been well documented, as had the hyperinflation of revolutionary France in the late 18th century. Isn’t it possible that, like today, he was overconfident in his ability to control his creation and in the economic theory which told him such control was possible? Certainly, in an article in the New York Times on the eve of the First World War, again from Liaquat Ahamed’s book, there seems to have been evidence of the general optimism that there would be no “unlimited issue of paper money and its steady depreciation … since monetary science is better understood at the present time than in those days.”

The fact is we do understand the economics of inflation. Despite what economists everywhere say about being in `uncharted territory’ with QE, we know that if you keep monetizing deficits eventually you get inflation, and we know that once you’re on that path it can be extremely difficult to get off it. But we knew that then. The real problem is that inflation is an inherently political variable and that concern over debt sustainability and unfunded welfare obligations leaves us more dependent on politicians than we have been in many decades. Frank Graham concluded his 1930 study of the Weimar hyperinflation with the following observation, which I think is as ominous as it is apt today:

“The mills of international finance grind slowly but their capacity is great. It is also flexible. The one condition is that the hoppers be not unduly loaded in the effort to get the whole grist from a single grinding. So much for the economics of the question. What politics has in store is, however, an inscrutable mystery. It can only be said that such financial difficulties as may occur will almost certainly arise from political rather than from economic sources.”

Related links:
Deflation dead and deader, Federal Reserve style – FT Alphaville
Of bonds and stocks and the Weimar Republic - FT Alphaville