炒銅鐵也許是錯

稀土價格下跌令LED燈成本趨降，雷士照明（2222）昨日的一個盈喜公告，令到一眾節能燈股「生猛」起來，可見經濟一環扣一環，反觀工業用金屬價格在一片衰退疑慮中前景未明，增添投資風險，純綷因美滙轉弱理由欠充分。

一些稀有金屬股上市之初憑着突出賣點，備受投資者注目，但其用途及供求關係往往異常複雜，非一般投資者所能理解。辛思維記得，當洛陽鉬業（3993）上市之初，無人認識該股業務及其金屬用途，一名報章專欄作家從招股書中抄了幾句鉬（Molybdenum）的用途，被市場認為見解卓絕，驚為天人，有電台訪問這位作家及詳細分析這隻股票，可見認識「鉬」這種金屬的人實在少數。敢問閣下又知不知道鉬的用途呢？

全球鎢金屬需求下降

昨日談過金、銀兩類受投資需求影響的貴重金屬，今日想與讀者談談工業用金屬，就近日的市況發展而言，工業金屬同時受到利好及不利因素時影響，雖然美元貶值令到所有金屬兌美元具備升值因素，但環球經濟放緩卻在扯工業金屬的「後腳」，限制了金屬價格的上升動力。

至於談及中國的金屬生產情況，就知道銅鐵涉及投資的影響因素多，與美元走勢的關係其實很微。再說，科技不斷進步，令到部分工業金屬的供求出現劇烈變化，好像節能的LED燈不斷取代鎢絲燈泡，便令到全球對鎢金屬的需求降低，鎢礦經營者反而是受害者。

銅原料投資前景悲觀

工業用的金屬中，始終以銅、鋁的投資者較多，兩者價格走勢也不同程度地受到經濟衰退所左右。辛思維最近看過的行業報告中，對銅的前景大多抱悲觀的看法，至於鋁材方面，報告則指供應偏緊，未來三個月鋁價可來個反彈。

里昂分析員David Murphy指出，下游銅類產品於7月份的需求正在減少之中，該行的銅產品訂單指數顯示，銅原料訂單按月下跌，指數跌至50中軸之下，反映銅原料需求按月下跌。細項統計資料揭示，7月份來自房地產、汽車、電子產品業的訂單均按年減少【圖】，反映需求的勢頭未轉好，銅價雖跌，但前景只屬中性。

鋁材方面，供應緊張是驅動價格的一個重要因素。里昂統計下游生產商的數據顯示，7月份下游鋁材的訂單指數在50附近徘徊，來自房地產、機械、電子產品、家庭用品和包裝的分類，訂單卻有所上升，加上受到限制的供應，鋁價在未來三個月應有一番新氣象。

名家踢爆美狂印銀紙真相

坊間仍對美元的信用議論紛紛之際，辛思維想起有兩位名家對美元的走向頗具預知能力。其中一個是諾貝爾經濟學獎得主、著名經濟學者佛利民（Milton Friedman），另一位是《貸幣戰爭》作者宋鴻兵，後者最近更為經濟把脈，認為美元弱勢難改，着投資者買白銀對抗風險。

佛利民的貨幣理論揚名天下，對於美元的貨幣手法亦有深刻見解，佛老是少數在金融海嘯前便指出美國財政部購買債券的行為，實際是增加貨幣供應的掩眼法。

佛利民在《貨幣的禍害──貨幣史片段》早提到，在金本位制度瓦解後，本身貨幣並沒有資產抵押，所抱者是大家對美國政府的信任。佛老亦在書中提到，美國通過公開市場操作，以美國政府內不同部門名義發行和購買債券，只需在兩者賬目中加上一些會計處理，便能從零變出銀紙。

美國在金融海嘯後推出的QE1及QE2，正是美國容易地增加貨幣供應後，以會計賬印銀紙的又一演繹。雖然佛老成名已久，但在美元危機出現前，大部分投資者對佛老的警告置若罔聞，如今的走勢證明佛老的分析準確。

白銀魅力大增

宋鴻兵在《貨幣戰爭》中，對於美國亂印銀紙這一時弊提出深刻的針砭。他預言美國前總統尼克遜於1972年完全取消金本位制度後，美鈔將過量發行，令美元陷入危機。最近他接受香港一家電台訪問時提到，在如今風起雲湧之際，正是擁抱黃金的時候。

與佛老的著作相似的是，宋鴻兵亦從歐美貨幣史的角度入手，帶出歐美貨幣體系由金本位或金銀複本位制開始，過渡至講過信字的貨幣制度，令美國政府有過度印鈔的傾向，最終埋下美元貶值的伏線。

宋鴻兵指出，長遠來看，白銀和黃金一樣，都是老百姓維持家產配置中不可缺少的部分，並認為黃金白銀又名「金銀細軟」，就是一旦發生什麼變故時可以背着就跑，在資產配置中有重要地位。

坊間不少市場人士認為，白銀的市場小，作工業用途的形象濃厚，將不如黃金般熱炒，宋鴻兵卻呼籲大家把眼光重新放在2001至2010年這十年，白銀的市場回報率達900%，高於股票。

宋指出，黃金對白銀相對歷史價位為1比16，現處於1比40左右，相對價格仍屬偏低，引發上升動力。

QE2完 美釋油儲 商品受壓 《巴隆氏》建議看淡能源股

第二季本周結束，聯儲局的第二輪量寬措施（QE2）亦會結束。財經雜誌《巴隆氏》（Barron's）認為，這意味美元拆倉，加上國際能源組織（IEA）釋出石油儲備，勢令商品下跌，認為投資者應看淡能源股及相關投資。

《巴隆氏》表示，投資者開始退出近來最多人參與的投資活動─沽美元、買商品，因為聯儲局主席貝南奇（Ben Bernanke）上周表明QE2如期6月30日結束。

該雜誌因此認為拋售商品的時機成熟，而且IEA和美國政府釋放6000萬桶石油儲備，意味美國決心降低油價。

基金經理看淡澳股

《巴隆氏》認為，沽空SPDR能源指數基金，甚至沽空這個交易所交易基金（ETF）的主要成分股、油企埃克森美孚（Exxon Mobil）和雪佛龍（Chevron），都可升值。同時，部分基金經理正利用QE2結束的消息投資，買入iShares MSCI澳洲指數基金（EWA）的認沽期權，因為澳洲經濟主要靠商品。

Ciovacco Capital Management投資總監喬瓦科（Chris Ciovacco）表示，聯儲局看來想等到資產價格再次下跌，然後才推出額外刺激措施，意味投資者未來數周需採取守勢。

但他說，聯儲局不排除QE3的可能，意味由聯儲局引發的對沖通脹資產價格升浪未來數月或再出現。

美股主要支持位 好淡友角力

標準普爾500指數上周跌0.2%，是過去八周以來第七周一跌，道瓊斯工業平均指數跌0.6%，但納斯特綜合指數升1.4%。標普500本季勢將下跌，離200天移動平均水平1263.47只有5點左右，好淡友本周預料在這個主要技術支持位角力。

QE2結束，美國經濟轉弱，希臘問題不明朗，都不利美股，但美股本周仍有利好因素，好友或伺機反撲。基金經理需要粉飾櫥窗，或要買入表現好的股份。

Cantor Fitzgerald策略師帕度（Marc Pado）說，標普500現在下試200天平均水平，時機太巧合，因為美企下月中開始公布業績，預料可刺激美股上揚，美股屆時便鞏固了一個技術支持位。

HighMark Capital Management投資總監戈爾茲（David Goerz）說，本周最重要的數據是製造業數據，包括周四的6月份芝加哥採購經理指數（PMI）和周五的6月份供應管理學會（ISM）製造業指數，數據可讓投資者知道，過去幾個月製造業放緩是否日本地震引發的臨時現象。

Commodity Prices and the Mistake of 1937: Would Modern Economists Make the Same Mistake?

Gauti Eggertsson

In 1937, on the eve of a major policy mistake, U.S. economic conditions were surprisingly similar to those in the nation today. Consider, for example, the following summary of economic conditions: (1) Signs indicate that the recession is finally over. (2) Short-term interest rates have been close to zero for years but are now expected to rise. (3) Some are concerned about excessive inflation. (4) Inflation concerns are partly driven by a large expansion in the monetary base in recent years and by banks’ massive holding of excess reserves. (5) Furthermore, some are worried that the recent rally in commodity prices threatens to ignite an inflation spiral.

