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2011年6月25日 星期六

Rising power, anxious state Tensions between China’s prosperous middle classes and its poor will make it a harder country to govern

AMONG those with most to celebrate as the Chinese Communist Party marks its 90th birthday on July 1st are the country’s bourgeois reactionaries. Perhaps now the most important pillar of the party’s support, China’s middle class was virtually non-existent until it was recreated in the late 1990s. So far, the communists have amply fulfilled their side of a tacit bargain in which well-off city-dwellers have traded political choice for fast-growing prosperity. But as the economy slows over the next decade, the party will struggle to keep its word. Indeed, peace and prosperity may depend on the very sort of political reform the party has tried so hard to avoid.

An affair to remember

In the past 15 years the middle classes have supported the party because of what it has done for them. Its rule has produced incredible economic progress, asserted China’s rightful role as a global power and, crucially, kept the country from falling back into the chaos that plagued it during so much of the 20th century. The post-Communist travails of the former Soviet Union have been valuable as what the party used to call “teaching by negative example”.

However, the love affair between a party that calls itself the vanguard of the proletariat and its actual, middle-class supporters is now under threat. At the root of this is an inevitable slowing in economic growth. As our special reporton China in this issue explains, the first decade of the century, with its relentless double-digit growth, may well have seen the peak of China’s economic exuberance. A sudden crash is not impossible: there could be a botched attempt to tackle either the property bubble or what the prime minister calls the “uncaged tiger” of inflation (now at 5.5%, its highest level in nearly three years). But an immediate upset is still unlikely: inflation is not yet out of control, still far below the 27.7% it reached in 1994. The danger is more in the medium term: growth will inevitably slow over the next decade, as China settles into its status as a middle-income country, and the burden of caring for an ever larger number of elderly people in a slower economy may make middle-class life far more uncomfortable.

To compensate, the party will have to usher in wrenching change. It is struggling to shift China away from the current unsustainable model, where growth is propelled by vast investment and export-led manufacturing, towards one where domestic consumption plays a bigger role. The country still has a long journey ahead in its efforts to build health-care, pension and social-security systems to reassure citizens: all of these are necessary to persuade the middle class to save less.

In addition, China’s state-owned businesses have an insatiable appetite for capital, which many of them waste. Curbing state companies means taking on all of the well-connected people who ride on their coat-tails, including parts of the middle class. The party’s creed (“Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought”) means nothing to most such people. The party is secretive about recruitment to its 80m-strong ranks. But an official report in 2008 said that, of new applicants for membership, by far the biggest category comprised university students over the age of 18. Although the decision by these young careerists to sign up shows the party’s clout, they have very different ambitions from those of the old ideologues.

The party will also have to work harder to sustain the urbanisation that has fuelled the economy. China has done the easy part: attracting underemployed young rural residents to urban jobs. But the supply is beginning to slow. It would help if farmers could sell or mortgage their rural land and use the money to help gain a stronger foothold in the cities. But the party remains overly fearful of privatising farmland, partly for atavistic fears of a destitute peasantry, and partly for ideological reasons.

Worse still, the system of household registration, or hukou, defines even long-staying urban migrants as rural residents, cutting them out of housing, education and other benefits. No wonder that the migrants are increasingly restive. Of the tens of thousands of protests each year, most are still rural, typically by farmers enraged by inadequate compensation for land appropriated for development. However, urban unrest, such as recent riots by factory workers in the southern province of Guangdong, is now more common. If the party is to keep the peace in cities and if it is to continue to attract migrants in sufficient numbers, it needs to find ways to turn them into full-fledged city-dwellers, with the consumer power to match.

Of taxation and representation

Here it runs up against the middle class most directly. To give migrants the same housing and other benefits as urban hukou holders, and to build a proper social safety-net will be expensive. And if more tax is the solution, then the middle class could well begin demanding a greater political say.

That is a day the party dreads. Since the nationwide student-led protests of 1989, the educated urban elite has mostly been politically quiescent. But the party fears them far more than it does unruly farmers or migrants. Beijing’s centre was flooded with police earlier this year when calls for an Arab-style “jasmine revolution” circulated on the internet.

The middle class’s anxieties have not yet fermented into a broader anti-government rage. But then the inevitable erosion of some of their privileges has barely begun. If the bourgeoisie does start to protest, the party will be faced with an old dilemma: liberalise or step up repression. All the evidence of the past—and of the recent crackdown—is that it will choose repression. But that in itself may help politicise the middle class. In other Asian countries a taste for democracy has risen with income; and repression would mean withdrawing freedoms from people used to their liberty gradually increasing.

In 2012 the party’s leadership—and the task of managing these tensions—is to pass to a new generation. The most recent leadership transition, in 2002, went smoothly. But every previous generational shift in the party’s 90 years has been chaotic, and, a decade on, the tasks faced by the leaders who took over in 2002 look almost easy by comparison with today’s.

If Greece goes… The opportunity for Europe’s leaders to avoid disaster is shrinking fast

THE European Union seems to have adopted a new rule: if a plan is not working, stick to it. Despite the thousands protesting in Athens, despite the judders in the markets, Europe’s leaders have a neat timetable to solve the euro zone’s problems. Next week Greece is likely to pass a new austerity package. It will then get the next €12 billion ($17 billion) of its first €110 billion bail-out, which it needs by mid-July. Assuming the Europeans agree on a face-saving “voluntary” participation by private creditors to please the Germans, a second bail-out of some €100 billion will follow. This will keep the country afloat through 2013, when a permanent euro-zone bail-out fund, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), will take effect. The euro will be saved and the world will applaud.

Time to stop kicking the can

That is the hope that the EU’s leaders, gathering in Brussels as The Economist went to press, want to cling to. But their strategy of denial—refusing to accept that Greece cannot pay its debts—has become untenable, for three reasons.
First, the politics blocking a resolution of the euro crisis is becoming ever more toxic (see article). Greeks see no relief at the end of their agonies. People are protesting daily in Syntagma Square against austerity. The government scraped through a vote of confidence this week; the main opposition party has committed itself to voting against the austerity plan next week and a few members of the ruling Socialist party are also doubtful about it. Meanwhile, German voters are aghast at the prospect of a second Greek bail-out, which they think would merely tip more money down the plughole of a country that is incapable either of repaying its debts or of reforming itself. As the climate gets more poisonous and elections approach in France, Germany and Greece itself, the risk of a disastrous accident—anything from a disorderly default to a currency break-up—is growing.

