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2010年10月4日 星期一

The biggest hedge funds in the US…

Posted by Sam Jones on Sep 30 17:05. Comment | Share

Out from AR magazine just moments ago is their annual ranking of the biggest hedge fund managers in the US. Unsurprisingly, Bridgewater is still number one. Surprisingly, it has increased its lead by a significant margin.

The firm now manages a titanic $50.9bn according to AR. Its nearest rival is JP Morgan – the bank – which manages around $41.1bn in hedge funds connected to its Highbridge business.

The nearest independent contender is Paulson & Co, with an estimated $31bn AUM. This year has hardly been kind on the firm, though after its spectacular 2008 and 2009, few would doubt its deserved place at the top table. Though September is supposed to have been good for Paulson, as of August 31 the Paulson Advantage and Advantage Plus funds were down 7.54% and 11.16% respectively.

Bridgewater has meanwhile seen its flagship Pure Alpha II fund return 16.74 per cent since January. In market conditions such as these, Bridgewater is deserving of praise. (The sylvan Connecticut-based firm is as cultish publicity-shy as it is successful, but according to investors, Bridgewater was a major beneficiary from the eurozone crisis).

The only other surprise is the – relative – fall from grace of DE Shaw, which according to AR manages just $17.8bn as of July 1 (we understand the number has since increased). Little wonder the firm is slashing jobs.

Related links:
www.ft.com/hedgefunds
www.twitter.com/samgadjones

2010年3月29日 星期一

Paulson’s $32 Billion Funds Prompt Too-Big-to-Succeed Concerns

By Katherine Burton

March 29 (Bloomberg) -- John Paulson started the year overseeing $32 billion in hedge funds, third in the world behind JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Bridgewater Associates LP. Unlike many of his biggest rivals, he’s taking in new cash, raising the question of how much money is too much for a hedge-fund manager.

“There’s no doubt that Paulson is a big draw for investors at the moment,” said Richard Tomlinson, founder of London-based Tomlinson Investment Consulting, which advises clients on hedge funds. “As with all managers that bulk up, there’s always the risk of returns becoming mediocre.”

Paulson & Co., the New York-based firm that the former Bear Stearns banker and Gruss Partners trader started in 1994, differs from many large competitors because it makes concentrated bets, such as the wager against subprime mortgages that helped generate $3 billion of profit in 2007. As assets increase, it can get harder for a fund to find investments big enough to drive returns and to trade without distorting prices.

Paulson’s main $19 billion Advantage funds, which primarily seek to profit on distressed debt, bankruptcies and mergers, have lagged behind peers this year and last after beating them in 2007 and 2008. Armel Leslie, a spokesman for Paulson, declined to comment.

Lessons of Tiger

The world’s largest hedge funds are approaching their previous peak assets after recovering from their worst-ever losses and investor outflows in 2008. They are benefiting from a shift by pension funds and endowments to established firms with steady returns and staff dedicated to risk management.

Fourteen firms managed $20 billion or more in hedge funds at the start of 2010, when industry assets stood at $1.6 trillion. Hedge funds oversaw a record $1.9 trillion in mid- 2008.

In 1998, only George Soros’s Soros Fund Management LLC and Julian Robertson’s Tiger Management LLC exceeded the $20 billion mark. Within two years of hitting that milestone, both firms had suffered big losses and decided to stop managing money for other investors.

“There is a point where you can be too big to generate returns,” said Lawrence P. Chiarello, a partner at Red Bank, New Jersey-based SkyView Investment Advisors LLC, which selects hedge funds for clients. “Being large and able to build a strong infrastructure are good things, but in general I think the pendulum has swung too far.”

The size at which a fund may become too big depends on factors such as its investment strategy and the markets in which it trades, Chiarello said.

Citadel’s Stumble

The industry is replete 充滿的 with examples of managers losing billions after they took increasingly bigger bets to produce top returns. Robertson’s fund was brought down in part by a 25 percent stake in US Airways Group Inc. and $2 billion of losses when the U.S. dollar fell against the Japanese yen.

In 2008, Chicago-based Citadel Investment Group LLC, whose assets had climbed to about $20 billion, lost 55 percent in its biggest funds after wagers on convertible, high-yield and investment-grade bonds hedged with credit-default swaps all went awry. It managed about $12 billion at Dec. 31.

Hany Shawky, a finance professor at the University of Albany-State University of New York, wrote a paper in 2008 that found that smaller funds outperform larger funds on an absolute basis. On a risk-adjusted basis, which takes into account the swings in returns, large funds were better. Shawky is working on an update to his study, which he said has found similar results.

