美元危機 誰是Winner and Loser？

美國國債歷史性失去標普AAA評級，令市場再度擔心美元的購買力下滑，兌瑞士法郎滙價曾大幅抽升，逼得瑞士政府宣布必要時將瑞郎與歐羅掛鈎，兌美元單日滙價回吐5%。

在這場美元貶值的風風雨雨中，誰會是贏家和輸家？想當然的受惠者可能未必受惠，一些隱於市的公司或許更值得留意。

美元問題觸發金融市場波動，環球股市連跌兩周，估值之調整是否已反映美元風險？

各路人馬持不同意見。美國股神畢非德接受美國《財富》雜誌訪問時指出，在上周美股暴跌期間進行了一次沽債換股，加碼買進包括大西洋保險公司（Transatlantic）等股票，又以低利率賣出20億元巴郡的優先無擔保債券。

航空股受惠

本報首席顧問、人稱「曹Sir」的曹仁超則表示，當恒生指數跌至19000點時，已開始「抄底」買第一輪貨，日前受訪時表示股票佔整體持倉約15%，出擊目標集中於工業股。

市場資金亦開始博弈哪類股票受惠美元貶值，其中最為明顯的，是內地航空股的上升。中國航空股近日可謂利好消息集於一身，溫州動車事故令投資者重新估計高鐵的需求（預期高鐵將大幅度取代內地航空的預期有所改變）；紐約期油下滑至每桶85美元左右，亦令航油開支預期減低；加上，本身大額的美元借貸（截至去年12月底為止，中國國航（753）估計有相當於60多億美元的借貸以美元為單位，人民幣兌美元每上升1%，國航產生超過7億元人民幣的滙兌收益；南方航空（1055）的美元借貸比例更高，人民幣兌美元每升值2%，就為該內陸航空公司帶來近8億元人民幣的滙兌收益）。在三大利好因素下，成為投資者入市的理由。

其實，除了大借美元的中資航空公司外，一些收入在中國而借港元的企業，亦收到受惠美元貶值之效。例如理文造紙（2314）、合和公路（737）便屬此類。

筆者兩個月前與理文造紙高層見面，問及借貸情況，CFO陳繼良以肯定的語氣告訴筆者，在美元、港元及人民幣三種貨幣之中，肯定選擇港元作為借貸貨幣，皆因港元借貸息口較低，兌人民幣又有貶值的好處；至於選擇美元或港元，因兩者掛鈎，效果差不多。

近日收費公路公司的財政問題甚囂塵上，部分非上市的公路企業借貸情況受到關注。不過對於投資早已完成，收入沒有間斷的合和公路（737）來說，卻不在受影響之列。

出口股遭殃

合和公路興建廣深高速公路的時為1993年前後，預計收入雖為人民幣，但當時卻選擇了美元作為主要債務單位。今時今日仍保留相當部分收入以美元為單位，達到整體債務的34%，美元與人民幣的購買力此消彼長，對集團有潛在好處。

至於Loser，則無可避免要數一眾以內地為基地的出口股。其中，美國市場佔偉易達（303）收入逾半，以美元計價的貨品能否在美元貶值潮中加足價，值得仔細研究。

當然，還有一些過去做得很出色的成衣製造商亦備受挑戰。好像代工多個美國女裝名牌的華鼎控股（3398）及生產歐美品牌女性胸衣的黛麗斯（333）。一旦美元兌人民幣貶值速度過急，製造商與客戶的訂價超出預期，吃虧的往往是廠商。

市場對美元的信心相當受有沒有QE3的影響。其實，美元增加債務支付賬單的做法由來以久，以量化寬鬆形式推行的QE1，獲得市場正面反應，但再行QE就可謂「招式已老」，將令市場愈懷疑美國的償付能力。

辛思維相信，聯儲局在壓力下，不會以「QE3」的名目增加貨幣供應，不過，換湯不換藥的招數仍有可能拖展，當市場意識到再度「受騙」後，又會引發新一輪Winner & Loser的追逐

金本位簡史

美國廢除金本位制已差不多40年，不過，自從1776年立國以來，聯邦政府大部分時間採用與貴金屬（黃金及白銀）掛鈎的貨幣政策。2008年金融海嘯後，聯儲局利用寬鬆貨幣政策刺激經濟不但成效不彰，國債急升更令美國主權信貸評級有降級之虞，近期美國不少重量級政經人士提出恢復金本位制，但金本位制真的是穩定經濟的靈丹妙藥？

去年11月11日G20於南韓召開環球金融及經濟會議之前3天，世銀行長佐利克（Robert Zoellick）在《金融時報》撰文呼籲，各國應考慮建立以黃金作為通脹、通縮及貨幣參考指標的國際貨幣體系。佐利克的建議無異於重返金本位制（gold standard）。總部在華盛頓的Peterson Institute for International Economics的Edwin Truman批評佐利克的提議沒有建設性兼不可行，Truman並取笑佐利克是活在歷史尤其是1980-92時代的人物。歐洲央行行長特里謝亦間接回應表示，各國央行早前在瑞士巴塞爾會議並沒有商討金本位制，據他記憶，上次提出類似意見的是1980年代的美國財長貝克（James Baker）。

不過，特里謝這次很快便聽見有人提到金本位制，著名雜誌《福布斯》總裁、1996及2000年兩度競逐共和黨總統候選人的商業大亨福布斯（Steve Forbes）今年5月初預測，美國將於5年內恢復金本位制，以改善日漸惡化的財政及貨幣失衡。他指出，在金本位制約束下，早年的樓市泡沫──寬鬆貨幣政策的部分產品──便不致那麼嚴重，因為政府要想如現在這般過度借貸將「困難得多」，聯儲局也受到限制不能任意印鈔；總之，恢復金本位制將有助穩定美元，重建外國投資者對美國政府債券的信心。

18日巴士巡遊

更高調鼓吹金本位制的行動接踵出現，6月13日，艾奧瓦茶黨（The Iowa Tea Party）和美國原則行動（American Principles in Action，APIA，非牟利民間組織，理念為宣揚及維護美國服膺的普世價值原則，例如人人生而平等，生命、自由、幸福不容剝奪）聯合贊助的18日巴士巡遊之旅啓程，駛經艾州多個城市宣揚金本位制，共和黨有意角逐2012年總統大選的6位最熱門人選亦參與巡遊，其中有前眾院議長金里奇（Newt Gingrich）、前新墨西哥州長Gary Johnson、前明尼蘇達州長Tim Pawlenty和前賓夕法尼州參議員Rick Santorum等，大會並安排金里奇和Santorum於7月2日在終點站Des Moines發表演說。