Second, the markets are convinced that muddling through cannot work. Spreads on Greek bonds over German bunds are eight points wider than a year ago. Traders know that Greece, whose debts are equivalent to around 160% of its GDP, is insolvent. Private investors are shying away from a place where default and devaluation seem imminent, giving the economy little chance of growing. The longer restructuring is put off, the more Greek debt will be owed to official lenders, whether other EU governments or the IMF—so the more taxpayers will eventually suffer.

The third objection to denial is that fears of contagion are growing, not receding. Early hopes that Greece alone might need a bail-out were dashed when Ireland and Portugal also sought help. The euro zone has tried to draw a line around these three relatively small economies. But the jitters of recent weeks have pushed Spain and even Italy back into the markets’ sights again. The belief that big euro-zone countries could be protected from attack has been disproved. Indeed, far from fears of contagion ebbing, the talk is of a Greek default as a “Lehman moment”: like the investment bank’s bankruptcy in September 2008, it might unexpectedly bring down many others and devastate the world economy.

While the EU’s leaders are trying to deny the need for default, a rising chorus is taking the opposite line. Greece should embrace default, walk away from its debts, abandon the euro and bring back the drachma (in a similar way to Britain leaving the gold standard in 1931 or Argentina dumping its currency board in 2001).

That option would be ruinous, both for Greece and for the EU. Even if capital controls were brought in, some Greek banks would go bust. The new drachma would plummet, making Greece’s debt burden even more onerous. Inflation would take off as import prices shot up and Greece had to print money to finance its deficit. The benefit from a weaker currency would be small: Greece’s exports make up a small slice of GDP. The country would still need external finance, but who would lend to it? And the contagion risk would be bigger than from restructuring alone: if Greece left, why not Portugal or even Spain and Italy? If the euro zone were to break up it would put huge pressure on the single market.

The third way

There is an alternative, for which this newspaper has long argued: an orderly restructuring of Greece’s debts, halving their value to around 80% of GDP. It would hardly be a shock to the markets, which have long expected a default (an important difference from Lehman). The banks that still hold a big chunk of the bonds are in better shape to absorb losses today than they were last year. Even if Greece’s debts were cut in half, the net loss would still represent an absorbable proportion of most European banks’ capital.

An orderly restructuring would be risky. Doing it now would crystallise losses for banks and taxpayers across Europe. Nor would it, by itself, right Greece. The country’s economy is in deep recession and it is running a primary budget deficit (ie, before interest payments). Even if Greece restructures its debt and embraces the reforms demanded by the EU and IMF, it will need outside support for some years. That is bound to bring more fiscal-policy control from Brussels, turning the euro zone into a more politically integrated club. Even if that need not mean a superstate with its own finance ministry, the EU’s leaders have not started to explain the likely ramifications of all this to voters. But at least Greece and the markets would have a plan with a chance of working.

No matter what fictions they concoct this week, the euro zone’s leaders will sooner or later face a choice between three options: massive transfers to Greece that would infuriate other Europeans; a disorderly default that destabilises markets and threatens the European project; or an orderly debt restructuring. This last option would entail a long period of external support for Greece, greater political union and a debate about the institutions Europe would then need. But it is the best way out for Greece and the euro. That option will not be available for much longer. Europe’s leaders must grab it while they can.

2010年4月1日 星期四

Devolving Volvo

Ford sells Volvo to Geely

For both buyer and seller, the deal is worth the risks

Mar 28th 2010 | From The Economist online

Reuters

IT TOOK more than a decade for Ford to create what it called its Premier Auto Group around a bunch of classy European brands—starting in 1987 with its purchase of Aston Martin, followed by the acquisitions of Jaguar, Volvo and then Land Rover. It all proved a terribly expensive distraction. Now, it has taken Ford three years of tricky negotiations to dismantle the group, selling the European marques at a considerable loss. Aston Martin went to a British-led consortium in 2007, Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) was snapped up by Tata of India in 2008 and, on March 28th, a deal was signed to sell Volvo to Geely, a small but vastly ambitious Chinese carmaker.

The sticker price is $1.8 billion, a fraction of the $6.45 billion that Ford paid for Volvo in 1999. The cost to Ford is worse even than those figures suggest: it has had to support the Swedish carmaker through years of losses and even now it faces further expenses associated with the sale to Geely that will eat up much of the meagre sum it is getting for Volvo.

Unstitching Ford and Volvo will take years

Over the years Volvo's design and production have been closely integrated with Ford's, so much so that it will take years to unstitch them. The sale agreement, which both sides hope to finalise in the third quarter of this year, includes a promise from Ford to continue providing Volvo with such things as engine and powertrain technology for the time being, just as it promised Tata that it would continue to support JLR.

When Geely's interest in Volvo was made public in the middle of last year, there were some doubts about whether Ford would want to take the risk of letting its technology and other intellectual property leak out to a fast-growing Chinese firm that could one day be a serious rival. The announcement of Volvo's sale says "safeguards" have been agreed to stop this happening. But it also says Volvo will be able to sublicense some of Ford's technology to others, including Geely.

Although Volvo represents only a small part of Ford's output, swallowing it will be a big challenge for Geely: last year it sold just 330,000 cars—most of them in China—which is about the same as Volvo sold worldwide. Unlike most big Chinese carmakers, Geely is privately owned and, in recent weeks there had been some doubts about whether it would get the financing needed for the purchase. However, those doubts were dispelled when Chinese state banks (and hence, it is assumed, the government in Beijing) said they would back it.
<< The line between state-owned and public owned companies becomes more blurred in this case as Geely is public owned with no government stake >>

Geely’s chairman and founder, Li Shufu, calls himself the Henry Ford of China. He and his managers like to talk big, promising to increase output to 2m vehicles by 2015. However, Mr Li's talk about entering the European market in 2007 and breaking into North America by the following year proved to have little substance.

The harsh truth is that most cross-border takeovers of carmakers have been disappointments (to name but a few, Daimler and Chrysler, BMW and Rover, and indeed Ford's purchase of Volvo and the other European marques). It will be a remarkable achievement for Geely if it bucks that trend. But for Volvo the deal has several attractions: it will gain access to China's rapidly growing car market; and, if Geely keeps its promises, it will retain its current management and its factories in Sweden and Belgium. Volvo, having lost so much money under Ford's wing, might do better under a more focused and autonomous management. If so, Geely will get a good return on its investment and a jump-start on entering the international market, as well as gaining an attractive range of premium-priced cars to sell at home.