While this summary arguably describes current trends, it is taken from an account of conditions in 1937 that appears in “The Mistake of 1937: A General Equilibrium Analysis,” an article I coauthored with Benjamin Pugsley. What we call “the Mistake of 1937” was, in broad terms, a decision by the Fed and the administration to implement a series of contractionary policies that choked off the recovery of 1933-37 and brought on the recession of 1937-38, one of the worst on record. What is particularly noteworthy is that the inflation fears that triggered the Mistake of 1937 were largely driven by a rally in commodity prices. These circumstances invite direct comparison with our own time, when a substantial recent rise in commodity prices (which now seems to be abating somewhat) stoked inflation fears and led some commentators to call for an increase in the federal funds rate.

The question for the contemporary reader is this: If we could transport a modern-day economist back to 1937, would he or she have made the same mistake? My suggested answer—admittedly somewhat hopeful—is no. I base this view on the fact that most economists today distinguish between the temporary movements in the consumer price index that stem from volatility in commodity prices and the movements that reflect fundamental inflation pressures. Hence a modern economist most likely would have identified the price rise in 1936 and 1937 as a temporary upswing in commodity prices that did not signal a significant increase in overall inflation.


The Mistake and Its Consequences

The Mistake of 1937 was a preemptive policy tightening in a fragile economic environment. Specifically, it was a decision to abandon the policy of “reflation” introduced in 1933. After prices tumbled during the 1929-33 depression, the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) and the Federal Reserve made a commitment to increase the price level to pre-depression levels. (For more on this key initiative of the 1933-37 recovery period, see my article in the American Economic Review, “Great Expectations and the End of the Depression.”) The reflation policy was backed by an aggressive increase in government spending, the maintenance of large deficits, the abandonment of the gold standard, and monetary easing. If we accept the account of modern macroeconomic models, this reflationary policy mix can be very expansionary once the short-term interest rate is constrained at zero (as it was at the time). Why? Because at zero interest rates, if people start expecting that prices will rise instead of continuing to fall, the real rate of interest—a critical determinant of aggregate spending—turns from positive to negative. Thus, it becomes economical to spend money rather than save it. A further benefit of reflation is that it can repair balance sheets of overleveraged households and firms, a point explained in more detail in my recent paper with Paul Krugman, “Debt, Deleveraging, and the Liquidity Trap.”

The Mistake of 1937 was to relinquish the benefits of reflation and to set all policy levers in reverse. The Fed and key administration officials hinted at interest rate hikes and endorsed austerity in fiscal policy; the key concern now was containing inflation rather than sustaining recovery.

The effects of this policy reversal on prices and production are evident in the charts below. The top chart tracks the consumer price index (CPI) and the wholesale price index (WPI) over the period 1927-41, while the bottom chart plots the movements in industrial production over the same period. In both charts, the first vertical line marks the point at which FDR became president and announced a policy of reflation, while the second vertical line marks the Mistake of 1937. What we see in the top chart is that at the time in 1937 when the administration started warning that inflation was too high, the price level had not yet reached the pre-depression levels that had previously been the administration’s goal. Following this policy reversal, both prices and industrial production tumbled. The line indicating the “reversal of 1938” marks the point when the administration recommitted to inflating the price level to pre-depression levels. Significantly, this renewed commitment was followed by robust growth, as the bottom chart makes clear.










The Role of Commodity Prices

What prompted the inflation fears that led to the tightening of policy in 1937? A rally in commodity prices was largely responsible for triggering the concerns about inflation. As the chart below shows, prices of several commodities more than doubled in the span of only one year. These price increases led many policymakers to express concern about excessive inflation, as my paper with Pugsley documents.






It is unlikely, however, that a modern economist put in the same position would respond to the commodity price rise in the same way. Economists today generally do not focus on commodity prices without regard to the behavior of the aggregate price index. The rally in the commodity markets in 1936 and 1937 seems to have been driven largely by temporary supply factors, rather than by upward pressures in the overall price level. This finding is borne out by the fact that while the price of some commodities (such as corn) more than doubled between 1936 and the Mistake of 1937, the CPI rose at a slower pace (see the first chart in this post), peaking at a 4.8 percent year-on-year rate in May 1937. What this reflects, I believe, is that while some components of the CPI were very volatile, the aggregate index was not moving much at all.

Fed economists today typically monitor various components of the CPI that are not influenced strongly by temporary supply disruptions. For example, one common measure tracked is “core CPI,” which excludes volatile food and energy prices from the overall CPI basket (see chart below). In early 2008, the economy started a downward spiral that culminated in a crisis. As the economy’s direction became increasingly clear, economists became more concerned about downward price pressures than about inflationary pressures. This shift paved the way for aggressive interest rate cuts that year, with rates ultimately declining to zero.





At the same time, however, there was a temporary rally in commodity prices, driven by a rise in oil prices in early 2008, as can be seen in the figure above. This development prompted some commentators to warn against “excessive inflation.” But Fed economists and many others judged that the rise in prices was specific to commodities and did not signal an increase in overall price pressures. Largely ignoring the temporary rally in commodity prices, the Fed focused instead on core inflation and some alternative price measures that did not move much even as the CPI peaked in July 2008 at a year-on-year rate of 5.5 percent. This judgment proved to be correct: the larger trend in the aggregate price level during the crisis turned out to be downward, despite relatively volatile commodity markets during this period.

The bottom line, then, is that it is unlikely that a modern economist transported back in time to 1937 would have preemptively tightened policy on the scale that policymakers did at the time. Today’s economists, guided by economic research on general equilibrium models over the past several decades (see, for example, Eusepi, Hobjin, and Tambalotti), are a bit better at distinguishing movements in relative prices driven by temporary disruptions—such as the rally in commodity markets in 1937—from movements in core inflation, which may reflect broader inflation pressures.

中式調控 從鐵礦石談到航運

內地近期收緊銀根，為發展過快的經濟降溫，間接引致建築活動減少，對鋼鐵生產構成影響，原材料堆積在轉運港，令年初見起色的航運業於夏季覺得墮進了「寒冬」。原材料在沿海地區倉庫堆積，淡水河谷也表示第三季鐵礦石不加價，一定程度反映中國鋼鐵需求並不殷切。以前有云「美國打噴嚏，全世界傷風」；今時今日恐怕是「中國打噴嚏，全世界傷風」，中國鋼鐵需求慢了下來，對全球的航運業已見影響。

麥格理最近公布一份分析限電對鋼鐵生產的影響，該行的結論是，電荒對鋼鐵業沒有真正的影響（no real impact），因為需求已經放慢下來。報告指出，電荒令到全國約26%的鋼鐵生產力受到影響。不過，今年夏天的鋼鐵需求也不強勁，故即使有缺電情況，對價格的影響也不算嚴重。

中國經濟一環扣一環，基建及住房建設放慢、鋼鐵生產減少、對鐵礦石的需求亦減慢下來，而從澳洲及巴西運來的鐵礦石同樣受到影響，這種氣氛立即影響IPO市場。

源庫擱置上市

推銷中國資源概念的源庫（394），今次招股卻遇上中國原材料需求減弱，遇到冷淡對待，最終要擱置招股。計及今次，源庫已是兩年之內第四次擱置招股。源庫能夠通過港交所（388）的上市申請，存在一定爭議，翻閱公司招股文件，發現集團於過去三年的收入皆是「零」，證券商預期源庫最快要到2015年才錄得盈利，而未來收入的保證來自澳洲的原煤和鐵礦石開採權。

根據港交所的上市資格規定，一間公司欲申請在主板上市，必須於過去三年合共有5000萬元的盈利紀錄，但源庫往績欠奉，能夠通過申請程序是因為獲得港交所的豁免，那麼港交所「開綠燈」的理由是什麼？

鐵礦石需求減少，另一受影響的行業要算是乾散貨運輸商。鐵礦石是乾散貨運商輸華的一項重要商品，需求減少直接影響到航運公司的生意。反映市場對運費預期的波羅的海乾散貨指數，年初時曾高見1693點，但於2月份曾滑落至1043點，目前雖有些微回升，但目前的1434點較年初時低15%，意味市場對短期運費的看法較年初為淡。