美國國會亦不時有提議恢復金本位制，有國會智囊團之稱的Congressional Research Service的Craig K. Elwell，今年6月23日特地就美國宏觀經濟政策發表題為Brief History of the Gold Standard in the United States報告（CRS報告）；Elwell表明對金本位制並沒有預設立場，報告只是陳述美國的貨幣系統歷程作為政策參考資料。

CRS報告指出，美國早期採用金銀並行的雙金本位制（bimetallic standard），最早的《鑄幣法案》（Coinage Act of 1792）規定了面值1美元的銀幣純銀含量（重416 grains的銀幣含純銀371.25 grains），而黃金與白銀的兌換率法定為1比15。

黃金白銀輪番外流

就在1792年鑄幣法案通過後沒有多久，國際銀價兌黃金即貶值至15.5比1，結果導致黃金外流，換取更多白銀回國使用，因而1792至1834年美國基本以銀幣為主要流通貨幣。1834年，國會通過調高金銀兌換率至16比1（當時國際市場約為15.7比1），方法是減少金幣的純金含量，但這次雙金本位「滙率」改制令原本10美元相當於3712.5 grains白銀的債務，在美國本土用較少黃金便足以償付，於是大量白銀流向國際市場以較低滙價兌換黃金回國使用，其後三藩市和澳洲陸續發現新金礦，黃金供應大增令白銀更加「奇貨可居」，到1850年，金幣在美國成為主要貨幣，銀幣幾乎消失無蹤。1853年，政府修訂法案批准鑄造1美元以下的小額銀幣應市。

美國在南北戰爭（1861年4月12日至1865年4月9日）之前並沒有法定鈔票，但市面卻流通包括政府票據和銀行本票（bank notes）等紙貨幣，最早期例如1812年對抗英國的「第二次獨立戰爭」（War of 1812），政府為了籌募戰爭經費發行有利息的票據，並承諾將來憑票兌換黃金或白銀；銀行則利用「硬幣」資產槓桿發行持有人可以兌換黃金或白銀的本票，不過，部分銀行由於「商譽」問題，其發行的本票會以票面值折扣易手，事實上，銀行擠提（金或銀幣）亦時有發生。無論如何，政府票據和銀行本票的出現有若貨幣雙金本位制。

然而，由於內戰造成的財政壓力，政府很快發覺無法兌現以黃金或白銀贖回票據的承諾，銀行亦不再以黃金或白銀兌換本票。1862年，政府根據《法定貨幣法案》或《綠背法案》（Legal Tender Acts或Greenback Acts）首次發行鈔票，市民可以利用這些法定貨幣（fiat money）在市場購買黃金或白銀，但政府不會向鈔票持有人兌換黃金或白銀，變相取消了雙金本位制。

真正的金本位制

內戰結束後，國會決定重新採用金本位制，經過1870年代連串辯論，聯邦政府在1878年通過為綠背設定約3.47億美元的發行上限，並釐定鈔票與金幣（不包括銀幣）的兌換價；1900年，政府通過的《金本位法案》（Gold Standard Act）再次確定黃金的地位，CRS報告將1879至1933年名為美國歷史上唯一的真正金本位制（A true gold standard）年代。

19世紀末，另一形式的紙幣——支票日漸通行全國，銀行只需存入少量現金於票據交換所（clearing agent）便可以簽發支票，而大多數支票交易都是在交換所收支互相沖銷，甚少涉及現金交易，而銀行內只會準備少量硬幣和鈔票以備客戶兌現，結果類似上世紀的擠提時有發生（尤其是現金需求特別緊張的農作物收成季節），有些銀行更被擠提而致倒閉。有見及此，政府於1913年成立聯邦儲備局，取代票據交換所的功能並負責調節貨幣供應。CRS報告強調，聯儲局的出現對金本位制無大影響，反而1930至1933年的銀行擠提浪潮使聯儲局也無法維持金融市場秩序。

羅斯福總統1933年3月入主白宮後，政府即推行多項新措施，包括取消鈔票兌換黃金權利，並將黃金國有化，以每盎斯20.67美元官價收購全國黃金後，嚴禁市民私藏黃金；羅斯福又運用1917年的《與敵通商法》（Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917）禁止銀行外滙交易或對外輸出黃金，同時將美元兌黃金大幅貶值40%，外國政府透過國際貿易只能以新的兌換價向美國政府換取黃金；其後羅斯福總統又根據Thomas修訂案（Thomas Amendment）賦予的權力，下令聯儲局加印鈔票至30億美元，1934年1月，金價升上每盎斯35美元。黃金只限於政府與政府之間的官方交易，CRS報告稱之為半金本位制（quasi-gold standard）的開始。

1944年，環球多國達成布列頓森林協議，外滙管制愈來愈寬鬆，各國貨幣可以自由兌換，黃金的地位進一步受到限制，國際貿易主要兌換為美元交收，國基會（IMF）的成立就是協助各國維持本國貨幣兌美元的穩定性，黃金已絕少用作國際貿易貨幣媒介。隨着國際貿易愈趨蓬勃以及各國經濟不同程度發展，貨幣危機經常發生，由於美元是穩定外滙市場（間接與黃金掛鈎）的主角，愈來愈多美元流入國際市場，1968年3月，美國政府廢除了聯儲局以黃金儲備作為印鈔的限制；而部分國家透過貿易賺取大量美元，美國金庫有被兌換一空的危機，聯邦政府迫得不明文禁止外國政府以美元兌換黃金。1972年12月，各國政府達成協議讓美元貶值，黃金官價由每盎斯35美元升至38美元，但美國從未以這價錢買賣黃金；1973年2月，財政部同意金價再升值至42.22美元，美元至此其實已變成自由浮動貨幣。1976年10月，美國正式宣布一項早已成為事實的法令：美元不能兌換黃金。

回復金本位的兩難

CRS報告回顧金本位制歷史指出，政府可以隨時利用行政命令改變金本位的定義，例子有1834年的金銀兌換價，甚至強制沒收黃金，例如羅斯福1933年的「新政」，而事實證明金本位制亦難以抵禦戰爭及國際或本土金融危機的衝擊。格林斯平於1981年9月（他當時是Townsend-Greenspan經濟顧問公司的合夥人，尚未被委任為聯儲局主席）在《華爾街日報》回應市場有聲音要求恢復金本位制的文章指出，重新實行金本位制即時要面對定價難題，財政部不論將金價定得太高或太低（或者其後證明太高或太低），都會造成一是大量黃金等着兌換美元，一是金庫被提空的隱憂。