Ford's focus

For Ford, its failed attempt to build a European-led range of premier marques has been a drain of both cash and management time. This is still true of Volvo, even though it is no longer doing as badly as it was in the depths of the economic downturn. Having struggled through the financial crisis without a government bail-out, Ford has the moral high ground over its archrivals, GM and Chrysler. But its noble abjuring of handouts has left it with a weaker balance-sheet than perhaps any of the world's top ten carmakers. The meagre proceeds from the Volvo sale will be little help in themselves, although at least Ford will earn profits from selling key parts to Volvo for the next few years, while being spared from having to pump investment into the Swedish firm. And at least it can say it has been more successful in its European divestments than GM, which struggled to offload Saab and decided in the end not to sell Opel.

Ford's management can now devote more time to greater priorities: rebuilding their core American market; and making progress on a strategy called "One Ford", under which all the company's models worldwide will be built on a small number of common platforms. Success on this is vital if Ford is to adapt to consumers' shift in tastes away from big gas-guzzlers toward smaller cars on which the profit margins are slender.

Unfortunately, the deal does little to solve the motor industry's biggest problem: growing overcapacity, especially in mature markets. Indeed, as with the JLR sale, Ford is handing production capacity to an ambitious emerging-market rival with plans to grow big in Ford's core rich-country markets. That said, neither Volvo nor JLR is big enough to matter much either way in denting Europe's overcapacity.

Perhaps a bigger worry for Ford should be the risk of intellectual property leaking out to Volvo's Chinese buyers. But this risk already exists in the joint ventures Ford has entered into in China with Chang'an, another Chinese manufacturer. Privately, Western motor-industry bosses assume that whatever safeguards have been agreed on paper, some of their technology will leak out to their Chinese business partners. But they see this as a part of the price for doing business in, and with, China. Given the vast growth potential of its market, it is assumed to be a price worth paying.

2010年1月4日 星期一

Japan's two lost decades - An end to the Japanese lesson

Dec 30th 2009
From The Economist print edition

Japan has taught the world a great deal about coping with the financial crisis. Now the West is on its own

Illustration by S. Kambayashi

“NEW Year rally expected on Tokyo market next week.” That was a typically boosterish Japanese newswire headline on December 29th 1989, the day that one of the world’s biggest ever asset-price bubbles reached bursting point. Exactly 20 years later the Japanese are still paying the price for such hubris (see article). The Nikkei 225 index, which peaked at 38,916, now languishes at just over one-quarter of that level (though once again there is talk of a New Year rally). Japan’s economy has barely grown in nominal terms after two “lost decades”, and is again suffering from deflation. Where Japan was once bearing down on America, it now feels the hot breath of China on its neck. Remember “Japan as Number One”? These days the country’s chief claim to fame is having a gross government debt burden approaching 200% of GDP.

For the Japanese this has all been deeply troubling. But in the past two years, as the Western world has faced many of the same problems that Japan has been grappling with since 1989 (the collapse of asset prices, a surge in distressed debt and a looming threat of deflation), Japan has provided some useful lessons on how governments should, and should not, tackle potentially systemic financial meltdowns.

Thanks to the precedent set by Japan, many of these lessons were quickly put into practice. Acting far more swiftly than the Japanese authorities did (the Japanese had the misfortune of having to learn through trial and error), Western policymakers provided liquidity to their banks and forced them to rebuild capital, while pumping in generous doses of fiscal stimulus to offset the collapse in private-sector demand. And like the Bank of Japan, they slashed interest rates and took extraordinary measures to try to keep credit flowing. The efficacy of these steps has led to growing optimism about the world economy.

So what is the Japanese lesson now? In many ways, the analogy is no longer terribly helpful. That is partly because the pupils are in a worse pickle than the teacher ever was. The most vulnerable countries, such as Greece, now face a risk that Japan never did: that markets will lose faith in their creditworthiness. Japan, for all its woes, has benefited from a huge pool of domestic savings and investors happier to keep their money at home than abroad. Meanwhile, the scale of the global upheaval makes Japan’s problems, which had little impact overseas and took place against a backdrop of global growth, look small by comparison. And with huge deficits in so many nations, the risk of a sudden loss of fiscal credibility is more acute than it ever was in Japan.

But there are other ways in which the pupils are in better shape. That is partly because they have less rigid systems. In the more adaptable Western economies there has been less resistance to structural changes in order to maintain productivity. There are also usually fewer political barriers to dealing with bad private-sector debts than there were in Japan. Moreover Westerners are also reaping the rewards of having acted more decisively than the Japanese did—especially when it came to pumping money into the economy and cleaning up financial balance-sheets. With fewer zombie banks, fewer signs of entrenched deflation and much earlier signs of growth, the West is in uncharted territory: it has arguably already got to a stage that Japan never really did.

Nothing more will I teach you today

That makes it very difficult to keep on drawing particular lessons from Japan’s sad plight. It does, however, still leave a general lesson common to all economic disasters: don’t be suckered by false signs of economic recovery. In Japan’s case, such hopes have led it repeatedly to tighten fiscal policy before private demand was strong enough to sustain a recovery. That entrenched deflation. Japan also left its banks too short of capital to cope with subsequent shocks.

Policymakers in the developed world still have an enormous task on their hands. Many banks have huge write-downs to make on their loans, economies are burdened with excess capacity and households’ debt levels remain high. It would be disastrous to tighten policy too soon, as Japan’s example shows. But Japan provides no useful guidance on when the right time would be. For that, there is only trial and error. And the more errors there are, the more the West’s next decade may look like Japan’s two lost ones.