令人擔心的是，航運商前些時候眼見市道復蘇，關始投資建造新船，大部分國際性航運公司去年復訂新船，意味將有一批新船下水。航運向來是一個周期性行業，經濟復蘇時，需求增加，大量新船建造及下水，但若碰上經濟突然「急轉彎」，多出了的供應會影響到運費收入，屆時又會對舊船有一輪淘汰。

新船合約遭「撻訂」

在上一個周期中，「轉身」最快的乾散貨運股是太平洋航運（2343），太航於2006年開始，便陸續把手上的船由購置改為租賃，令手上的船資產減少，至2008年遇上金融海嘯，太航因而可輕裝上陣應對，故此，太航對市場的看法頗具參考價值。

大航管理層對目前業界出現的低迷情況似乎已有預感。集團行政總裁Klaus Nyborg於3月市況還好時預測，整個市場上將有三成的乾散貨新訂單要面臨「撻訂」，其所持的理據是，往日一直支持乾散貨運市場的是中國，但預期今年只會持平，影響到鐵礦石運費價格，連同運煤及運其他貨物的費用也一併受影響。太航當時預測有1.37億噸容量的新船下水，在市況不穩下，有三至四成的新船合約或遭「撻訂」，要運力需求取得新的平衡，運費才能企穩。

造船股股價「先跌為敬」，但實質影響會滯後。皆因由接到客戶訂單到造船，往往要一至兩年時間，例如廣船（317）首季純利達到1.75億元人民幣，按年升一成，反映了去年訂船的熱鬧情況，故鐵礦石運輸需求減少所帶來的負面影響，相信要三至六個月後才會浮現。

Standard Bank says Chinese copper market cause for concern

Posted by Izabella Kaminska on Mar 28 17:49.

We’re calling it the “The Great Chinese Commodity-as-Collateral Financing” fiddle.

That is, the purchase of commodities like copper on deferred payment terms for the sole purpose of raising cheap financing for reinvestment in higher yielding assets.

We’ve raised the alert before, but now thankfully more and more analyst research seems to be catching on.

The latest comes in the shape of a Standard Bank note by a team freshly back from a Chinese field trip (H/T the FT’s Jack Farchy).

Not only do they provide excellent new estimates of just how pervasive the practice in China really is, they’re sounding the loudest alert to the copper market yet.

For one, the note is entitled “China trip report — copper market a real cause for concern”.

Here are some particularly useful anecdotes we found from the note (our emphasis):

We visited China last week, with the aim of gauging Chinese sentiment, the impact of monetary tightening measures on consumers and also investigating the scale and implications of copper’s use as a financing tool. We were already fairly bearish towards copper’s near term prospects before the trip. That negative feeling has intensified, with significant downside risks to copper prices emerging.

• Anecdotally, something in the region of 600,000 mt of refined copper is currently sat in bonded warehouses in Shanghai, with perhaps another 100,000 mt in the southern ports. This is equivalent to around 11% of China’s total refined consumption and around 40% of China’s net refined copper demand.

• Bonded stocks have climbed by around 300,000 mt since the beginning of this year, pointing to the absence of end use demand at the moment.The amount of metal is so high, that spare capacity at some bonded warehouses is running out, with some metal being stored outside.

• The scale of the refined inventory casts into doubt the size of the expected refined deficit in the copper market this year, and raises the prospect of a balanced market, or even a small surplus.

• More worryingly however is that the primary use of copper in bonded warehouse appears to be as a financing mechanism to provide cheap working capital for various types of business often unrelated to the metallic industry.

Initially via a letter of credit and then by using deferred payment LC, they create a borrowing vehicle. Estimates for the amount of metal tied up in such a way range from 40-80% of total bonded stocks. Our estimates are towards the upper end of this range.

• Property developers (or the property developing arms of conglomerates), appear to be behind the lions share of this type of activity, driven by an unwillingness by domestic banks to extend finance, or the imposition of interest rates of anything from 10-20% when they do. On that basis, interest rates on metal of LIBOR + cost of funding look very attractive indeed.

The big news of course is that Standard Bank attributes the lion’s share of the commodity “fiddle” to property developers.

That means, in their opinion, not only is the arrangement exposed to falling copper prices, it’s equally vulnerable to falling Chinese real-estate prices. Potentially, more so.

As they note:

A scenario of falling Chinese property prices, perhaps combined with a government clampdown on alternative sources of funding, would therefore be a devastating outcome for the copper market, simultaneously robbing the metal of an end-user and leading to a mini credit crunch. The obvious home for the bonded material would then be the LME warehouses in the Asian region, with very negative implications for sentiment towards copper prices.

As for the Shanghai-London arbitrage — which traditionally sends copper China bound when prices are higher in Asia than in London — the volumes have, as we havenoted, for a while been flowing towards Shanghai regardless of lower prices.

Now Standard Bank says that scenario only emphasizes the use of copper imports as a financing tool, as the arbitrage loss is clearly seen as a natural hike in the cost of financing.

Or as they put it:

In terms of the SHFE-LME arbitrage, the level remains depressed. With copper also now regarded as a financing tool, the arbitrage is likely to be artificially depressed for some time to come. Arguably, any arbitrage losses on metal that is brought into China, if financing deals are wound up, is perhaps more akin to an interest rate than a trading loss, i.e. an additional cost for the facility to that already paid to the financial institution.

• With the SHFE-LME arbitrage remaining in negative territory, even more of the spare metal in bond, (not held on finance), may be re-exported and delivered into LME warehouses over the coming weeks and months. This alone should keep a lid on prices and prevent the market getting too carried away, even without any potential implosion in China.

Now account for that when you’re the People’s Bank of China…

Tricky.

Related links:
China’s bonded-warehouse copper mystery – FT Alphaville
China’s copper as collateral addiction - FT Alphaville
Copper’s rise slowed by Chinese oversupply - FT
Simply amazing commodity collateral shenanigans in China - FT Alphaville

「空手套白狼」危險

3月底至5月尾，老畢曾連撰多文，評論內地企業以進口商品為名，利用眼前銀根緊縮中小企資金難求的形勢，高息放貸大賺一筆。這種在短時間內「錢生錢」的套利手法，內地稱之為「空手套白狼」。

3月底拙文〈供不應求原是幻　押銅借錢才是真〉一文，探討的正是「商品融資再放貸」的問題，當中提及銀行信用證（Letter of Credit, LC）和「遞延支付」（deferred payment）二事。其時資料不足，對「空手套白狼」這種交易手法以至「錢生錢」可能引起的後遺症，交代得不夠清楚。

6月10日，內地報章《21世紀經濟報道》對這個「危險遊戲」的操作過程，作了圖文並茂巨細無遺的介紹，隨文刊登的「大豆融資」流程圖，令人一眼便能看穿「空手套白狼」是怎麼回事。內地企業樂此不疲、民間尤其江浙一帶的「地下錢莊」生意滔滔，箇中原委，細觀【圖2】，盡皆瞭然。

老畢多篇前文，主要講銅，而《21世紀》針對的卻是大豆，然而兩者皆牽涉商品進口、信用證和高利貸，手法一般無異。值得注意的是，沒有內地銀根緊絀、中小企資金難求這個大環境，「商品融資再放貸」這條資金鏈便無法形成，惟如此一來，企業不務正業投身「高利貸」尚在其次，部分內地進口商每月五六船、貨值以10億元人民幣計的大豆，到底是企業藉民間借貸市場套取暴利的工具，還是實實在在反映內地對商品需求的可靠指標？

還有一點非常重要，企業以大量商品進口向銀行申請信用證，獲得九十至一百八十天不等的延期支付貨款「空檔」。大豆或其他商品到港後，進口商迅速拋售以換取現金回籠，從進口至現金到手，一般需時四十餘天。換句話說，即使以九十天的最短延期支付貨款賬期計算，進口商還有長達四五十天的資金周轉期，將這筆錢投入年息動輒二三十厘的民間借貸市場，只要資金能按時回籠不出亂子，在充裕的時間內補回到期信用證，「空手套白狼」便大功告成。由於息口高得驚人，進口商即使以低於成本價拋售大豆或其他商品虧了本，高利貸提供的利潤空間，仍足以彌補拋售損失有餘，何樂而不為？