看來福布斯、金里奇以至APIA等的言行即使沒有政治因素，但透過金本位強化美國經濟體系顯然是不切實際的期望。

香港人民幣離岸市場的形成

早前特區政府表示要分三個階段發展人民幣產品，即人民幣計價債券、人民幣計價基金和人民幣計價IPO，以期在香港建立一個「人民幣產品平台」。其後不久，金管局更開始首個推介香港為離岸人民幣中心的國際路演，向海外地區推廣香港提供的包括結算、融資、債券、財富管理在內的各類離岸人民幣業務。

人民幣逐步走向國際化是大勢所趨，香港會在其中扮演什麼樣的角色？ 「人民幣產品平臺」的發展前景如何？香港在打造這一平台的時候，有哪些國際經驗可以借鑒？

國際關注人民幣國際化

人民幣的國際化由來已久，最早可追溯至1996年大陸開放經常賬戶，但其後進展緩慢。由於國內金融市場的不完善和不成熟，中國一直對資本賬戶實行控制，人民幣亦是不可自由兌換貨幣。最近的次按危機中，美國放任美元貶值的做法，造成中國持有的美元外儲備大幅貶值，一方面為了降低對美元的依賴，另一方面為了滿足不斷增長的對外貿易與金融的需要，中國開始加速人民幣的國際化進程。

縱觀2010年，麥當勞在香港發行人民幣債券進行融資，中國工商銀行向印尼提供人民幣貿易信貸，中國銀行對海外部分城市的客戶開放人民幣儲蓄賬戶，中國企業更在人民幣結算跨境貿易的基礎上，進一步獲准使用人民幣進行海外收購和投資。這些舉措皆旨在推動人民幣走出去，擴大人民幣在國際上的使用。

前不久在南京結束的G20會議中，各國對於將人民幣加入特別提款權的討論，更表明人民幣國際化早已不再是中國政府的單邊嘗試，更是國際社會關注的議題。

一國兩制下屢屢扮演金融改革試點角色的香港，毫無懸念的擔當了人民幣國際化的試驗地。憑與內地的緊密聯繫，和自身國際金融中心的特殊地位，香港的人民幣離岸市場發展迅速。自 2004年起，人民幣離岸市場開始在香港建立，隨人民幣跨境結算的推廣和2010年新的人民幣結算協定的簽署，中央政府正在放寬限制，鼓勵銀行和金融界進行人民幣產品的創新，從而有效利用香港離岸市場上的人民幣。

今年通過十二五規劃也明確表示支持香港發展成為離岸人民幣業務中心，那麼在建立離岸市場方面，有哪些國際經驗可以供我們借鑒，從而規避風險，建立優勢呢？

借鑒倫敦歐洲美元經驗

離岸貨幣市場的發展起源於二戰後歐洲的歐洲美元市場，其中最成功的例子則非倫敦莫屬。上世紀五十年代，以倫敦為中心的歐洲美元市場初步形成，當時佈雷頓森林體系使美元成為國際性貨幣。

馬歇爾計劃援助給歐洲各國的大量美元，前蘇聯和東歐各國為了防止在美國存款被凍結從而轉移的美元，以及銀行為了避稅和規避本國法規而存放在西歐銀行的存款，是歐洲美元最初的由來。

在眾多的競爭者中，倫敦能夠脫穎而出，有兩方面的原因：首先，倫敦的歷史基礎、法制環境、基礎設施和人才儲備，為離岸金融中心的發展提供了基礎。

歷史方面，源於埃及埃及蘇彝士運河危機引發的英鎊風暴及隨後的英鎊管制，迫使之前依賴英鎊融資的倫敦銀行集團，轉向發展美元產品以謀求生路；由於大量美國跨國公司選擇在倫敦設立地區分部，這些公司傾向從當地銀行進行美元借貸；法制上，倫敦有成熟的法治體系，政府的不干涉使得倫敦外市場足夠開放；作為一所悠久歷史的國際城市，倫敦基礎設施完善，吸引全歐洲的人才，而且倫敦在英語上擁有溝通的絕對優勢。

其次，倫敦擁有足夠存量的資金池，優質的投資產品和相應的兌換制度，推動倫敦歐洲美元市場的後續發展。歐洲美元市場發展初期，美國對外的經濟援助和蘇聯東歐等國的轉移存款，為市場提供足量資金；商業銀行和投資銀行為了牟利，積極為這一較少監管的貨幣提供存貸、債券發行等兌換、交易、流通服務，促進了歐洲美元市場的發展。

從倫敦的經驗可以看出，歐洲美元是自由市場、金融機構、投資者自行選擇的結果，而一個成功的離岸市場的建立，其前提是制度、環境的便利，其基礎是足量的資金儲備，其發展前景則取決於投資產品和渠道的多寡，這亦是香港在人民幣離岸市場發展上能否致勝之關鍵。

從歐羅歷史 看歐羅前景

「早在2月便在本欄說過，歐盟就像戰國時搞合縱的山東六國，『像雞綁在一起不能安寧』一樣，從前『歐豬』瘋狂借貸種下的禍根，現在就是整個歐羅區還債遊戲的開始。到今天獅子山學會的論調不變，更認為好戲在後頭。」──　這是我去年初對歐洲債務危機的評估。事隔一年，又參加過上月Property and Freedom Society（PFS）在土耳其舉行的學術會議，遇見年輕德國經濟學家Philipp Bagus，看過他的著作The Tragedy of the Euro後，對歐羅的前途，更不敢樂觀。

德貨幣曾兩次崩潰

原來，在普遍德國人眼中，既有強勁的馬克，就不須有歐羅，因為在沒有歐羅以前，德國央行打擊通脹的決心，源於其慘痛歷史：一戰後的德國央行因胡亂發鈔引發超級通脹，間接使希特拉上台發動二戰，死了過千萬人。所以德國在戰後痛定思痛，認為真正和平實有賴貨幣制度的穩定。

事實上，曾經有一代的德國人，一生經歷兩次貨幣制度崩潰而變得一無所有（1923年的惡性通貨膨脹和戰後1948年的貨幣改革），所以德國國民要求央行保衞貨幣購買力的執着是可以理解的，這亦解釋德國馬克一直在各歐洲貨幣中處於強勢的理由。

然而，歐洲大陸其他大國如意大利、西班牙和法國，她們的中央銀行可沒有德國央行對捍衞貨幣購買力的執着，獨立性也不如德國，以致在政府壓力下濫發鈔票為政府的債務融資；所以，自布雷頓森林協定瓦解以來，法國法郎、意大利里拉和西班牙比薩塔等貨幣定期對西德馬克貶值變成指定動作。

不過，貨幣定期貶值對這些高通脹國家的統治階層非常不利，因為一切的進口變得昂貴，收定額退休金的人士特別受到影響，也會使外國人不願意到該國投資，經濟受損，最終國民也會知道這是政府理財不擅的結果。