2009年12月22日 星期二

Greece and the euro - Athenian dances

Dec 17th 2009From The Economist print edition

Urgent measures must be taken by the most profligate euro-area member of all

IN GREECE ouzo and olives have given way to debt and downgrades. The country stands out among post-Dubai sovereign risks for its bloated and corrupt public sector, and a budget deficit and public debt of almost 13% and 125% of GDP, respectively. Spreads on Greek government bonds over German Bunds have widened to more than 2.5 percentage points. Nor were investors impressed by this week’s promises by George Papandreou, the prime minister, to cut the deficit to under 3% by 2013. They noted an absence of detail, a heavy reliance on hoped-for new revenues and talk of public-sector pay rises in 2010—and, warned by a credit downgrade by Standard & Poor’s, pushed spreads wider still (see article).
By Greek standards Mr Papandreou has been courageous, but he should have been braver still. Ireland set the pace on December 9th by producing a budget that sharply cut public-sector wages. Mr Papandreou and his finance minister, George Papaconstantinou, talk up the need to balance fairness and social peace with fiscal austerity. But the socialist Pasok party won a big majority in October’s election, making it Greece’s strongest government in a generation. The opposition has an untested new leader. Mr Papandreou wants to avoid direct confrontation with his trade union supporters, but the need to re-establish fiscal credibility ought to have come first.
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To its credit, his government recognises that Greece’s ills go far beyond the public finances. Stuck in the euro, its economy has lost competitiveness. Too many Greeks are underemployed. Education, especially higher education, needs reform. Exacerbating these worries is the poor quality of Greece’s statistics. The previous government admitted that Greece had massaged its figures to qualify for the euro in 2001. The new one confessed that this year’s budget deficit had suddenly shot up from 6.7% to 12.7%. An independent statistics agency set up by Mr Papaconstantinou will help, but it will take years before the markets and Greece’s European Union partners trust its figures. That is one reason why Greece’s fellow euro-area members are so concerned. Their unspoken fear is that, unless the new government gets tougher and pushes through deep reforms, Greece could be on an inexorable path towards default.

Fearing Greeks bearing bonds
When the euro was born a decade ago, it came with central rules limiting budget deficits and banning bail-outs. Yet the rules, which theoretically included huge fines for excessive borrowing, were never likely to stick, and were soon emasculated by France and Germany. Worse, the financial markets came to assume that no euro-area country would ever be allowed to go bust: the EU and the European Central Bank would surely find some way to stand behind it.
It is true that, as Germany’s Angela Merkel has conceded, all euro-area countries have an interest in staving off a default. If Greece went under, the markets’ attention would quickly turn to other euro-area debtors like Spain, Ireland and Italy, and dent confidence in the euro itself. Yet no euro-area country wants to give its more profligate fellows the impression that their debts will be covered. The bond markets’ recent jumpiness suggests that investors, at least, are readier to believe that the strong might be willing to let the weak go under.
Good. The ban on bail-outs must remain credible, in the interests of all the euro members. Otherwise, the burden on the strong could become intolerable, and the weak would get feebler still. Investors are already nervous about Greece; if it finds an easier way out, its political leaders will never have the stomach for difficult choices. Hard times, unfortunately, demand harsh measures.

2009年12月21日 星期一

The world economy - The Great Stabilisation

Dec 17th 2009

From The Economist print edition

The recession was less calamitous than many feared. Its aftermath will be more dangerous than many expect

IT HAS become known as the “Great Recession”, the year in which the global economy suffered its deepest slump since the second world war. But an equally apt name would be the “Great Stabilisation”. For 2009 was extraordinary not just for how output fell, but for how a catastrophe was averted.

Twelve months ago, the panic sown by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers had pushed financial markets close to collapse. Global economic activity, from industrial production to foreign trade, was falling faster than in the early 1930s. This time, though, the decline was stemmed within months. Big emerging economies accelerated first and fastest. China’s output, which stalled but never fell, was growing by an annualised rate of some 17% in the second quarter. By mid-year the world’s big, rich economies (with the exception of Britain and Spain) had started to expand again. Only a few laggards, such as Latvia and Ireland, are now likely still to be in recession.

There has been a lot of collateral damage. Average unemployment across the OECD is almost 9%. In America, where the recession began much earlier, the jobless rate has doubled to 10%. In some places years of progress in poverty reduction have been undone as the poorest have been hit by the double whammy of weak economies and still-high food prices. But thanks to the resilience of big, populous economies such as China, India and Indonesia, the emerging world overall fared no worse in this downturn than in the 1991 recession. For many people on the planet, the Great Recession was not all that great.

That outcome was not inevitable. It was the result of the biggest, broadest and fastest government response in history. Teetering banks were wrapped in a multi-trillion-dollar cocoon of public cash and guarantees. Central banks slashed interest rates; the big ones dramatically expanded their balance-sheets. Governments worldwide embraced fiscal stimulus with gusto. This extraordinary activism helped to stem panic, prop up the financial system and counter the collapse in private demand. Despite claims to the contrary, the Great Recession could have been a Depression without it.

Stable but frail

So much for the good news. The bad news is that today’s stability, however welcome, is worryingly fragile, both because global demand is still dependent on government support and because public largesse has papered over old problems while creating new sources of volatility. Property prices are still falling in more places than they are rising, and, as this week’s nationalisation of Austria’s Hypo Group shows, banking stresses still persist. Apparent signs of success, such as American megabanks repaying public capital early (see article), make it easy to forget that the recovery still depends on government support. Strip out the temporary effects of firms’ restocking, and much of the rebound in global demand is thanks to the public purse, from the officially induced investment surge in China to stimulus-prompted spending in America. That is revving recovery in big emerging economies, while only staving off a relapse into recession in much of the rich world.

This divergence will persist. Demand in the rich world will remain weak, especially in countries with over-indebted households and broken banking systems. For all the talk of deleveraging, American households’ debt, relative to their income, is only slightly below its peak and some 30% above its level a decade ago. British and Spanish households have adjusted even less, so the odds of prolonged weakness in private spending are even greater. And as their public-debt burden rises, rich-world governments will find it increasingly difficult to borrow still more to compensate. The contrast with better-run emerging economies will sharpen. Investors are already worried about Greece defaulting (see article), but other members of the euro zone are also at risk. Even Britain and America could face sharply higher borrowing costs.

Big emerging economies face the opposite problem: the spectre of asset bubbles and other distortions as governments choose, or are forced, to keep financial conditions too loose for too long. China is a worry, thanks to the scale and composition of its stimulus. Liquidity is alarmingly abundant and the government’s refusal to allow the yuan to appreciate is hampering the economy’s shift towards consumption (see article). But loose monetary policy in the rich world makes it hard for emerging economies to tighten even if they want to, since that would suck in even more speculative foreign capital.

Walking a fine line

Whether the world economy moves smoothly from the Great Stabilisation to a sustainable recovery depends on how well these divergent challenges are met. Some of the remedies are obvious. A stronger yuan would accelerate the rebalancing of China’s economy while reducing the pressure on other emerging markets. Credible plans for medium-term fiscal cuts would reduce the risk of rising long-term interest rates in the rich world. But there are genuine trade-offs. Fiscal tightening now could kill the rich world’s recovery. And the monetary stance that makes sense for America’s domestic economy will add to the problems facing the emerging world.