「空手套白狼」不出事皆大歡喜，惟只要商品融資中任何一環出問題，進口方的資金鏈就會立即面臨斷裂。這非但可通過借錢的一方未能準時還款（違約）引爆，更可怕的是大宗商品在國際期貨市場價格暴跌，內地進口商放貸獲利無法彌補拋售商品錄得的虧損；此局一現，惡性循環，後果不堪設想！

中国对大豆的需求似乎没有看上去那么旺盛。

一大型大豆压榨企业高层向本报透露，山东、江浙等地的部分大豆压榨企业以及大豆贸易商们，最近数月连续大手笔地进口大豆，利用信用证90天甚至180天的账期腾挪资金，这些资金大部分流入江浙的民间借贷市场。

他接触到的一家山东企业，每月维持5-6船的大豆进口量，粗略估算下来货值在10亿人民币左右，这家企业宁可每月以低于进口成本的价格抛售大豆，账面浮亏8000万-9000万元人民币，待放贷资金回笼以后收益也能完全抹平这一亏损。

当前国内主要港口的大豆库存数，坊间机构估算数字在600万吨以上，处于峰值水平，而且一直处于大进大出的周转状态。

这中间究竟有多少大豆属于融资性进口形成的泡沫？申银万国期货经理林迅峰刚刚从江苏、安徽、湖北、河南调研归来，他接触到的业内人士估计，港口大豆库存中有30%甚至40%属于融资性进口，他个人则估算认为“10%-15%是相对可靠的数据”。

不得不提的一个背景是，金融机构的存款准备金率年内5次上调，商业银行的信贷额度一再收紧，由此催生的民间借贷需求，使得江浙一带的民间借贷综合年利率今年一季度涨幅超过了10个百分点。

套现资金高息放贷

为了快速销售变现，进口商们设定的销售价格不仅仅低于进口成本价

据压榨企业人士透露，有大豆进口资质的企业在签订进口合同后，向银行申请信用证，在缴纳20%-30%左右的保证金后，企业一般可以获得90天甚至180天不等的延期支付货款的远期信用证。

大豆到港后，进口商们迅速抛售掉大豆换取现金回笼，“实际上大豆进口的船期一般在一个月左右，考虑到抛售等时间，从进口到现金到手一般在40多天。”前述企业人士说，即便按照90天的账期计算，这也还有40-50天左右的资金周转时间。

这笔通过打时间差腾挪出来的资金进入民间借贷市场后，只要资金最后能够按时回笼，补上到期的信用证的窟窿，这笔几乎是“空手套白狼”的交易就算是成功。

事实上，实际操作中，进口商们往往是多票货先后运作，如果每月都有进口量，1月的信用证款就可以用4月的贴现款来还，2月的用5月的还，以此类推，相当于一直有一笔流动现金在手里可以运作。

中华油脂网的总编辑郭清保分析，当前进行大豆进口融资操作的企业主要集中在山东、江浙以及东南沿海等区域，且贸易商居多，压榨企业介入这一操作的还不普遍。而变现之后的资金流向，部分用于企业自身经营，更多则流向江浙民间借贷市场。

林旭峰在其调研报告中说，考虑到民间借贷动辄25%-30%的高利息来看，大豆融资的利润惊人。

“不得不考虑的还有汇率因素。”林说，利用时间差，贸易商们还可以坐享人民币缓慢升值的收益。

只是，由于国内外价差，前述压榨企业人士说，上述山东大型进口商每个月近10亿货值的进口大豆实际能变现到手的只有9亿多人民币。

为了快速销售变现，进口商们设定的销售价格不仅仅低于进口成本价，往往也略低于国内现货市场价。考虑运费等各项成本，上述山东贸易商进口大豆的成本为4300元/吨，但近期的销售价格仅为3900元/吨。

郭清保说，对现金的强烈需求以及之后的高利润回报，会使得进口商们愿意承担这部分损失。”

危险的游戏

山东某大型压榨企业的资金链已经出现问题

可以说，没有国内银根紧缩、中小企业融资需求放大这一大背景，大豆融资的链条也难以形成。

1-3月温州民间借贷综合年利率分别为23.01%、24.14%和24.81%，单季上涨11.91%，比上季度涨幅高8个百分点。

广东一大型大豆压榨企业介绍，贸易融资手段不仅仅大豆一种，在华南地区，棕榈油的进口融资更为普遍，棕榈油一般一船进口量在1万吨左右，折合1200万美元的货值，虽然撬动的资金量不如大豆，但是因为从马来西亚等地进口，中间仅有10天左右的船期，加上抛售的周转周期也不过20天，留给企业的时间差更为充裕。

实际上，利用大宗商品进口进行贸易融资原先仅仅局限于贵金属，尤其是金属铜的进口融资，撬动资金多，周转也更快捷。但是，据一位给企业代开贸易信用证的中介人士介绍，这一年以来，这样的操作已经蔓延到大豆、铁矿石、氧化铝等多类大宗商品。

大宗商品进口融资背后重重危机。

有业内人士透露，山东某大型压榨企业资金链已出现问题，这家企业的资金放贷出去后，没能及时收回，因为下游的借款企业没能从银行贷出款归还高利贷。

大豆进口融资变现的资金大部分投入民间借贷，而贷款的中小企业大部分将这笔资金用于短期的“过桥”周转，也即是用高利贷的钱还银行的账，再从银行贷款还高利贷。

郑州国家粮食交易市场分析师杨京表示，只要大豆融资中间的任何环节出了问题，进口方的资金链条就将面临断裂。高利贷的资金未能回笼只是情况之一，如果遭遇到芝加哥期货交易所的大豆价格大幅下挫，企业放贷获利填不上进口亏损，也可能出现大量大豆积压在手中，无法变现的情况。

郭清保也提醒，虽然当前作为行业主流的压榨企业并未过多参与大豆进口融资，但是趋势并不乐观。由于决策层严控通胀，小包装油的价格上涨受限，当前的大豆压榨几乎无利可图，不排除后续会有更多企业为了盈利介入大豆进口融资。

而行业内的开工率若日渐下滑，对进口大豆的实际需求也会减少，考虑到中储粮接连三年的大豆收储，政府手中还有相当数量的储备可用于调节市场，国内大豆的供求相对宽松。

郭清保说，“这可能形成一个恶性循环，大量大豆的压港，终端却没人接手，再严重一些，就可能引发新一轮的行业洗牌。”

炒化纖股留意棉花走勢

上周商品價格急挫，紐約期油一度跌破每桶100美元，金價回落，白銀回吐逾兩成，不過周五跌勢暫喘定。事實上，大宗商品價格早已呈回落趨勢，棉花價格在2月見跌勢。商品價格直接影響股市，棉花價格除了帶動紡織股外，其亦牽動棉花的代替品化纖股。

事實上，化纖股與棉花價格的走勢有密切關係，以儀征化纖（1033）為例，將過去一年股價變化與棉花現貨價格比較，兩者走勢有類同的情況。棉花自去年6月起，因天氣失常加上新興市場需求殷切，展開升浪，至2月觸及高位後回落。

棉價急升 儀征受惠

作為棉花的代替品，儀征化纖同期股價變化類似，去年10月至今年2月見升勢，其後下滑，3月見穩定，至上月中再度回落。

在棉花價格急升之下，儀征化纖毋懼國際油價今年初飆升的威脅，首季業績勁升4.7倍。期內收入50.57億元（人民幣下同），較去年同期增長36.1%，純利4.4億元，同比增長470%，毛利率升至15.76%。其實，今年首季國際原油和聚酯原料價格不斷上成，但下游紡織品出口受惠全球經濟復蘇而持續增長，儀征化纖將成本轉嫁至下游市場，因而保持高產品利潤空間。

不過，左右儀征化纖股價走勢的因素，除了棉花和石油價格外，近年還受母公司私有化一事困擾。市場一直憧憬儀征母公司中石化（386）進行股改，然後將其私有化。此事由2006年成為市場傳聞，久不久有相關的消息傳出，但只聞樓梯響，未見有實際行動。不過投資者曾多次以私有化為主題，將此股炒起。

百宏招股 定價進取

如果留意化纖股，可考慮正在招股的百宏實業（2299）。該股是中國最大的滌綸長絲和全牽伸絲生產商之一，安踏（2020）、361度（1361）、特步（1368）、匹克（1968）、利郎（1234）和七匹狼等是現時客戶。