所以，自1979年起，歐洲各政府為免強馬克影響他們的威信，就一直企圖干預滙市，成立歐洲貨幣制度（European Monetary System，EMS），以西德馬克為錨，希望把成員國的滙率保持在2.25%的區間波動（Exchange Rate Mechanism，ERM）。

法視馬克為眼中釘

可是，ERM的問題在於，如果一國的貨幣對西德馬克升值，她的央行當然可以無限制地增發貨幣買入西德馬克壓止滙率上升；可是，如果是對西德馬克貶值，該國央行卻沒有無限的馬克買入自己的貨幣阻止滙率下跌。

因此，如果真的要滙率保持在2.25%的區間波動，就一定要西德央行配合干預滙市，可是德國人對抵禦通脹的執着，就是不肯配合，加上二戰的歷史傷痕，新仇舊恨，讓鄰國特別是法國非常不快。法國視西德馬克為眼中釘，不除不快，可以在傳言中前法國總統默特朗把馬克喻為「西德的核武」可以看到。

總之，ERM的結果有目共睹：1992年由索羅斯帶頭逐個擊破，英國和意大利於兩日內雙雙退出，貨幣大幅貶值；法國法郎在一年後再被狙擊，也無奈要把區間波動擴闊到15%。歐洲以政治為先不理經濟原則的第一次貨幣聯盟，其實早在十九年前已被證明徹底失敗。

既然第一次試驗已經失敗，德國人有為何會嘗試第二個更危險、更泥足深陷的歐羅計劃？近來德國便有報導，當年德國願意放棄其引以為傲的馬克，是基於法國的壓力：如果不加入歐羅，也別指望東西德統一。當然，有關政府官員予以否定，不過若傳言屬實，歐羅，一個讓德國不得不配合的EMS 2.0，其實只不過是一個新的凡爾賽和約，Germany will pay！

說了這些歐洲貨幣發展史，你對歐羅的前景，又會否有新的體會？

傳加快升值換有限量寬 中美暗渡陳倉？

10月15日，周五。隔晚美股反覆低收。美國上周首次申領失業救濟金人數意外地上升，市場亦擔心當局對抵押貸款展開調查，強制收樓可能會波及信貸市場，銀行股帶領大市下跌。道指輕微低收1點，納指收市下跌5點。港股結束前兩日的強勢，在高位整固，大市低開118點之後，一度掉頭上升，重企23800點水平，其後再度回落。恒指下跌94點或0.4%，收市報23757點，成交金額減少至1233億元。國企指數逆市上升37點或0.3%，收報13613點。期指下挫136點，收報23738點，低水19點。

回顧本周走勢，承接外圍升勢，港股周初已突破23000點關口，惟人行對六行提高存款準備金率，導致大市略為整固。但市場憧憬美國量化寬鬆貨幣政策如箭在弦，在資金蜂擁入市之下，大市一度升穿23800點，高見23866 點。恒指全周累積急升813點，升幅達到3.5%，平均每日成交金額突破1000億元，高達1099億元。

變數多不宜妄動

美滙江河日下，市場開始估底。隨着內地十二．五規劃、聯儲局議息、美國國會中期選舉、G20首爾峰會等政經大事此落彼起，金融市場變數將多不勝數，估底、摸底俱危。

上周末華盛頓IMF會議看似一事無成，各國在滙率問題上仍然各說各話，但過去數天，意外事件接二連三，情況絕不尋常。表面看，陷入「貨幣戰爭」的國家寸土不讓，言文攻勢一浪接一浪，但暗地裏卻可能在加緊協商。周四晚有壇友在《信博》貼上外國網站Business Insider發放的傳言，指中國將以加快人民幣升值步伐，換取聯儲局規模較小的量化寬鬆，雖純屬傳聞，是耶非耶無法證實，但老畢發現，自IMF華盛頓會議結束後，亞太國家和金磚四國之一俄羅斯俱有「異動」，這些都是如假包換的政策舉動，並非道聽途說胡亂揣測。

亞太俄國俱有異動

論受關注程度，當數新加坡金管局在經濟大幅放緩、貿易對手紛紛干預市場壓抑滙率下，仍然作出容許坡元加速升值的決定。此舉令美滙指數進一步下挫，歐羅、英鎊、澳幣兌美元皆觸及重要心理關口（歐羅1.4、英鎊1.6、澳元一算）。

然而，這只是過去數天不尋常事件之一，另有二項與貨幣相關的發展，同樣值得一談:①俄羅斯比新加坡更早擴大盧布兌一籃子貨幣交易區間，目的跟獅城一樣，都是增強滙率彈性。以當前形勢而論，等同容許盧布升值；②澳洲和南韓在市場普遍預期加息下，不約而同維持利率不變。這個決定，意味澳洲、南韓除了擔心上調息率可能引入更多熱錢外，兩國似乎都相信，與加息一樣，強幣具壓抑通脹之效，兩「害」相權寧選後者。新加坡容許坡元加速升值，也許亦是基於類似想法。

本報周五大篇幅報道新加坡容許升值一事，在相關分析中引述市場人士的話說，獅城此舉有「先發制人」之意，但似乎未把道理說得明白。

在近日圍繞「貨幣戰爭」的論述中，一個非常突出的主題是，所有國家為保出口競爭力，皆在設法阻止本國貨幣升值；基於人同此心，不干預滙市，無異於雙手把市場佔有率「送」給貿易對手。另一方面，美國次論量寬箭在弦上，資金不斷從發達國市場（DM）流向新興市場（EM）。按此思路，泰國向外資徵稅、日本搶在美國之先擴大量寬，都是力阻滙率進一步走強的「先發制人」之舉。

然而，從日本的經驗可見，干預滙市、加碼量寬雙管齊下，仍阻不了圓滙上升。老畢昨天說過，泰國的有限度資本管制，同樣無法截斷源源不絕的國際資金洪流。星洲容許坡元加速升值，若如業界所言有「先發制人」的意圖，那麼其做法便跟泰國利用行政手段遏止外資流入，又或日本「以量寬制量寬」背道而馳，目的並非在美元弱勢（亞幣強勢）中逆水行舟，而是順着此一大勢所作的政策部署。

過去，亞幣滙率的「彈性」，取決於中國對人民幣的意向和態度，敵不動我不動。獅城主動踏出容許坡元加快升值的第一步，會否鼓勵其他亞洲國家減少對滙率的干預，反過來令人民幣面對更大的升值壓力，值得關注。