That is why policymakers face huge technical difficulties in getting the exit strategies right. Worse, they must do so against a darkening political backdrop. As Britain’s tax on bank bonuses shows, fiscal policy in the rich world risks being driven by rising public fury at bankers and bail-outs. In America the independence of the Federal Reserve is under threat from Congress. And the politics of high unemployment means trade spats are becoming a bigger risk, especially with China.

Add all this up, and what do you get? Pessimists expect all kinds of shocks in 2010, from sovereign-debt crises (a Greek default?) to reckless protectionism (American tariffs against China’s “unfair” currency, say). More likely is a plethora of lesser problems, from sudden surges in bond yields (Britain before the election), to short-sighted fiscal decisions (a financial-transactions tax) to strikes over pay cuts (British Airways is a portent, see article). Small beer compared with the cataclysm of a year ago—but enough to temper the holiday cheer.

2009年12月16日 星期三

VW, GM and Peugeot-Citroën - Asian alliances

Dec 9th 2009From The Economist print edition
New ties for VW, GM and Peugeot-Citroën signal a way forward for the car industry

HAVING weathered the storm, the thoughts of global carmakers are now focused on the tie-ups they hope will give them an edge in the upturn. Two such deals, the first involving General Motors and its Chinese partner SAIC, the second between Volkswagen and Suzuki, have been concluded in the past few days. Another, linking PSA Peugeot-Citroën and Mitsubishi, is still under negotiation. All three are aimed at winning a bigger presence in Asia and tapping into low-cost manufacturing expertise, while sharing components and development budgets.
Of the three, the most significant is Volkswagen’s announcement on Wednesday December 9th that it has agreed to pay $2.5 billion for 19.9% of Suzuki, a family-owned Japanese maker of small cars and motorcycles. Along with Fiat, Suzuki is the only international outfit that knows how to make money out of small, inexpensive cars. That is something VW forgot long ago. But it needs to relearn it, argues Max Warburton of Bernstein, as asset-management firm, if it is not to suffer from the worldwide trend towards downsizing, as new emissions laws bite and growth shifts to poorer consumers in emerging markets.

The other thing Suzuki offers is unique exposure to emerging markets. Through its 54% stake in Maruti Suzuki, it has managed to keep more than 40% of the increasingly competitive Indian market. It also has a strong position in Pakistan and Indonesia, two other teeming countries with nascent car markets. VW, which is the market leader in China and has around a quarter of the Brazilian market, was uncharacteristically late setting out its stall in India, where it only began manufacturing this year. If the alliance blossoms, and VW ends up turning Suzuki into its 11th brand, it will have taken a big step towards its long-term goal of overtaking Toyota as the world’s biggest car firm.
The deal between GM and SAIC to set up a 50:50 joint venture to produce small cars in India, announced on December 4th, is another sign of the times. GM will contribute the factories and distribution network it already owns in India; SAIC will invest up to $350m in cash and other assets. The plan gives China’s biggest carmaker a foothold in the second-fastest-growing car market in the world (after China), while helping cash-strapped GM to mount a more vigorous push into India, where it has struggled for several years to reach its target of a 10% market share. GM and SAIC are also intending to bring to India the ultra-cheap micro-cars, minivans and pickups they make with another Chinese partner, Wuling.
At the same time, GM said that it was ceding control of its successful joint venture with SAIC in China by selling a 1% stake to the Chinese firm for $85m. With a 51% shareholding , SAIC will have the right to approve budgets and all senior appointments. Nick Reilly, the architect of GM’s Asian strategy who was recently appointed boss of Opel/Vauxhall, insisted that the sale was merely a technicality to allow SAIC to consolidate its earnings from the venture. Some observers interpret it as the price for getting SAIC’s help in India. Others detect the beginning of a trend whereby Chinese car manufacturers will assert greater authority over their Western and Japanese partners. Mr Reilly merely said that GM had agreed in order to get SAIC’s “full co-operation and the full co-operation of the Chinese government in other things.”
PSA’s negotiations to buy between 30% and 50% of Mitsubishi, which has several times been close to bankruptcy and is still carrying a heavy burden of debt, have some way to go. The two firms have had ties for several years: Peugeot and Citroën sell a rebranded version of Mitsubishi’s Outlander crossover (somewhere between a car and an SUV) and PSA shares a factory with Mitsubishi in Russia. Mitsubishi, with its presence in Asia and its network of factories and dealers in America, could help the French group reduce its reliance on Europe. But cultural clashes have bedevilled such cross-border deals in the past. And PSA, whose automotive business has junk-rated debts of $3 billion, may have difficulty finding the $3.5-4 billion that a 50% stake in the Japanese firm is likely to cost.

Banks and small businesses - For want of a loan

Dec 10th 2009 WASHINGTON, DCFrom The Economist print edition
America’s best job creators are being hit by a credit crunch

IT IS basically a second stimulus, though no one wants to call it that. On December 8th President Barack Obama announced a set of proposals to address unemployment and made it clear that he wanted to use some of the unspent TARP funds (money set aside to support failing banks) to help pay for them. No precise figure was given. Some $50 billion will be spent on infrastructure projects; there will also be new rebates for home insulation and other energy-saving incentives. But the linchpin of the administration’s effort is a broad push to support small businesses.

That sounds reasonable. Small businesses (firms employing 500 workers or fewer) have accounted for 64% of net new job creation over the past 15 years, according to the Small Business Administration (SBA), an independent government agency. And a recent economic study found that cities with more small firms have done better at creating jobs over the past 20 years. But America’s most recent recession has hit small businesses hard. The very small, with fewer than 50 workers—employing almost one-third of working Americans—have suffered around 45% of the job losses of the downturn.
Unfortunately, helping small businesses has not proved easy. The stimulus package passed last spring offered tax benefits, including capital-gains tax exemptions and increases in the amount of business expenses that could be claimed for tax purposes. The bill also targeted the flow of credit to small businesses. Money was set aside to cut fees and provide guarantees for major SBA lending programmes. The results were disappointing. Although lack of access to credit inflicted huge damage on small businesses last autumn, lending (or lack of it) has not been the main problem for most of 2009. Rather, it was the weak economy that devastated profits and loan demand (see chart).
That is now changing. As economic activity has picked up, so has demand for small-business loans—so much so that remaining stimulus funds ran dry in November. Small firms are being hit by a credit crunch. Two common sources of financing, credit-card debt and home-equity credit, have become less useful; months of poor economic conditions have eroded credit-worthiness, while the housing bust has left a quarter of mortgage borrowers with negative equity. Smaller regional banks have long been a third option, but the looming commercial-property bust is diminishing their usefulness.
That bust may not cause the financial panic that rotten home loans did. But nearly 40% of outstanding small-business loans are held by banks with the greatest exposure to commercial-property risk. In 1993, the figure was only 11%. As commercial-property losses grow, banks will be forced to curtail lending.
Will Mr Obama’s latest ideas help? Most are extensions to current stimulus measures. The one exception is a new small-business tax cut for job creation, details of which have not yet been released. Mr Obama intends to provide a booster to the SBA loan programmes, offering more money to cover fee reductions and SBA guarantees for small-business loans made by commercial banks. All this is good. But lending is the chief problem. If regional banks are fighting to survive, lower fees will not be enough to get small-business finance flowing again. Ironically, it might have been better to use some of that TARP money for the banks after all.