百宏最多集資34.94億元，八成用作擴充產能，另有5%用以償還銀行的短期借貸，剩餘用作研發、品牌推廣及營運資金。

該公司今年預測盈利為8.5億元，預測市盈率為10.3倍至13.8倍。相比原材料行業目前平均6.2倍市盈率，而2011年預測的7.4倍市盈率，百宏定價較為進取，同時亦反映同業估值較低。

棉花價格回落，作為生產代替品的化纖股跟隨回吐。對化纖股感興趣的投資者，不妨多望棉花走勢兩眼。

煤價難以獨善其身

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近期，受到市場追捧的，除了水泥股，還有煤炭股，背後的原因，當然離不開近期煤價的強勢。而內地傳媒亦有報導指，國家能源局正計劃建立類似石油儲備的煤炭儲備，以穩定煤價。內地對煤炭的需求穩定增長，煤價不跌，看似都是支持煤股上升的重要理由。只不過，不得不提的是，發改委近期不斷約談日用品及食品企業，要求暫緩加價，煤價要獨善其身，恐怕有難度。

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日本核危機發生後，中國決定重新審視核電發展計劃，令市場對火電淘汰減慢產生憧憬。再上近期國際油價上升，亦進一步帶動煤價上漲。除了秦皇島港、廣州港的煤炭價格上升，漲價情況更蔓延至內陸地區，連內蒙古鄂爾多斯市煤價亦在兩周內漲了40元。煤價持續帶動煤股向好，神華（1088）過去一個月內升了約9%，兗煤（1171）更升超過兩成。

官方壓抑加價

只不過，煤價上升令煤股獲利的同時，背後付出代價的，當然是那些用煤的企業。火電企業除了面臨虧損，甚至出現無煤可用的情況。除了火電之外，其餘需要使用煤作燃料的工業等，例如鋁行業，同樣遭殃。穩定的燃料價格，對國家整體有利。所以，近日，內地就有消息指，國家發改委正部署進一步調控煤價。

對於發改委的行動，辛思維不會感到意外，只因近期發改委的「魔爪」已伸遍各行業，除了康師傅（322）、酒類企業及一些日用洗滌用品企業的加價均被叫停，去年底被要求暫停加價至令年4月的食用油企業，據說又收到發委改的通知，要求將限價令延期兩個月。中國食品（506）母公司中糧集團，作為國企，亦是內地最大的糧油企業，當然要乖乖聽話。

食品如是，煤價當然不例外。報道指，國家發改委部署開展電煤價格專項檢查，強調將2011年重點合同電煤價格維持2010年水準不變。這是去年底以來政府第三次發出控制煤價上漲的通知。

只不過，若單純控制合同煤，其實對於緩解電廠成本壓力的作用有限，有業內人士指，其實目前，真正能控制價格的電煤只占總量的20%。尤其是當近年煤價快速上漲，合同電煤兌現率降低，以一些質素較低的煤應付，變相加價的行為亦十分普遍，無助電企解決困境。

內地傳媒引述一家煤企負責人指，多家煤企曾收到國家發改委的內部文件，要求嚴控電煤煤價，不得輕易上漲，而控制的範圍已經不僅限於重點電煤價格，而是所有的電煤價格。

建國家煤庫

事實上，雖然政府可以施行各種價格控制，但在供需不平衡之下，仍難以避免各種黑市價格的出現。所以，為了更好地平衡供需，北京商報就引述國家能源局消息指，今年將啟動建設「國家煤庫」，今年首批儲備為500萬噸，隨後還會有第二批、第三批，總規模預計達到2000多萬噸。

設立儲備的其中一個好處，就是可以調控淡季及旺季之間的價格波動。只不過，對於目前內地每年30億噸的煤炭消費量來說，儲備的價格穩定作用，似乎只是聊勝於無。

相反，煤庫的建設過程中，可能會短暫時間之內，拉高煤炭需求，對短期煤價上升。而在實際操作中，煤炭儲備比石油儲備更具難度，煤炭儲存量越大，周轉時間越長，財務成本越高。加上煤炭的儲存期限通常只有3個月，時間愈長，品質愈降。還有另一個問題，就是煤炭儲存中會發生自燃，需要淋水降溫，增加了人工成本。

另一方面，《證券時報》報道，神華向股東大會提請不超過總股本20%的再融資議案，以及不超過10%的股票回購議案。

對於以上報道，公司未有正成公布，融資的用途未知與國家建設煤庫有沒有任何關係，不過，近年來，為擴大資源版圖，包括內地石油、天然氣等企業紛紛向外進行收購行動，煤企亦不落後。消息指，神華目前正參與競標蒙古國最大煤礦。

在政府的價格壓抑下，已累積一定升幅的煤股，股價可能將面對回調的壓力。但在需求持續增加之下，煤企就算不加價，必定也能做到薄利多銷。所以，對於煤股的中期前景，仍不必感到擔憂。

中國找鐵礦石用心良苦

今年中國經濟高速發展，建築和工業活動皆相當活躍，對鋼鐵的需求殷切，無奈國內製造鋼鐵的原材料鐵礦石缺乏，令到中國大感頭痛。

《福布斯》日前報道，中國與北美鐵礦石供應商克利夫斯資源（Cliffs Natural Resources）達成協議，從北美地區出口鐵礦石，看來中國鋼企有意增加鐵礦石的來源，期望打破必和必拓、力拓和淡水河谷（6210、6230）的壟斷。

克利夫斯是北美洲最大的鐵礦資源公司，根據該公司網頁資料，集團在美國及加拿大擁有6個大型鐵礦，並於澳洲和巴西有一些鐵礦公司之權益。

經濟高速發展，中國對於鐵礦石的需求愈來愈大。據海關統計，今年首季度，中國進口鐵礦砂達到1.8億噸，按年增加14.4%，進口均價為每噸156.5美元，按年大幅上漲59.5%。

中國長期依賴三大巨頭供應鐵礦石。不過，隨著淡水河谷前任CEO 阿格內利離去，新CEO對華取態如何仍是未知之數，坊間便擔心淡水河谷換了舵手，將受到巴西鋼鐵商的壓力，供應中國鋼企鐵礦石時加添限制。形勢有變，中國鋼企向克利夫斯採購礦石，亦不失為分散風險之舉。

不過，長期依靠「三大巨頭」供應礦石，中國鋼鐵業發展始終受制於人。鋼鐵企業每年初與鐵礦石供應商洽淡價格時，往往無奈地要接受三大集團的大幅加價的要求。

為扭轉劣勢，中國企業近年於外國收購鐵礦石資源方面十分積極，但並不是每次皆順利。好像於2009年，中鋁集團提出向當時財困的力拓注資195億美元，以增加對力拓的持股，雙方已簽下協議。不過，澳洲政府機構外商投資審核委員會把審核時間由一般的30天延長90 天，增加了完成交易的不確定性，最後力拓毀約，交易告吹。五礦資源（1208）2009年收購財困的OZ Minerals，澳洲政府便以部分資產住於軍事禁區為理由不批准交易，逼使五礦資源大幅修訂收購條款，剔出敏感資產，方能完成收購。

在積極游說下，中國企業的收購亦有一些成功例子，例如中信泰富（267）便早於2005年成功買入西澳洲的鐵礦，明年將可投產；湖南華菱鋼鐵公司亦成功收購了澳洲另一採礦商Fortescue Metals。不過，現時中國外闖收購的鐵礦資源，仍不足以應付龐大的需求，環球經濟有所好轉，一些外國的礦石企業的叫價已大幅上升，增加中國企業「搜礦」的難度。始終對外收購礦山才是解決國內鋼鐵業原材料供應短缺之道，盼望在不久將來，中國企業在收購場上又傳來好消息。

供不應求原是幻 押銅借錢才是真

拜財經博客（FT Alphaville應記一功）鍥而不捨窮追猛打所賜，券商投行不甘後人落力跟進，內地銅進口與借貸融資之間的關係，呼之欲出。

3月28日，南非標準銀行（Standard Bank）以〈中國之行滙報──銅市值得關注〉（China trip report － copper market a real cause for concern）為題，根據該行分析團隊在上海實地考察的所見所聞，針對銅進口與企業尤其內房融資的「轇轕」，發表了一份參考性甚高的報告。一天後，渣打銀行在其金屬市場周報中，對內地大量銅進口被用作抵押品，繞過中央貸款限制取得低成本融資，提出與標準銀行口徑相似的質疑。