10月14日，為對沖基金和機構投資者提供滙市分析服務的市場研究機構Faros Trading，就人民幣滙率與美滙指數的關係，提出頗具參考價值的觀察，一引無妨。

附圖顯示，在人民幣始於2005年7月、終於2008年7月，歷時三年的首輪滙改，美元兌人民幣滙率持續下跌，期間美滙指數亦步亦趨同步下滑。2008年年中，人民幣在升值約二成後重新緊盯美元，自此美元兌人民幣滙價跟美滙指數的相關性便不復再見。今年6月起，中國重新啟動滙改，美元兌人民幣持續創出2005年以來的新低，美滙指數也在差不多同一時間（今年6月）見頂，意味兩者的關係隨着人民幣恢復彈性而重現。

放大圖片

投資者是否可以把這種關係簡單地理解為「人民幣彈性加強＝美滙指數低處未算低」，有待進一步探究。然而，美滙指數在2008年年中北京勒停滙改時見底；今年6月中國宣布重啟滙改後，美滙指數於同一時間見頂，似非純屬巧合。按照Faros Trading的推算，美滙指數由現水平起計，仍有7％至9％跌幅；那是否意味美元兌人民幣將出現幅度相若的下滑（人民幣兌美元〔港幣〕出現最多一成的升幅），拭目以待。

內地股市氣勢如虹，連續第七個交易日上升，創十一個月以來最長連漲天數。滬綜指以全日最高位收市，企穩2900點之上，收市報2971點，大升91點或3.2%，再創超過五個半月收市新高。

人民幣滙價持續上升，中間價升穿6.65關口，以人民幣作為收入、美元作為債務融資成本的航空股，股價「起飛」。南航（1055）表現最搶鏡，暴升6.3%，盤中見5.81元新高；東航（670）上揚1.8%，國航（753）高收近1%。

中共十七屆五中全會在北京揭幕，會期由15日至18日，重點審議「十二．五」規劃綱要。外界普遍預期新能源產業將獲得中央眷顧，從事產銷相關設備的股份顯著造好，東北電氣（042）飆升8.5%，上海電氣（2727）上揚4.7%，東方電氣（1072）急升4.5%，哈動（1133）上升2.4%。

李超人把握跌市增持

特首日前在施政報告中，收緊投資移民政策，把「磚頭」剔除於認可資產之列，地產股一度應聲下挫。長實（001）主席「李超人」再次發揮其準繩的眼光，把握跌市時機入市，當日以每股平均價115.58元，增持了二十五萬股長實，涉資近2890萬元。持股量由42.23%上升至42.24%。

市場認為，內地人買「磚頭」的資金會流入股市，利好本港證券股的盈利。國泰君安（1788）暴升11.4%，耀才（1428）大升逾8%，光控（165）上漲5.7%，大福（665）升幅達到5.3%，申銀萬國（218）也上升近4%，大市成交保持活躍，連續三日超過1000億元，大行調整港交所（388）目標價舉行，預計陸續有來。港交所再創185.9元新高，收報180元，升幅近1%。

Fears of global currency war rise

Thailand is introducing a tax on foreign holdings of bonds, the latest in a string of attempts by emerging economies to curb destabilising capital inflows amid fears of a global currency war.

The Thai cabinet on Tuesday imposed a 15 per cent withholding tax on capital gains and interest payments for government and state-owned company bonds, a clear signal that it would take tough measures to curb inflows of “hot money”.

Emerging markets have been caught in the middle of a seemingly intractable dispute over exchange rates and capital flows between the US and China, on evidence again at the International Monetary Fund meetings in Washington over the weekend.A surge of money into Thailand has driven the baht to its highest against the dollar since just before the Asian crisis of 1997-1998.

While the US accuses China of undervaluing the renminbi, China blames loose US monetary policy for driving money into emerging markets that threatens to destabilise their economies.

Jean-Claude Trichet, president of the European Central Bank, added his voice to warnings about the dangers of a global currency war, saying in New York the international community “must say ‘no’ to protectionism and ‘no’ to beggar-thy-neighbour policies”.

The Thai announcement signals a lack of confidence that the issue will be resolved at next month’s meeting of G20 heads of government in Seoul, South Korea.

“Most countries in Asia are moving in the direction of capital controls,” said Dariusz Kowalczyk, a strategist at Crédit Agricole. “But I doubt they will be successful. There is so much liquidity, and there will be even more from quantitative easing in Japan and the US, that the tide will be just too high.”

Korn Chatikavanij, Thai finance minister, played down the move, saying Thailand was only rescinding a 2005 tax waiver for foreign investors. “This is not capital controls,” Mr Korn told the Financial Times. “We are equalising the tax treatment between foreign and local investors”.

But he conceded that the recent inflows were “problematic”. Mr Korn said foreign holdings of Thai bonds had increased “unnaturally” over the past month, shooting to 10 per cent of the total, and eclipsing a previous record of 4 per cent.

The move follows a doubling of taxes on foreign bond purchases in Brazil and sustained – though denied – currency market intervention by the South Korean authorities to hold down the won. The Thai authorities have already intervened in recent months to prevent the baht rising, but to little effect.

Capital controls have been recently endorsed by the IMF as a legitimate short-term weapon for reducing the impact of volatile capital flows, but many economists remain sceptical about their effectiveness. After an initial dip, the baht was the only Asian currency to appreciate against the dollar on Tuesday.

There has been recent speculation in India and the Philippines that some form of controls might be introduced, but senior officials have played down the reports.

Pranab Mukherjee, the Indian finance minister, said on Monday that there was no need for intervention to take the steam out of the rupee, or for capital controls on fund flows.

Japan warns on S Korean currency policy

Japan has suggested that South Korea may come under more international scrutiny for intervening in markets to depress the won, in a veiled warning amid a bitter global debate about currency policy.

Yoshihiko Noda, the Japanese finance minister, raised questions about South Korean interventions ahead of next month’s G20 meeting, which Seoul will host.

Japan and South Korea, which have both intervened in currency markets, have been drawn into a bigger battle between the US and China over currency and monetary policies thatescalated at recent International Monetary Fund meetings.“As chair of the G20, South Korea’s role could be seriously questioned,” Mr Noda told the Japanese parliament, according to Reuters.

The US wants China to allow the renminbi to appreciate, while China says loose US monetary policy has sparked destabilising inflows into emerging markets. Mr Noda said “competitive currency devaluation” would be a “big issue” at the G20 meeting.

“South Korea intervenes in the won as needed [while] China in June started to move towards a more flexible renminbi, but the pace is slow,” said Mr Noda.

“We have confirmed at the [G7] that emerging market countries with current account surpluses should allow their currencies to be more flexible.”