When good news is bad news

Dec 10th 2009From The Economist print edition
A foretaste of a new phase in the markets
Illustration by S. Kambayashi


IT IS better to travel hopefully than to arrive. For weeks data on the American economy had been patchy, indicating a spluttering recovery. Unemployment in particular continued to rise, hitting 10.2% in October. Have patience, said the optimists. Unemployment is a lagging indicator. Sure enough, on December 4th the non-farm payrolls data for November showed a fall of 11,000 jobs, a far smaller figure than expected. The last jigsaw-piece of recovery had slotted into place.
You might have expected the stockmarket to rebound sharply on the news. After all, a rise in employment can make the recovery self-sustaining. Workers will buy goods, making the corporate sector expand production and take on more employees. The economy can be less dependent on ad hoc government schemes like “cash for clunkers”. But the Dow Jones Industrial Average eked out a mere 22-point gain on the day of the announcement.

Admittedly the data were not uniformly bullish. One reason why the headline unemployment rate fell to 10% last month was because discouraged workers dropped out of the numbers since they were no longer looking for a job. Nevertheless, increases in hours worked and temporary employment suggested the improving trend will continue.
This may have been another case of “buy the rumour, sell the fact”. Stockmarkets have been rallying since March on anticipation that the global economy would recover. Now the news is confirmed, some investors may have decided it was time to take a profit. As with the stockmarket wobbles caused by Dubai’s debt problems, traders may have decided this was the right moment to close their books for the holidays.
After all, one of the main motors of the rally has been near-zero interest rates in the rich economies. These have driven investors out of cash and into riskier assets, including corporate bonds and equities. But the justification for such low rates has been the fragile state of the economy. Proof of a recovery will bring forward the day when easy money is withdrawn. Indeed, after the news, markets moved to price in the first Federal Reserve rate hike in June 2010 (even though Ben Bernanke, the Fed chairman, later spoke of the “headwinds” facing the American economy).
Higher rates are not the only implication of a better employment market. David Rosenberg, a strategist at Gluskin Sheff, a Canadian asset-management firm, adds that the stockmarket may have become used to treating negative employment news as positive for corporate costs and profit margins. If companies start hiring workers again, these productivity gains may slow.
Investors may also begin to worry more about the strain on government finances that has been imposed by the crisis. A report from Moody’s, a rating agency, this week described the American and British public finances as “resilient”, rather than the more solid “resistant” categorisation afforded to Canada and Germany. Continuation of America’s and Britain’s AAA ratings depends on credible fiscal consolidation. Greece was downgraded on December 8th by Fitch, a rival rating agency, from A- to BBB+, prompting falls in Greek shares and government bonds.
If 2008 was the year of the banking meltdown, then 2009 was the year of the stimulus packages. In contrast, 2010 may be the year of the exit strategies, in which investors have to contemplate what economic (and market) fundamentals look like without massive government support. Many countries may have hoped to get through 2010 without withdrawing that support but markets could force them into action, by pressuring either their bonds or their currencies.
The immediate aftermath of the payrolls data may have offered a brief glimpse of that future. The dollar rose. This could have been due to the anticipation of higher interest rates giving the currency yield support in 2010, or it may have been due to the inverse relationship between the dollar and risky assets this year. Investors have been borrowing in dollars to buy higher-yielding assets.
Meanwhile gold fell in response to the payrolls news. This makes little sense if gold is supposed to act as a hedge against rising inflation: evidence of a stronger economy should make bullion rise, not fall. But it makes perfect sense if you see gold as an alternative currency to the dollar, rising when the greenback declines and vice versa.
Gold’s fall could be an omen in another way, too. During the rally, almost all assets rose in tandem. During 2010 there may be a lot more differentiation.

2009年12月9日 星期三

British public finances - Tax and mend

Dec 9th 2009From Economist.com

Taxes rise in Britain, as the government struggles to get public finances in order
SINCE Alistair Darling took over as Britain's chancellor of the exchequer (finance minister) in June 2007, he has presented three big end-of-year fiscal statements. They go by the snappy name of a “pre-budget report” and are in effect mini-budgets. The previous two were showstoppers. The one he presented on Wednesday December 9th mattered for what it revealed about Labour’s priorities in dealing with Britain’s huge budget deficit.
The first statement, delivered shortly after Mr Brown had abandoned a plan to hold a snap general election, was notable for some flagrant clothes-pinching from the Conservative opposition, with an effective doubling in the tax-free limit on inheritance tax and a levy on people living in Britain but claiming “non-domiciled” tax status. The second, in 2008, was more momentous, for it owned up to the startling deterioration in the public finances, even though its forecasts were soon overtaken by even worse ones in the full budget in April this year.
Thankfully this time, Mr Darling did not have to announce another big downward revision to growth or an upward revision to public borrowing. The Treasury expects the economy to shrink by 4.75% this year (which nonetheless compares badly with its forecast for a contraction of 3.5% in April). But it still expects the economy to expand by 1.25% in 2010, and indeed to emerge from recession in the final quarter of this year. And the chancellor is sticking to his prediction of 3.5% GDP growth in 2011, which was heavily criticised as over-optimistic this spring. He expects the economy to carry on growing at this pace in 2012.
Nor did Mr Darling have to own up to yet another deterioration in the borrowing numbers, which was just as well given how terrible they are. A year ago he said that the deficit expected in 2009-10 would soar from £38 billion ($62 billion) to £118 billion. That was revised up again in the April budget to an even more breathtaking £175 billion. But on Wednesday the chancellor raised that just to £178 billion, equal to 12.6% of GDP.
Mr Darling has also stuck broadly to his plan to bring the public finances back into balance, first set out a year ago and then made tougher in the budget. That plan will build up to a fiscal consolidation worth around 3% of GDP in 2013-14. As before he expects the deficit to fall to 5.5% of GDP by then.
Despite this broad continuity, Mr Darling has used the pre-budget report to draw sharp political dividing lines ahead of the general election, which must be held by early June. As expected, he announced a windfall tax on bank bonuses, which may reap £550m this year. He will also freeze the threshold at which taxpayers become liable to pay income tax at 40% in 2012-13. But most important, changes to national-insurance contributions will raise an extra £3 billion in 2011-12.
With the help of these tax increases (and aided by some smallish improvements in expected deficits), Mr Darling will find an extra £7.7 billion for spending in 2011 and almost £7 billion in 2012-13 without changing his overall forecasts for borrowing. That enabled him to pledge that in real terms almost all the NHS budget would be shielded from cuts in 2011-12 and 2012-13 while spending on schools would rise. He backed that up with a tough sounding commitment to cap pay increases in the public sector in those two years at 1%.
The pre-budget report–which was dubbed the pre-election report by George Osborne, the chancellor’s opposite number–aims to depict Labour as the defender of public services and prepared to biff banks which pay big bonuses. But it also shows a government unwilling to reduce the deficit as fast as the markets would like. Even before his statement, the government had been criticised for failing to set out a big enough fiscal consolidation. Mr Darling may succeed in appealing to Labour’s core voters but the government risks exhausting the tolerance of the investors who are financing Britain’s big deficit.