透過「信用狀」（Letter of Credit, LC）和「遞延支付」（deferred payment LC），內地企業（大多數為物業開發商）以此途徑融資，成本一般為倫敦同業拆息（LIBOR）加倫敦金屬交易所（LME）與上海期貨交易所兩地之間的套戥差價。由於進口銅的企業並非直接從事金屬買賣，不過以此法作「曲線」融資，套戥（交易）損失近乎一種額外的利息開支；饒是如此，涉及的財務成本仍遠低於傳統銀行貸款（在當前環境下，即使銀行願借，息口亦必十分「拿利」），又或發債須付的高息。與物業銷售利錢相比，透過此法融資，既可解決營運資金短缺的問題，又不虞損及發展項目的投資回報，「善加利用」的誘因極大。

渣打在報告中指出，上海期貨交易所數據顯示，旗下倉儲銅庫存上周達172,000噸，為去年5月以來最高，較今年初水平增加30％。然而，庫存增長主要拜融資相關活動所賜。由於進口並未被真實需求消化，據在上海考察過的標準銀行分析團隊實地滙報，囤積於部分倉儲的銅，已多至設施容納不下，須在貨倉外另覓空間擺放。

兩行報告「着力點」雖稍有不同，渣打更注重此種融資手段對銅價的影響，惟數據大同小異，且不約而同指向內地企業在中央勒令銀行「收水」下，利用銅市作「跳板」尋求資金日益流行，成為上有政策下有對策的顯例！

五礦出擊押注銅 需求真假鬥一番

蟷螂捕蟬，黃雀在後，當全球以為澳洲銅礦集團Equinox Minerals收購加拿大礦商Lundin Mining事在必行之際，內地國企五礦集團旗下的五礦資源（1208）宣布，出價每股7加元、總計63億加元，「現兜兜」收購Equinox，作價較後者上周五收市有23%溢價。

Equinox 在澳洲和加拿大上市，五礦看中的是該公司在贊比亞的銅礦項目。據悉，此礦年產量逾十四萬噸，被業界視為非洲銅礦資源一大重要據點。

五礦已呼籲Equinox股東向後者收購Lundin 說不，好讓其成就大業。收購倘事成，Equinox股東當然笑逐顏開，但Lundin卻多得五礦唔少，只因後者上周因「待嫁」而放棄與加拿大同業Inmet Mining合併的計劃，如今隨時泡湯。

近日老畢多次論及銅市，五礦於此時高調「走出去」，假設收購成事，目前佔集團生產比重僅25％的銅，將大幅提升至60％；此長彼消，現佔五礦業務最大份額的鋅（63％），比重將銳降至不足三成。

管理層「去馬」　銀行「包底」

五礦CEO Andrew Michelmore在聲明中強調，收購Equinox跟集團透過海外併購促進增長的策略若合符節，惟從併購完成後五礦銅、鋅業務的消長，不難發現這家銳意變身環球多元化礦商的國企，實際上選擇了在銅身上押下重注。

國企收購海外資產／資源，錢從來不是問題，管理層一聲「去馬」，自有國營銀行在融資上「包底」。五礦決定在銅身上burn cash，只要被購方的政府和監管機構不橫加阻撓，交易即可水到渠成。

對國企而然，戰略／國家利益凌駕於商業／股東考量，SOEs並非traders，五礦是否選擇了一個好的時機出擊，對收購方來說不是最重要的因素。不過，你和我卻是traders，銅板塊在消息刺激下有表現，江西銅（358）股價是日就升了3.6％。然而，關於銅市，老畢認為有數事值得注意︰

①銅這種資源對經濟周期非常敏感，《信報》讀者想必知道，這點特質為銅贏得「擁有經濟學博士銜頭的金屬」（the metal with a PhD in economics）的稱號，銅因此又名Dr. Copper。近期中美數據皆顯示經濟尤其製造業擴張勢頭不墜，股市油價商品貨幣無不小回大漲表現堅挺，惟銅價於2月創新高後，非但無力再上，過去六周更掉頭回落近一成。在美國就業轉佳聯儲局考慮「退市」、歐洲加息勢在必行、中國PMI反映經濟持續擴張等消息數據背後，Dr. Copper卻「唔多認同」。投資者對瀰漫股市的樂觀情緒，至少應打個問號。

②從附圖（二合一，上方大圖）可見，期銅（以代號EOD顯示）上周五紐約收市跌穿20天移動平均線，而下方小圖則顯示銅價對標普500指數（SPX）比率跌至0.319（EOD÷SPX），同樣跌穿20天移動平均線。大家若有留意周一「沿圖觀勢」 （刊第28頁），應發現與銅價一樣，追蹤一籃子半導體股份的ETF（紐約證交所代號SOXX），跟其他風險資產走勢背馳。股市咁High，美金又「弱過藥煲」，如果經濟前景真係咁「正」，何以銅價和半導體兩大對經濟周期反應最快的資產，於同一時間呈現roll over之兆？

③老畢3月31日〈供不應求原是幻　押銅借錢才是真〉一文見報後，有讀者在《信壇》留言，一方面同意內地面對融資困難的企業，利用信用狀（LCs）行「掩眼法」，以銅作為抵押品取得低成本資金；另一方面，讀者認為內地確實缺銅，是以在進口不斷上升背後，銅的需求孰真孰假難以識辨。這個，我同意。既然真假難分，老畢倒有一個想法：何謂「真實」需求？囤積者的初衷若是投機炒賣低買高沽，而「接貨」者則利用LCs作「掩眼法」，真正目的是繞過中央貸款限制取得資金，以從事回報更高的投資／投機活動，比如發展商興建到頭來無人居住，形同「鬼域」（ghost zones）的物業……。這種需求，你不能說不「真實」，但志雲大師話齋，假的真不了，銅價當真roll over，老畢擔心的倒非發展商，而是內地的銀行體系！

資源概念吃香 洛鉬逢低收集

洛陽鉬業（3993）的非全資附屬公司新疆洛鉬，已協議向河南省地勘局二院收購新疆哈密東戈壁一座鉬礦的採礦權，代價10.36億元（人民幣．下同）。

新疆洛鉬由洛陽鉬業佔70％，鑫源礦業（河南地勘區控制）佔30％，已繳足資本1億元。根據協議，新疆洛鉬的註冊資本將增至14億元，於收購協議簽署後十天內繳足。洛陽鉬業將出資9.1億元，鑫源礦業出資3.9億元，將從收購代價扣除；完成注資後，雙方所持股權維持不變。

於代繳資本後，新疆洛鉬應付收購餘款6.46億元，其中4億元將於新疆洛鉬完成注資及維吾爾國土廳受理採礦權轉讓申請後五日內支付，其餘2.46億元將於2013年6月後或鉬礦投產後支付，以較早者為準。

收購採礦權的鉬礦，採礦面積16.77平方公里，預測資源量為鉬礦3.5億噸，估值報告所列價值10.24億元，與收購代價相近，代價經雙方磋商後釐定。這項收購實際是買方與賣方合作，賣方提供採礦權，買方提供現金14億元而佔新疆洛鉬70％，賣方提供採礦權另收取現金6.16億元，另佔新疆洛鉬30％。

完成收購後，新疆洛鉬仍持有現金3.64億元，相信用於探礦及採礦，協議雖無披露探礦及採礦耗資多少，但協議已規定新疆洛鉬的註冊及繳足資本額，實際已顧及未來資本需求。

或發債改善財務

洛陽鉬業認為，所收購的新疆鉬礦是大型高品位鉬礦床，具有巨大的勘探升值潛力，且適宜露天開採，收購後可增加鉬資源儲量，進一步鞏固作為世界領先鉬生產商的地位。

6月底，洛陽鉬業錄得淨現金7.85億元，另有債務證券投資及金融資產18.3億元，理論上有足夠資金收購，實際也是如此，因淨現金是現金額19.67億元扣除銀行借貸，即使不出售債務證券投資亦可應付。洛陽鉬業已在候機發行債券中，以改善現有財務安排，現借貸主要是流動性，有必要改善。