Fears of a currency war have grown as emerging economies try to curb capital inflows. Thailand on Wednesday became the latest country to introduce measures to curb “hot money” inflows by reinstating a tax on foreign purchases of Thai bonds.

Mr Noda’s comments came after the yen hit successive 15-year highs against the US dollar. The currency traded at Y81.85 as of early afternoon in Tokyo, after reaching a fresh high of Y81.39 earlier in the week.

The Japanese finance ministry appears to have held off from intervening again after its massive intervention of $25bn on September 15 to stem the yen’s rise.

While making implied criticisms of “competitive devaluations”, Mr Noda repeated Japan’s mantra that it was ready to take decisive action to tackle the rising yen, including intervention if necessary.

Tokyo has explained its September intervention – its first in more than six years – as a move to limit excessive yen volatility, which it claims distinguishes itself from action taken by other emerging economies.

The South Korean finance ministry declined to comment on the Japanese finance minister’s remarks. Seoul says it does not intervene to prevent the appreciation of the won, but simply “smoothes” the markets in times of volatilty.

Japanese exporters face stiff competition from Korean companies, which have benefited from a relatively weaker currency. The yen has gained 13 per cent against the US dollar this year, while the Korean won has gained only 4 per cent. Over the same period, the won has weakened 8 per cent against the yen.

While Japan has defended last month’s intervention, analysts said the current focus on currencies made it more difficult for Japan to intervene again on such a large scale.

When Tokyo intervened in September, the yen was rising against the dollar, even though US interest rates were stable and the economy appeared to be improving. But now the increasing chance of a second round of quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve is putting downward pressure on bond yields and the US dollar.

“Unless market participants change their view on US rates, it would be difficult for the dollar to maintain a sustainable uptrend against the yen,” said Yunosuke Ikeda, a strategist at Nomura.

投行及對沖基金主宰國際金融

2010年10月12日

投資行為論證篇

鄒小敏

金管局前總裁任志剛於上周公開提醒他服務多年的香港市民，形容目前國際金融市場是百年一遇的混亂情况，原因是此刻歐美多國的實體經濟仍未從2008年的金融海嘯中完全恢復過來，但在國際金融體系裏出現他從未見過這麼龐大數量的國際游資四處流竄，尋覓快速獲利的金融買賣。

雖然這次出現龐大熱錢的起源，又是由市場憧憬美國政府將帶頭施行第二次量化寬鬆貨幣政策（QE2）所至，但任志剛仍為美國政府的貨幣政策說好話，認為美國的做法主要是為振興本土經濟，但因美國同時也是世界儲備貨幣國家及全球最大經濟體，所以無可避免地對世界其他國家造成量化寬鬆的金融沖擊。

作為大半生和各國中央銀行打交道、熟悉央行如何運作的任志剛，他發表了以上的言論，正反映出一個日益嚴峻的國際現象，就是跨國金融機構的勢力巳緊迫，甚至超越各國中央銀行的權力及監管。這個國際現象若形容為可怕（terrifying）是不適當，也許應被形容為可畏（awesome）！

影響政策 配合跨國投機

這些跨國金融企業是誰？不就是投資銀行和對沖基金，他們兩者之間的關係千絲萬縷，例如互相是對方的客戶或間接合作夥伴，這些已是人所皆知。他們進行的交易因屬場外（over-the-counter），所以幾乎是不受任何國家的金融監管機構所監管，以及在國際金融法下也沒有太多的具體條例去限制他們的作為；更甚的是，這些跨國金融企業通過其政冶力量，以至可能施壓影響某國政府的財金政策去配合他們的跨國投機活動。美國已是一個好例子，其財政部及中央銀行（聯儲局）一直以來充斥了不少前身為投行高層的要員。

上周提及的人民幣遠期不交收合約（NDF），一直以來是對沖基金非常熱中的投機活動。數月前，NDF的每天成交額已高達50億美元。NDF是一種與counterparty進行對賭的期貨合約，買方以機構投資者為主，現在市場預料美國政府將施行第二次量化寬鬆貨幣政策，使以往的主要參與者（對沖基金）更能加大投機力度。

以這些在中國境外（一般在新加坡及香港進行）的NDF做法為例：對沖基金買入了在四十五天內人民幣升值3％的合約，假若在合約的四十五天內人民幣都沒有升值3％，那麼NDF的買方將付出千分之五的期權費；但若人民幣升值3％，NDF的合約賣方將必須補齊買方所有升值的差價。這些獲利將由作為中間人的銀行擔保進行資金調配，以美元交收。

NDF槓桿賺大錢

其實，即使人民幣升值3％或5％，對沖基金的收益也根本不明顯。所以惟有做非常大的財務槓桿才符合對沖基金的利潤要求。在這類NDF的交易中，對沖基金只須繳交很低的保證金，例如1億美元的NDF合約，買方必須付出50萬美元的期權費，而其財務槓桿可高達十倍至二十倍。如果對賭成功，對沖基金便獲得300萬美元的利潤收益。

NDF的買方如對沖基金當然為看好人民幣，對升值有憧憬。而NDF的賣方其中不少是國企，他們不一定是預期人民幣貶值，只可能是進行套息交易。他們先在內地借入低息美元貸款，再兌換成高息的人民幣，然後在香港賣出同等數額及年期的人民幣遠期合約，既消除未來的滙兌風險，又可輕鬆賺取美元與人民幣的息差，正是一筆無風險套利的金融投機。

從相互需要到適者生存 「大國政治」捲土重來

2010年10月12日

財經路向透視

從滙率戰到網絡商業間諜案，從吵得不可開交的國際會議到非洲資源的新一輪爭奪戰，可以看出「大國政治」已經捲土重來。

新興經濟體——尤其是中國、俄羅斯、印度和巴西實力的增長，正在改變各國外交和國防部門的工作重心，同時推動着金融市場的發展，重塑全球商業環境。

脆弱共識

美國前國務卿基辛格上月在日內瓦發表演講時，把當今新興國家崛起之勢比作十九世紀或二十世紀初期「大國誕生」的方式；大約百年前的那場國家競爭，最終釀成了第一次世界大戰。

「可能會發生混亂，但一旦出現混亂的局面，新秩序早晚就會出現。」基辛格表示，如今這批新興大國，尤其是中國，正讓國際關係和世界體系變得動盪起伏；他認為，各國領袖應協同努力，盡量避免這一過程「讓人類遭受前所未有的苦難」。

雖然2008年的全球金融危機似乎讓各國在經濟互相依存和共同監管等問題上形成了某種脆弱的共識，但這種共識已經基本宣告破裂。日前，IMF總裁施特勞斯卡恩痛陳全球合作的減弱趨勢，「合作勢頭沒有消失，但顯然正在弱化，這才是真正的威脅；任何人都要記住，對於全球的危機，不存在一種『國內』的解決方案」。