2009年12月1日 星期二

US health-care reform - Proceed with caution

Nov 23rd 2009
From Economist.com
A health-care reform bill gets to the floor of the Senate. A rowdy debate will follow

DEMOCRATS in the Senate defeated a Republican attempt to block their health-care bill on Saturday November 21st, just days after Harry Reid, the Senate majority leader, unveiled the long-awaited legislation, which amalgamates proposals from various Senate committees. Republicans tried, with a filibuster, to stop the measure from even proceeding to the floor, providing an early test of Democratic resolve. To get the 60 votes he needed, Mr Reid had to cajole three wavering Democrats—Mary Landrieu of Louisiana, Blanche Lincoln of Arkansas and Ben Nelson of Nebraska—and their support came at a price. Republicans are calling an extra $100m doled out in federal money for Ms Landrieu's state “the Louisiana purchase”. All three have since pointed out that a final “yea” is far from certain.
The Senate bill is similar in scope to the measure passed by the House of Representatives on November 7th, although there are differences. The Senate bill, for instance, relies much more on expanding Medicaid, the system of provision for the poor. As in the House, the Senate legislation creates insurance “exchanges” and a government-run insurance scheme that would compete with private plans, but it allows for states to opt out. Ms Landrieu and others would like to go further and adopt a “trigger” that would implement a public plan in five years, but only if private plans are no more affordable by then. Joe Lieberman, an independent Democrat, has insisted he will vote against any final bill that contains a public option “as a matter of conscience”.
The Senate bill would raise the payroll tax for Medicare paid by the wealthiest Americans from 1.45% to 1.95%, put a tax on “Cadillac” insurance plans (the most expensive policies) and levy a 5% charge on non-essential cosmetic surgery. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the bill would cost $848 billion, less than the $1 trillion price-tag it attached to the House bill, and would yield a net reduction to the federal deficit of $130 billion between 2010 and 2019. On Friday the CBO revised its earlier estimate of the House bill and forecast that it would cut $138 billion from the deficit, rather than the $109 billion it estimated two weeks ago.
Republicans insist that the health reforms would end up costing more. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, a former director of the CBO and an adviser to John McCain, told Congress recently that every “budget gimmick” in the book is being used to dampen the estimated fiscal damage: “leave out inconvenient spending, back-load spending to disguise the true scale, front-load taxes, let inflation push up tax revenues, promise spending cuts that have never materialised…the list goes on.”
Republicans will use his words to chip away at hesitant Democrats when the Senate debate begins after Thanksgiving. Polls show that Americans are becoming more wary of increased government spending, and do not think current proposals are helping. Conservatives are preparing for a rowdy fight in the Senate and millions of dollars are being spent on advertising in the states of wavering Democrats. Conservative groups are shrill in their contention that health care will be rationed. They have sought to link the debate about government “interference” in health to recent controversial advice from a quasi-governmental panel that said women should delay having a mammogram until into their 50s, reversing long-standing guidance that they are screened for cancer in their 40s. Another contentious issue will be abortion, as the Senate bill does not include the amendments to restrict the procedure that were inserted into the House bill.
The Senate debate is likely to last until Christmas, at least. Mr Reid stresses that “the road ahead is a long stretch”. It is hard to say how much the legislation will change during that time, but amendments are bound to come. Some think it will compare to the debate in the 1960s when civil-rights legislation was passed, with senators arguing about the essence of the American republic. Whether they reach that standard, and whether Mr Reid will be able to give Barack Obama an early Christmas present, will become clearer after the Thanksgiving turkeys have been digested.

Deflation in Japan - The curse of defeatism

Nov 26th 2009From The Economist print edition
Anybody who thinks deflation is no longer a threat should look at Japan and its flailing authorities