Smaller Bets

While New York-based JPMorgan and Bridgewater of Westport, Connecticut, are larger than Paulson’s firm, they tend to make comparatively smaller bets.

JPMorgan manages about $33 billion in more than 50 funds in markets around the globe. The bank’s wholly owned Highbridge Capital Management LLC subsidiary manages an additional $11 billion in four funds.

Bridgewater manages its $43.6 billion in one strategy it calls Pure Alpha. The firm takes many small positions using futures to bet on stock indexes, bonds, currencies and commodities. Those markets are liquid, meaning that traders can get in and out of positions without moving prices dramatically.

Paulson tends to invest a lot in trends he has identified.

In 2007, before the housing market collapsed, he spent $2 billion buying credit-default swaps on subprime mortgages, a trade that soared when home loans went bad in record numbers. Today he has 10 percent to 15 percent of his Advantage funds in the shares of gold-mining companies on the expectation that prices of the metal will rise along with inflation.

Housing Score

The subprime wager paid off. The Advantage Plus fund, which uses leverage to amplify returns, jumped 160 percent in 2007 and 37 percent in 2008. Comparable funds gained an average of 6.6 percent in 2007 and fell 22 percent in 2008, according to Chicago-based Hedge Fund Research Inc. The firm’s Credit Opportunities funds, which held the biggest chunk of Paulson’s subprime trade, were up 600 percent in 2007.

Paulson’s performance was more pedestrian in 2009. The Advantage Plus fund climbed 21 percent, compared with about 25 percent for peers. Through February 2010, it lost 1 percent, compared with a gain of 1 percent for similar funds. The Credit Opportunities funds climbed 35 percent last year, and are up 0.35 percent this year.

Some Paulson investors say they aren’t concerned that he’s gotten too big.

Bigger Not Bad

“For funds that invest in a number of strategies, size isn’t an issue,” said Brad Alford, head of Atlanta-based Alpha Capital Management LLC, which picks hedge funds for clients and is a Paulson investor. “Bigger funds produce more in revenue, so they can hire the best talent and build the most robust infrastructure.”

Paulson, 54, started his hedge-fund career 16 years ago with a fund that focused on merger arbitrage. In 2004, when he was managing $3 billion, he began expanding, adding the first Advantage fund. He opened his first credit fund in 2006. At the end of 2008, he started the Recovery Fund, now $1.7 billion, to bet on companies like Citigroup Inc., Conseco Inc. and Bank of America Corp. as they rebounded from the financial-services meltdown.

This year he launched a $350 million gold fund and a real estate fund that is buying property at distressed prices.

Paulson, who made a presentation at a Merrill Lynch & Co. investor conference in February, defended the size of his firm as he closes in on the $36 billion in assets he reached in 2008.

Marketing Continues

“Paulson funds tiny relative to market opportunities,” was the title of one slide. It compared the $6.9 billion Credit funds to the markets for distressed mortgages, high-yield bonds and leveraged loans, saying each are more than $1 trillion.

Paulson continues to market his funds because he sees opportunities in the next 18 months to 24 months as companies restructure their debt, said Charles Krusen, head of New York- based Krusen Capital Management LLC and a Paulson investor.

The unleveraged version of the Advantage fund is targeting returns of 12 percent to 15 percent, he said.

“We think they’ll be able to do that,” said Krusen, adding that Paulson has closed his credit and merger-arbitrage funds before when he was concerned their size might hinder performance.

Brevan Howard Asset Management LLP, Europe’s largest hedge- fund firm, closed its $2 billion Asia Fund and $2.5 billion Emerging Market Strategies Fund to new investors last November, and is limiting inflows into its $21.3 billion Brevan Howard Master Fund Ltd.

Tudor, Shumway

Paul Jones’s Tudor Investment Corp. has stopped taking money into its $9.5 billion BVI Global Fund Ltd. Jones also returned some of 2009 profits in the Greenwich, Connecticut- based fund to clients this year as another way to cap returns.

Chris Shumway, who runs Greenwich, Connecticut-based Shumway Capital Partners LLC, a stock hedge fund, isn’t accepting more money after reaching $8 billion. New York-based King Street Capital Management LP, a credit fund, told investors it would “moderate” growth now that it has more than $20 billion, according to a letter sent to investors.