私人部門分析人士把這種變化描述得更加露骨。怡和保險顧問集團（Jardine Lloyd Thompson）信貸和政治風險部門負責人Elizabeth Stephens說：「僅僅一年前，他們都還以為各自相互需要；但現在是適者生存。」

有人說，這一幕是不可避免的——其中一個重要原因就是全球金融體系愈來愈不平衡，新興國家貨幣升值壓力增大。

許多國家依賴出口導向型的經濟增長，以促進就業，保證社會穩定，這必然會導致各國在滙率和獲取資源問題上出現衝突。大家都想壓低滙率，同時確保自己拿到便宜的燃料和糧食。

中國就處於這種緊張格局的中心，其中既有滙率的原因，也有其對資源需求巨大的原因，但問題並不局限於中國和美國形成的所謂「G2」格局。

另類武裝

有人發現，日本等亞洲國家的主權財富基金正在追隨中國和中東國家的腳步，爭奪非洲等地的糧食、礦產和能源資源。這種資源戰對二十一世界的影響，可能堪比常規戰爭對二十世紀的影響。

「我們只不過是在用另一種方式武裝自己罷了。」Investec全球策略師Michael Power說：「我們沒必要把滙率戰搞得那麼駭人聽聞——但事實上確實存在某種衝突。」

Bank of Japan sets course for QE

By Jonathan Soble and Mure Dickie in Tokyo

Published: October 5 2010 06:20 Last updated: October 5 2010 09:31

The Bank of Japan has set a course for “quantitative easing” in a bid to shore up the nation’s faltering economic recovery.

The central bank on Tuesday said it was considering creating a Y5,000bn ($59.7bn) programme to buy assets to increase liquidity in the financial system, as part of a “comprehensive monetary easing policy”.

In recent months, the central bank has come under criticism from the government and many economists that it was responding too timidly to weak demand and falling prices.

In a statement, the bank said it would “maintain the virtually zero interest rate policy until it judges…that price stability is in sight”.

The asset-buying programme would be similar to “quantitative easing” policies adopted by central banks in the US and Europe.

The Bank of Japan said it would look at buying government and corporate bonds, commercial paper, exchange-traded funds and real estate investment trusts.

Japan’s previous experiment with quantitative easing, from 2001 to 2006, involved injecting commercial banks with excess cash.

Chiwoong Lee, an economist at Goldman Sachs, said the aggressiveness of the monetary easing was “a big surprise”.

“They will have tried every monetary policy that is presently conceivable 可想到的, 可想像的; 可理解的; 可相信的,” he said.

The likelihood of new action on monetary policy appeared to increase last month when the central bank signalled that it would not rush to withdraw extra liquidity in the financial system created by Tokyo’s recent yen-weakening intervention in the currency market.

Some analysts were anticipating a more limited expansion of the bank’s cheap three- and six-month credit facilities or greater purchases of government bonds, the one financial asset the bank currently purchases outright.

In its statement the Bank of Japan said: “Although Japan’s economy still shows signs of a moderate recovery, the pace of recovery is slowing down partly due to the slowdown in overseas economies and the effects of the yen’s appreciation on business sentiment.”

Japanese industrial production declined 0.3 per cent in August from the previous month, confounding economists who had predicted a 1.1 per cent rise. Meanwhile, the central bank’s quarterly Tankan business sentiment survey found that big manufacturers were pessimistic about the outlook for this quarter.

After the announcement, the dollar climbed from Y83.55 to Y83.90, while 10-year Japanese government bond futures rose slightly. The Nikkei stock average reversed an intra-day decline, ending up 1.5 per cent

What price Tokyo’s (first round) of intervention?

Posted by Gwen Robinson on Oct 01 10:16. Comment | Share

The details of Tokyo’s first yen intervention in six years have emerged from the Japanese finance ministry.

As Bloomberg reports on Friday, Japan sold Y2,120bn in the month through to September 28 in a bid to weaken the yen after it rose to a 15-year high on September 15. This was in many circumstances more than expected:

“The number exceeded expectations somewhat and may add to speculation they intervened more than once,” said Takashi Kudo, general manager of market information service at NTT SmartTrade Inc., a unit of Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Corp. in Tokyo. “If the market gets the impression that they will continue to step in, that’s a positive for easing the yen’s gains. And exporters may not need to buy the yen in a hurry.”

To put it in context, that Y2,120bn ($25bn) worth of intervention far exceeded the previous single-day high of Y1,660bn that the BoJ put into yen-containment efforts on January 9 2004. In the eight months from January 2003, the government injected about Y13,300bn into the market in efforts to stop the yen breaking through Y115 to the dollar, according to finance ministry data.

Nomura’s Tokyo-based team led by currency strategist Yunosuke Ikeda estimates that this time, the finance ministry expects to spend a total of between Y10,000bn to Y20,000bn to try to curb yen strength. Tokyo’s current budgetary arrangement allows a maximum of Y34,700bn for FX intervention, according to end-June estimates, Ikeda adds.

At the same time, as the Bank of Japan heads into its regular policy meeting on Monday, and the yen stays stubbornly high, speculation is growing — as we noted on Thursday — that the central bank will take extra measures towards easing.

The BoJ’s problems are being compounded by extra pressure on the dollar-yen exchange rate, amid growing expectations in the US that the Fed will shortly take more steps to boost the economy. That follows the Fed’s September 21 announcementthat it is “prepared to provide additional accommodation if needed to support the economic recovery” – which has fuelled speculation of a fresh round of quantitative easing, as the Fed increases Treasury purchases.

So back in Tokyo, just to keep people on their toes, as Bloomberg adds:

Finance Minister Yoshihiko Noda [on Friday] reiterated the government’s resolve to take bold action on the yen if necessary. Vice Finance Minister Mitsuru Sakurai yesterday said he expects the Bank of Japan to make appropriate policy decisions at a monetary policy meeting next week, an indication the government wants the central bank to do its part in supporting growth.

Meanwhile, Julian Jessop of Capital Economics has some thoughts on the recent Japanese intervention, as he writes in a client note:

This month’s intervention by Japan to weaken the yen has contributed to fears of a “global currency war” or, viewed more positively, to hopes that large-scale unsterilised intervention by the major central banks will be another important way in which unconventional monetary policy will be used to boost nominal demand and asset prices. We are far from convinced.