JUDGING by the shrill comments from Wall Street, Japan’s biggest problem is its huge public-sector debt, which has grown to nearly twice the size of the country’s GDP. But it isn’t (see
article). Far more pressing is deflation.
On November 20th the new government of Yukio Hatoyama acknowledged what has been obvious for months: that prices are falling again after a three-year hiatus. This is worrying not just for Japan; countries such as America and Britain have more similarities with Japan than is commonly acknowledged (see
article). Sadly neither the Hatoyama administration nor the central bank has shown any intention of tackling the latest incarnation of the deflationary curse.
That is a grave miscalculation. Prices in Japan may not yet be in a downward spiral, but deflation is entrenched: even the Bank of Japan (BoJ) acknowledges that prices may fall for at least another two years. The more they do so, the bigger the burden of Japan’s debt becomes, and the more households and firms are likely to retrench. As it is, high real interest rates act as a powerful brake on Japan’s incipient recovery.
Japan may have muddled through such scares before, most recently after a five-year splurge of liquidity unleashed by the BoJ between 2001-06. There may be some complacency that because deflation did not spiral downwards then, it will not do so this time. But a few years ago the world economy was strong and Japan could export its way back to health. This time around, global conditions are weaker and the yen is one of the world’s strongest currencies. It is a credit to Japan’s exporters that they are doing well despite such conditions. Largely thanks to them, Japan’s economy jumped forward in the third quarter, though there are already signs that the pace of recovery may be slowing. But to nail deflation once and for all, bolder steps by monetary and fiscal authorities are needed.
The BoJ can start by being more assertive. It is almost as if it is so exasperated by the flaky achievements of its previous anti-deflationary efforts that it would rather sit back and wait for a recovery. But that is a defeatist attitude. If nothing else, it should publicly revive discussion of alternative plans to reflate the economy. That could include increasing government-bond purchases, or setting itself a monetary target not just based on a positive inflation rate, but on robust growth of nominal GDP. If the recovery falters, the BoJ could go further, exploring the use of negative interest rates on bank balances, which would encourage banks to lend money rather than hoarding it at the central bank. Such extraordinary measures would almost inevitably lead to a weaker yen, which would irritate Japan’s trading partners. But Japan cannot get out of the deflationary mess if the yen keeps strengthening.
Mr Hatoyama’s administration, meanwhile, should stop pestering the BoJ about deflation and face up to its own responsibilities. In the short run that includes keeping fiscal-easing measures in place, at least until there is less deflationary slack in the economy. (So far the government has prevaricated about the need for continued fiscal stimulus.) In the longer term, it should strive to raise Japan’s trend rate of growth, which many reckon has fallen to about 1% a year from 1.5-2% previously, as the population shrinks.
That means boosting productivity through labour-market reform, immigration policies and free trade, none of which the ruling Democratic Party of Japan has been keen on so far. Its goal of prompting growth in the underachieving domestic side of Japan’s economy is a fine one, and certainly there is room for huge productivity improvements in some areas, particularly agriculture. But that should not come at the cost of harming exporters, which the DPJ has myopically threatened to constrain through union-friendly wage controls.
Big bang-bang
In short, Japan needs a double-barrelled big bang to jolt its economy back to life. If that threatens to spook investors, the authorities should have up their sleeve a credible long-term plan to restore order to public finances—but one which should be put in place only when growth is on a firmer footing and deflation has been truly licked. If the consequence of all this additional stimulus is a weaker yen, so be it. It will be a small price to pay if the eventual result is more openness and buoyancy in one of the world’s largest economies.

Parallels between Japan and the West - Same chords, different tune

Nov 26th 2009 WASHINGTON, DCFrom The Economist print edition
There are enough similarities to worry


FOR policymakers in the rich world, Japan’s plight is the stuff of nightmares. The damage from the early 1990s property and banking bust lingered for years, devastating the government’s finances and, eventually, enveloping the economy in deflation. The effects are still visible.
Small wonder, then, that a desire to avoid Japan’s experience has shaped other governments’ responses to the financial crash. Their reactions, from the speed and scale with which central banks reached for unconventional monetary tools to the focus (at least rhetorically) on fixing the banking mess, all contrast with the tentative initial response to Japan’s bust. But will that be enough? Close inspection suggests that, from America to Britain, worrying similarities with Japan remain. And on some counts today’s post-bubble policy challenges are more complex than anything Japanese policymakers ever faced.
Macroeconomically, the main parallel is the massive shift in private and government saving. Japan’s asset bust left a gaping hole in corporate balance-sheets. As firms spent years paying down debt, the economy had to be supported by a large and persistent increase in government borrowing (see chart). On average, Japan’s government has run a structural fiscal deficit of more than 5% of potential GDP every year since 1993.
The precise contours of the balance-sheet mess are different today: in America, Britain and other post-bubble economies, households have the biggest holes to fill. But the private sector’s adjustment has been even more wrenching, with a dramatic shift to surplus mirrored—as in Japan—by a huge increase in public borrowing. And it is far from finished. Even if household balance-sheets are repaired at warp speed, today’s post-bubble economies will probably need support from big budget deficits for several years yet.
Faster balance-sheet adjustment also risks a steeper downturn. Despite massive stimulus, today’s recessions have been deeper than the aftermath of Japan’s bubble. Jobless rates and the amount of slack in the economy are higher, which raises deflationary pressure even as central banks have turned on the monetary spigots. The OECD’s latest Economic Outlook estimates America’s output gap, the difference between actual and potential GDP, at almost 5% and Britain’s at over 6%, both larger than Japan’s. And America’s 10.2% jobless rate is arguably an underestimate of labour slack. A broader measure, including underemployed workers, has reached almost 18%.
With so much spare capacity, deflation remains a risk even as economies stop shrinking. Although consumers’ inflation expectations are stable, professional forecasters now expect slower price growth. According to a survey by the Philadelphia Federal Reserve, forecasters’ estimates of ten-year inflation rates have declined, to 2.26% today from 2.5% three months ago.
Optimists point out that Japan made many mistakes, not least the time it took to clean up its banking system. But some of those errors are being repeated today. For all the hoopla about stress tests and financial restructuring, the real strategy in most post-bubble economies is to allow banks to grow their way out trouble gradually, by making fat profits on the back of free central-bank cash. Many impaired assets remain on their books. The result is a dysfunctional banking system, with credit shrinking thanks to lack of supply as well as lack of demand. Latest figures from America’s Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) suggest that banks’ loan balances fell by 2.8% between July and September, the biggest drop on record. A haul of 552 banks, or 7% of the total, are now on the FDIC’s problem list. Britain’s bank lending to non-financial firms continued to fall in October.
In America the consequences of this credit crunch are being mitigated, at least for large firms, by the ability to tap the bond market. Gross bond issuance by non-financial firms is running at 55% above its ten-year average. In Britain, too, companies have turned to bond markets in greater numbers but there is less capacity. The capitalization of Britain’s private-sector bond market is the equivalent of 16% of GDP, compared with 120% in America and a G7 average of 50%. As Adam Posen, an external member of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee, recently observed, Britain’s dependence on a few big troubled banks marks an “uncomfortable parallel” with Japan in the 1990s.
There are plenty of differences, too. Japan’s bust was bigger (its banks’ stock of non-performing loans reached 35% of GDP, well above the gloomiest forecasts today). Its macroeconomic adjustment was complicated by a shrinking population. But for years Japan had the advantage of being the only big country in trouble. Today more balance-sheets need repair, the prospects for export-led growth are dimmer, and the increases in public debt will be broader. More broken nights beckon.