“Three of our core managers have closed to new investments,” said Stewart Massey, who runs Massey Quick & Co., a consulting firm in Morristown, New Jersey, that caters to wealthy individuals, endowments and foundations. “We love to see that. What they are saying is, ‘I’m running this for performance, not scale.’ ”


Hedge-Fund Firms With $20 Billion or More in Assets
(Jan. 1, 2010)

JPMorgan Chase & Co. $44 billion
JPMorgan Asset Management $33 billion
Highbridge Capital Management $11 billion

Bridgewater Associates $43.6 billion
Paulson & Co. $32 billion
Soros Fund Management $27 billion
Brevan Howard Asset Management $27 billion
Man Group $25.3 billion
D.E. Shaw $23.6 billion
Och-Ziff Capital Management $23.5 billion
Baupost Group $21.8 billion
Angelo, Gordon & Co. $20.8 billion
Goldman Sachs Asset Management $20.8 billion
Farallon Capital Management $20.7 billion
Avenue Capital Group $20 billion
King Street Capital Management* $20 billion

*As of Feb. 28, 2010.
Source: AR magazine, Pensions & Investments magazine and
Bloomberg data.

2010年1月5日 星期二

BarCap’s funding findings


The last of our Barclays Capital’s European bank special is a funding finale.

This is, of course, something which has been mentioned before.

The withdrawal of cheap central bank liquidity, a wall of short-term debt that will need to be refinanced and the continued weakness in the securitisation market, mean it’s very much expected that banks will experience a hike in funding costs in the coming years.

And while BarCap sees the additional burden as “manageable” they are talking pretty big numbers:

Banks spent the last decade radically shortening the maturity profile of their senior unsecured bond funding – from around six years to nearer half that today. This runs against prudent management as well as forthcoming regulation. We estimate that in the next three years, c€850bn will need to be re-financed at longer, more expensive maturities. Massive central bank liquidity support (c€875bn in Europe) will also be progressively withdrawn and replaced by funding at higher commercial rates, adding to these pressures.

(For an illustration of the funding issue, click here to view a few of the Barclays charts).

The interesting point, which Barclays highlights. is the potential discrepancy between maturity profiles and funding costs of banks. To wit, the below chart, showing their estimate of banks’ residual bond maturity (that is, assuming they don’t issue any new ones):

maturities
You can see there’s a rather wide range, consequently producing some very different funding requirements.

BNP Paribas, for instance, has the second-longest maturity on its remaining bonds of nine years. That means, according to BarCap, that to replace the €16bn of maturing bonds over 2010-12 and to ensure a blended average maturity of 6.3 years requires the bank to issue new bonds with an average 5.2 years maturity.

By contrast, for SocGen, the residual maturity of its issued bonds is just one year, which means that replacing its €8.6bn of maturing bonds over the 2010-12 periods would require new issues to have a longer, more expensive, maturity of 8.8 years.

And that’s just the maturity, funding costs between weak and strong banks also vary significantly obviously. The difference between the 10 narrowest and 10 widest bank CDS spreads, for instance, is now at about 100bps. That’s lower than the 250bps it was at the height of the crisis, but still very much above its pre crisis norm of 10bps or so.

Overall, BarCap estimates an overall impact on post tax profits of €7bn, or about 6 per cent of its net profit forecast for 2012. But within that, the numbers vary very much by bank.

About a third (HSBC, NBG, Standard Chartered), for instance, see almost no impact, while another third (Bank of Ireland, Alpha Bank, BankInter, etc.) see their earnings impacted by over 15 per cent.

Back to BarCap:

That, we believe, is the key message. The forthcoming normalisation of funding is likely to result in a range of strategic and financial responses across the sector.

The good news is that quality is actually starting to count in the bank debt market:

At the same time, we will see greater divergence in bank funding costs than before . . . For the first time in more than a decade, there is a major strategic advantage from being a well funded, “strong” name in the debt market.

But ironically, at the potential expense of that other issue covered by BarCap on Tuesday — Too Big To Fail:

In practice, weaker banks don’t always need to accept higher funding costs: they can shrink. But that’s the point; weak banks will struggle to execute their strategic goals if they are unable to get sufficient funding at economical terms. This will only be accentuated as banks look to replace the c€875bn of central bank funding. Ironically, just as some of Europe’s biggest banks might be impacted by “too big to fail” regulations, those same large, wellfunded banks – HSBC, BNP Paribas, BBVA and the like – may well have the funding base that allows them to grow bigger at the expense of their weaker rivals.