洛陽鉬業上半年盈利4.18億元，較上年同期增長112％；期內各項產品產量增、售價升、毛利高，都是純利勁升的原因。期內鉬精礦產量17649噸，增長4.1％；白鎢精礦產量4013噸，增加42％；硫酸產量15451噸，黃金359.9千克及白銀10840千克。各項產品售價反覆有升，內地市場銷售額佔總額88.2％，毛利率亦有變動。

股價大升後見回落

中國商務部已於2009年底及2010年7月下達2010年第一批及第二批出口配額，包括鉬初級產品（氧化鉬及鉬鐵）分別為4877噸及3310噸；鉬化石產品46噸及35噸；鉬製品88噸及52噸；鉬鎢材料製品97噸及66噸。另於6月下旬，經國務院批准，於7月15日起，取消鉬製品、鍛軋鉬條、桿、型材及鎢製品的出口退稅。

上半年，出口營業額只佔11.8％，出口產品提供毛利亦佔11.8％，第二批出口配額少於第一批，意味着下半年出口量減少，再有取消出口退稅，同樣對出口不利，只望從價格及內銷彌補。

自釣魚台事件以來，稀土業備受注意，洛陽鉬業被視作稀土類，股價受惠。10月底，國土資源部宣布，把鉬列入保護性開採礦種，所謂保護性是限產及限制出口，受此刺激，股價急升，但鉬價無大變動。

中國的鉬產量只佔全球三分之一，亦早有限制及徵出口稅15％（下半年已取消），其影響力不及稀土，因而股價已作大量回吐，現價已差不多回落至搶升前水平。

鉬是珍貴資源是事實，而價格亦受經濟形勢所影響。2007年是洛陽鉬業的純利高峰，達22.4億元，增長47.8％；2008年跌26.8％，至16.4億元；2009年更挫69.3％，至5.03億元，業績極為波動，今年轉好，是合理預期。

收購消息對股價無刺激，當時走勢正在調整中。該次急升50％後已調整30％，升勢完全消化，此後發展還看有關政策消息而定，更實際的應是業績，因具概念，是可逢低收集的股份。

五礦資源獲注資利走強

五礦資源（1208）向控股股東五礦有色收購一個名為MMG國際礦業資產投資組合，代價高達18.46億美元，相當於143.988億港元，是一項相當龐大的交易，但這是國有企業的注資，而非賣殼。

MMG目前經營四個礦山，包括老撾的Sepon銅及金礦；澳洲昆士蘭省Century的鋅礦（世界最大之一），亦生產鉛及銀；西澳洲的Golden Grove鋅、銅、鉛及貴金屬礦，以及澳洲塔斯曼尼亞的Rosebery鋅、鉛、銅及貴金屬礦。此外，MMG亦擁有位於澳洲塔斯曼尼亞的Avebury鎳礦（正在維護及保養），以及若干其他開發項目及一項積極性礦物勘探計劃──澳洲昆士蘭Dugald River的鋅項目，已進入可行性研究的最後階段。

收購代價包括現金7.8億元，向賣方貸款54.144億元、發行新股28.22億元，以及發行永久次級可換股證券53.82億元。集團向賣方貸款年期為五年，年利率由首兩年2％升至最後一年5％，可提早償還部分及全部。發行新股每股作價3元，永久次級可換股證券按面值發行，計息1％，換股價3.45元；該證券可轉讓，發行人有優先購買權，以便購買後註銷，該證券不上市買賣。

新股發行價折讓大

是次收購是關連交易，須獲獨立股東批准，而收購的先決條件是，澳洲政府根據外資併購法批准收購，以及同意解除五礦有色有關MMG的現有承諾；另獲雙方股東批准及取得中國有關監管機構適當的批文。此外，五礦資源也尋求股東特別授權，發行不多於二十七億股新股；若予發行，將集資不多於124.8億元，用於償還向賣方的貸款及用於勘探或發展計劃。

收購代價是按專業估值雙方磋商釐定，有關礦山採儲量及礦產資源量的評估報告，將於寄出正式通函時附列，但專業估值不包括勘探及發展項目帶來的價值。五礦有色剛於2009年6月以108.1億元購入MMG的投資組合，其後已就此承擔大量資本開支，商品價格已出現整體上漲。董事會參考獨立財務顧問的推薦意見後，認為條款公平合理。

MMG今年6月底，資產淨值60.16億元，2009年4月（成立日期）至12月止應佔純利13.45億元，今年上半年為17.36億元。由於收購代價參考估值，而純利期間均有兩段不完整期間（不足一年），因而計算P/B及P/E的意義不大。假若今年下半年業績與上半年相同，則P/E約四點一五倍，以供參考。

收購代價中的發行新股價為3元，較公布前股價6.28元折讓52.2％，較9月公布可能收購消息前股價4.78元折讓37.2％，較過去三十日股價折讓19.6％，較九十日平均價折讓4.5％，較一百八十日平均價折讓0.7％，較過去一年平均價溢價6.8％；定價3元相當於2009年P/E三十三點五六倍，以及今年6月底每股資產淨值一點○九倍。發行股較股價有較大折讓，於若干賣殼事例上常見，但作為國企的五礦有色對屬下注資，折讓較大則令人關注。

事實上，五礦資源於8月底的股價只是3.3元，而公布收購計劃前已被炒起，顯然是走漏消息，其後於10月11日更炒至7.07元。站於五礦有色立場而言，難免要求較大折讓，股東對此是否接受，可運用投票權決定。

可獲即時盈利貢獻

五礦資源目前主要業務是氧化鋁，包括生產、加工、銅加工及金屬套管生產，控股股東對其注資，是助其成立一間國際性多元化、以上游為基本的金屬集團，而且市值可擴大一倍以上。收購的優點是，能即時取得現金流量及盈利，還有持續增長的潛力。集團除了為收購代價發行相關證券外，亦計劃發行新股集資124.8億元，用於償還向賣方的貸款54.144億元，餘數70.65億元將用於其他項目的勘深及發展。

目前五礦有色佔五礦資源股權63.39％，如完成上述全部計劃，以及全部永久次級可換股證券換股，五礦有色所佔股權為52.38％，主要為計劃發售股份集資124.8億元（發行二十七億股）所攤薄。

五礦資源進行收購，基本上對發展是有利的，而發行新股代價的高低（亦牽涉可換股證券換股價），接受與否則見仁見智。筆者認為，注資及相關安排是有利於五礦資源的每股盈利增長，從這一角度而言，是可以接受的。

`There's no bubble in gold,’ CIBC says

Posted by Tracy Alloway on Dec 18 08:46.

The idea of a `gold bubble’ went stratospheric in recent days, as economist Nouriel Roubini blasted the “barbarous relic” and the gold bugs who followed it.

And indeed, on Thursday it seemed Roubini was somewhat vindicated, as the shiny stuff dropped below $1,110 for the first time since early November.

But there are (clearly) those who disagree with the gold bubble theory.

Wading into the debate on Friday, for instance, are the commodities analysts at Canadian bank CIBC, with a research note titled “Bubble, bubble, are we in trouble?” The subtitle, for those who can’t bear the suspense, is “Precious metals to continue their Royal Ascent”.

And the reasoning:

Gold has been exhibiting significant correlation to the U.S. dollar, yet we believe other fundamentals will support continued strong performance of the metal, including stronger investment demand, the market’s need for a safe haven investment, and the absence of growing mine supply.

. . .

The rationale for accelerated reactions to dollar-led gold price movement lies in the additional factors contributing to the strength in the metal. Currency movements may be important but they are not the only factor propelling the price of gold. Uncertainty of many factors has led to strong investment demand for the metal as one of the prime drivers to gold price increases. Whereas jewelry demand accounted for about 82% of metal purchases a decade ago, that figure has dropped with investment demand rising to as much as 73% of total demand in some recent quarters. Aside from the safety protection offered by bullion, we suspect that investors have sought to limit volatility within their holdings by diversification into traditionally counter cyclical vehicles such as gold.

The desire for diversification is not limited investors. In ever increasing amounts, Central Bankers have also joined the party that arguably they were responsible for its demise 12 years ago. Whereas back in 1997, there was selling pressure on bullion brought about first by the governments of the Southern Hemisphere (Argentina, Australia), followed by Switzerland, Netherlands and the United Kingdom, now there is net buying taking place among Central Banks. Key among the buying group of late is China and India. We think this trend to broader purchases by Central Banks will continue leading to a new source of demand that hitherto was a source of supply as Central Bank selling intensified at the turn of the millennium.