Related links:
Banks don’t just have an asset problem, says Moody’s - FT Alphaville
Banks face hike in funding costs – FT
BarCap calculates the cost of `Too Big to Fail’ – FT Alphaville
BarCap’s `credit surprise’ snapback – FT Alphaville

BarCap calculates the cost of ‘Too Big Too Fail’

Barclays has done a number on European banks. On Tuesday morning it has published a full 351 pages worth of research, in six separate notes, as it started coverage of the sector with the team it poached from Citigroup.

FT Alphaville will be picking out some highlights — to begin with, the notion of ‘Too Big Too Fail’ (TBTF).

Here’s what the BarCap analysts, led by Simon Samuels and Mike Harrison, say:

Banks have not always been this big. Indeed, as recently as 1990 none of the top 25 banks in the world boasted a balance sheet larger than their host country’s GDP (indeed, bar UBS, they were all less than one quarter of their host country GDP). By 2007 – on the eve of the financial crisis – this had totally changed . . .

Total balance sheet is not the only measure of size, but it is an important one. Eventually, if banks get too big, then national governments – as the ultimate guarantor of the system – lack credibility. This was exactly what happened to Iceland in 2008, and presumably would have happened to Ireland were it not a Eurozone member. Other measures – such as employment within financial services – show a similar pattern with the proportion of the working population in Europe employed in financial services rising from 10% in 1990 to 15% today. However sliced, banks have got bigger.

“So what?” you might ask. On one level, it is a perfectly reasonably question. It is not that long ago that the prevailing mantra was that bigger banks were safer. Moreover, there was hardly a detectable size-related pattern to the banks that “failed” in this crisis. Universal and narrow banks, large and small banks all ended up being rescued by either their governments or their competitors.

Whilst banks may have got bigger relative to the wider economy, it is not at all clear that bigger banks are more vulnerable. Indeed, to put the point another way – it could be argued that smaller, more narrowly defined institutions are more vulnerable to failure (see later).

That, however, misses the crucial point – namely that an industry that has been forced to rely to an unprecedented extent on its taxpayer base (capital injections for some banks, funding and funding guarantees for all banks) must expect those taxpayers in turn to demand widespread restructuring. The taxpayer cry is simple – “this must never happen again” . . . A number of major economies have either committed and/or distributed a significant percentage of their GDP as part of the rescue of the global banking sector. And it is for that reason that the debate over the cost to the taxpayer of failure – especially for those banks deemed TBTF – has now emerged.

And the TBTF response could take three forms, according to Barclays.

First, you could force banks to get smaller, though the analysts say a simple screening by size would not have predicted bank failures in the recent financial crisis.

Second, you could try to make banks “fail proof” by improving their solvency or liquidity (i.e. boosting their capital or requiring them to hold more liquid assets, be more self-funded, etc.).

Third, you could try to implement some sort of “controlled failure” procedure (the idea of living wills etc.).

Barclays’ biggest point though, is that regulatory proposals will be felt by banks deemed TBTF.

The BarCap analysts have accordingly come up with a list of 20 European banks they think could be considered TBTF by virtue of their size, interconnectedness or just identification by regulators as systemically important.

The results are below, click to enlarge.

In addition to identifying those 20 TBTF banks, Barclays also shows the impact of them having to carry additional regulatory capital above the sector average (currently Core Tier 1 of 8 per cent for 2011).

TBTFsmall

So for instance, if Allied Irish were to increase its Barclays-forecast 2011 Equity Tier 1 level of 3.3 per cent, to 5.3 per cent, it would need additional capital equivalent to a whopping 603 per cent of its current market value. Yowzers.

By contrast, banks like Credit Suisse and UBS would be relatively unaffected by such a measure, since they’ve already, in the words of BarCap, experienced a process of “massive deleveraging that the Swiss regulator has already forced upon them – which has taken their core capital ratios 400bps higher than the industry – precisely in recognition of their TBTF status.”

A point aptly summed up by the below chart (riffs of which, we’ve seen before):

TBTFsizechartsmall

Related links:
The problem is not TBTF, but TDTR - Naked Capitalism
All hail the Basel banking regime change – FT Alphaville
Banks too big to (excessively) bonus, FSA says – FT Alphaville

MergerMarket’s M&A rankings

Investment banks like these things — and when the latest deal league tables show Goldman Sachs being knocked off the top spot by Morgan Stanley we can treat it as bona fide news.

From MergerMarket, an FT sister company…

League Table of Financial Advisers to Global M&A: Value - Merger Market

We should add, however, that MOST only head the 2009 list because of this…

Europe: Top Announced Deals Year End 2009 - Mergermarket

The full 37 page Mergermarket report can be found here.

Related links:
Brief respite from brickbats
– Reuters DealZone