In the absence of growing mine supply, we anticipate that bullion will continue to perform well over the next few years and possibly longer. Short-term gyrations however will also be the norm and in the past two weeks we have seen what we consider to be a normal (and arguably healthy) correction to the upward phase of a continued long-term bull market for gold.

The bank is accordingly raising its gold price forecast for 2010 and 2011 from $1,100 and $1,200 an ounce respectively, to $1,200 and $1,400.

And just in case you’re still concerned gold might be in something of a bubble:

We do not believe gold has experienced a bubble with the recent pullback of about 8% in prices, any more than the pullback in May-June of 2006 signaled the end of bull market for bullion. We continue to expect that investors will continue to add to positions or more likely start to build positions for gold exposure. It is our belief that at least in Canada, generalists are well underweighted gold equities relative to the 13% weighting of the precious metals sector on the TSX. For the rest of the world, the holdings are less than in Canada and therefore may also need to be adjusted upwards to compensate for higher risk levels for alternative investments.

And so, CIBC also presents the below three charts.

The first showing, the current bull run in gold (from the low in circa 1999, when the UK, err, sold off its reserves) against the 1970s/1980s bull run that started in 1972:

The second shows the current gold bull run against that widely-known bubble, the tech boom of the early 2000s. The trajectory is a bit, umm, different:

Not to worry though, CIBC says. The picture is still very different between gold equities:

Related links:
A golden sell-off – FT Alphaville
Gold retreats on talk of bubble – FT

[Outlook 2010] Goldman Sachs up 12-mth gold forecast to $1350/toz

Posted by Izabella Kaminska on Dec 03 16:49.

The 2010 commodity outlook from Goldman Sachs has just landed in our inbox and a quick skim across the forecasts confirms the bank that previously liked to be bullish oil, is now also bullish gold.
Well relatively so, in so much as they’re raising their 12-month forecast to $1350 per troy ounce versus a previous $960.
Although they do warn that once the Fed reins in its unconventional policies and sets upon a tightening path, gold prices may come under pressure.
As they note (our emphasis):With the US Federal Reserve expected to keep its short-term nominal interest rate target near zero through 2011, we expect the low US real interest rate environment to continue to provide strong support for gold prices in 2010 and 2011. However, as we also expect US inflation to remain subdued, we expect gold prices to come under significant downward pressure once the US economic recovery strengthens and the US Federal Reserve begins to raise interest rates. Consequently, an earlier-than-expected tightening of US monetary policy is the primary downside risk to gold prices in 2010 and 2011, in our view. In the interim, however, we expect the low US real interest rate environment, continued gold-ETF buying and reduced Central Bank gold sales will allow gold prices to continue to move higher. We therefore raise our gold price forecasts to $1200/toz, $1260/toz, and $1350/toz on a 3-, 6-, and 12-month horizon, respectively, with a 2010 average price forecast of $1265/toz and a 2011 average price forecast of $1425/toz. While an earlier than expected tightening of US monetary policy presents a substantial downside risk to gold prices in 2010 and 2011, we believe the near-term risk to our gold price forecast is skewed to the upside.
Meanwhile, they have actually cut their 12-month forecast on WTI oil to $92.5 per barrel versus $95 per barrel — the forecast acknowledging that a slower than expected recovery in developed market demand will have “pushed back the clock on global inventory drawdowns”.
Although that’s not to say they’re more sanguine on the longer-term price outlook. The analysts have introduced a 2011 forecast of $110 per barrel based on strong demand from emerging markets. As they explain:
Our forecast rebound in US economic growth to 2.1% in 2010 and 2.4% in 2011 will likely push US total petroleum demand higher, albeit only slowly, reaching 19 million b/d by 3Q2010. However, although we expect the economic recovery to gradually increase total petroleum demand through 1H2011, we expect a global supply shortage in 2H2011 as strong emerging market demand runs up against anemic production growth, creating the need for demand cutbacks in the developed world (Exhibit 6). Furthermore, although distillate demand in the US will likely recover gradually, we expect demand to reach only 4 million b/d by 1Q2011 before sharing the same fate as US total product demand in the second half of 2011.
And here for your viewing pleasure is the bank’s view on the entire commodity complex:

Article Series - Outlook 2010
The deluge begins
Deutsche Bank ponders all things sovereign
Goldman sees 2010 as 'exciting, with risks!'
Goldman Sachs up 12-mth gold forecast to $1350/toz
JPM targets 20% gain for Euro equities
Thundering Herd bullish on Euro equities
How will analysts fare?
Moody's sees sovereign states a-suffering

Mexico’s new ‘C’ for commodity banker

Posted by Izabella Kaminska on Dec 10 09:35.

Mexican Finance Minister Agustin Carstens — the man who netted Mexico a profit of more than $5bn by shrewdly hedging 2009 oil output at $70 per barrel — has been nominated by Mexico’s president Felipe Calderón on Wednesday to head the country’s central bank, Banxico.
According to RBC Capital Markets, that move should be welcomed by the market as Carstens has proved himself more than capable for the position. Nevertheless, the tougher job is still that of finance minister — meaning it might have made more sense to have left Carstens in his old position, according to the RBC analysts.
As they noted earlier this week:Our view is that the tougher job is the FinMin post, so Carstens should stay there (he seems the most capable), with Ortiz or Garcia Tames heading up Banxico; this is the base-case, in either variation, signalling that President Calderon has listened to the most important economic stakeholders (industry, financial markets, congressional leaders, etc.) in Mexico. A second-best option is Alonso Garcia Tames at the MinFin, with either Carstens or Ortiz at Banxico. Ernesto Cordero (Secretary of Social Development in the current government) assigned to the FinMin would be the least-favoured option in our mind (15% probability), and should be read as Calderon looking for a yes-man at Hacienda, and it would make negotiations on structural reforms with Congress harder.
On Wednesday, however, it transpired that RBC’s least desired candidate for Finance Minister, Ernesto Cordero, was named by Calderon as the country’s finance minister.
This is a touch painful because Mexico’s S&P BBB+ rating very much depends on the success of tax reforms passed this year. Cordero, meanwhile, is seen by many analysts as a `yes man’ unlikely to move Mexico away from its over-dependence on oil revenues in the short term.
S&P lowered Mexico’s outlook to negative in May precisely because of concerns that declining oil revenue and tax collection could swell the country’s budget deficit. Fitch, meanwhile, delivered a rating downgrade to BBB in November based on structural weakness in the country’s fiscal accounts.
As BNP Paribas wrote on the matter earlier this week:
The combination of the structural decline in oil production and the worse than expected fall in economic activity and tax revenues generated a financing gap for the government of more than 4% of GDP in 2009. The government was able to lean on its successful oil price hedge, the transfer of unrealized CB profits, its existing oil stabilization funds and budget cuts to make ends meet.For 2010, however, with the government still expecting a large 3.0% of GDP shortfall and with many of those extraordinary revenues either depleted or non-applicable, the administration has been forced to push through a tax reform in the midst of one of the worst recessions in Mexico’s history.Much has been written about this recently approved tax reform, and clearly, it was not enough to impress one of the rating agencies. Fitch delivered the first rating downgrade by any agency in the last 14 years with a one-notch move to BBB, citing the structural weakness in the fiscal accounts as the key reason behind the decision (S&P maintains its BBB+ rating on negative outlook while Moody’s recently affirmed its Baa1 rating with stable outlook).
In other words, putting too much faith in oil hedging isn’t necessarily a wise strategy. Not that that has stopped Mexico from putting on more hedges.
As the FT reported on Wednesday, Mexico has taken out a $1bn insurance policy against oil prices falling below $57 a barrel next year, a sign it believes the world is still at risk of a double-dip recession.
The hedge, however, goes against expectations from institutions like Goldman Sachs who see prices rising to as much as $92 per barrel next year.
The following chart from BNP Paribas, however, might explain some of the strategy. It suggests at $75 per barrel, oil prices would generate substantial extra revenues for the government, which has actually budgeted for $60 per barrel prices in 2010:
In other words, why not play it safe? While it would lose out on additional revenues if prices went above $90 per barrel, that’s not half as costly to the country as prices going substantially below $60.

Related links:Mexico buys $1bn insurance policy against falling oil prices - FT
Oil sector watches Mexican strategy for pricing clues - FT