For a start, if the aim of Japanese authorities was to cause a fundamental shift in sentiment towards the yen, they have clearly failed. The yen initially fell sharply after the official intervention on 15th September, but it has now retraced almost all of that decline. The upshot is that, rather than making intervention by others more likely, this failure has surely reduced the chances that central banks elsewhere will follow Japan’s example.

What’s more, there is very little evidence that Japan regards currency intervention as a tool of monetary policy… two key points: first, it is worth clarifying just whose intervention it was. The Bank sold yen for dollars… However, the Bank was simply acting as the agent for the Japanese government and specifically for the Ministry of Finance, which determines currency policy.

Second, too much has been made of the fact that the intervention was apparently unsterilised. The yen sold do seem to have been allowed to accumulate in commercial banks’ current accounts at the Bank of Japan (thus loosening monetary conditions), rather than been mopped up through operations such as bill sales. But this may not be as significant as it first appeared.

Anonymous “official sources” have suggested that the intervention has not been fully sterilised (yet?), but there has been no formal statement on this issue from the Bank. Current account balances held at the Bank have risen by ¥2-3 trillion since 15th September, the bulk of which may well represent unsterilised intervention. However, these balances usually rise anyway in late September as the end of the fiscal half year approaches. The Bank may simply have decided to leave the intervention funds in the market ahead of the fiscal half year-end as a convenient way of providing extra liquidity, but will then allow them to drain again in October as seasonal pressures unwind.

Even if left fully unsterilised, notes Jessop, the Y2,000bn or so spent would represent just 2 per cent or so of Japan’s monetary base, and less than 0.3 per cent of the broad monetary aggregate, M2. This figure, he notes, is:

…also dwarfed by other possible monetary policy changes – for example, if the Bank does ease policy further next week, the leading option would probably be an increase in the total amount of cheap loans under the special funds-supply operation from Y30,000 to Y50,000 – an increase potentially 10 times bigger than any boost from the intervention.

Overall, says Jessop, the markets “may have read far too much into the actions of the Japanese authorities”. He concludes:

“We certainly stick to our first thought that the intervention will not fundamentally alter the outlook for the yen. Moreover, the move is still best seen as a gesture to appease domestic criticism of PM Kan, rather than the first in a series of unsterilised interventions designed to complement other monetary tools. And if Japan’s actions were the opening salvos in a global currency war, they have proved to be a damp squib.”

Related links:
Japan intervention watch - FT Alphaville
Yen intervention: Did they or didn’t they? – FTAlphaville (Sept 24)
In-depth: Yen intervention – FT.com
What next for the yen: ‘A lot of fake movements’ – FT Alphaville

France woos China over currency talks

France and China have been in talks for the past year over whether there should be heightened co-ordination of exchange rates to promote stability of the international monetary system in the wake of the financial crisis.

The talks and their content have been kept secret, in an attempt to draw China into a discussion on global currency co-ordination, a subject that Beijing has been reluctant to countenance in the past.

France has long advocated greater global economic governance. This summer, in a speech to French ambassadors on France’s priorities for the G20, Mr Sarkozy called for a “new framework for discussing currency movements”.In an ambitious move reminiscent of the currency accords of the 1980s, President Nicolas Sarkozy hopes to open a debate on the subject when France takes over the presidency of the G20 group of leading nations in November, according to people familiar with the matter.

Mr Sarkozy is hoping to win Chinese support for a common approach during discussions with Hu Jintao in November, when the Chinese president visits Paris.

The move comes against the background of rising concern over exchange-rate interventions by a host of countries, most notably China but also Japan and South Korea, to prevent their currencies from rising against the dollar.

Though China has recently allowed the renminbi to appreciate modestly, the US House of Representatives passed a bill this week allowing the adm inistration toimpose duties on Chinese imports because of currency undervaluation.

The bill must pass the Senate and be approved by President Barack Obama before it becomes law, but its initial passage reflects growing anger in Congress. China, which is on track to surpass Japan this year as the world’s second-largest economy, has resisted pressure for years, especially from the US, for substantial appreciation of its currency.

People familiar with the matter said France wanted to open the debate during the G20, rather than push a particular view, and was not proposing fixing rates. One priority would be to identify which institution should deal with global currency issues, the sources said.

Mr Sarkozy is planning to discuss currency co-ordination with Mr Obama when he next visits Washington. Germany too will be approached, and the subject may be raised when Mr Sarkozy meets Angela Merkel, German chancellor, in Deauville on France’s Normandy coast this month.

The French and German leaders are set to meet Dmitry Medvedev, Russian president, to discuss joint security concerns and priorities for the G20.

Brazil in ‘currency war’ alert

By Jonathan Wheatley in São Paulo and Peter Garnham in London

Published: September 27 2010 16:30 | Last updated: September 27 2010 19:18

An “international currency war” has broken out, according to Guido Mantega, Brazil’s finance minister, as governments around the globe compete to lower their exchange rates to boost competitiveness.

Mr Mantega’s comments in São Paulo on Monday follow a series of recent interventions by central banks, in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in an effort to make their currencies cheaper. China, an export powerhouse, has continued to suppress the value of the renminbi, in spite of pressure from the US to allow it to rise, while officials from countries ranging from Singapore to Colombia have issued warnings over the strength of their currencies.

EDITOR’S CHOICE

Hostilities escalate to hidden currency war - Sep-27

Editorial Comment: Brazil dazzles global finance - Sep-27

Lula proves hard act to follow on political stage - Sep-27

beyondbrics: Brazil - Aug-09

Gavyn Davies: Strains in currency rate blocs - Sep-27

Brazil seeks to lower real’s temperature - Sep-22

“We’re in the midst of an international currency war, a general weakening of currency. This threatens us because it takes away our competitiveness,” Mr Mantega said. By publicly asserting the existence of a “currency war”, Mr Mantega has admitted what many policymakers have been saying in private: a rising number of countries see a weaker exchange rate as a way to lift their economies.

A weaker exchange rate makes a country’s exports cheaper, potentially boosting a key source of growth for economies battling to find growth as they emerge from the global downturn.

The proliferation of countries trying to manage their exchange rates down is also making it difficult to co-ordinate the issue in global economic forums.

South Korea, the host of the upcoming G20 meeting in November, is reluctant to highlight the issue on the gathering’s agenda, also partly out of fear of offending China, its neighbour and main trading partner.

The US dollar has fallen by about 25 per cent against the Brazilian real since the beginning of last year, making the real one of the strongest performing currencies in the world, according to Bloomberg.

In spite of Mr Mantega’s recent aggressive public statements, however, Brazil has so far held back from taking any action other than intervening in the local currency spot market.

The central bank bought as much as $1bn a day for much of the past two weeks – about 10 times its daily average in recent months – but this was largely to absorb money entering the country to take part in last week’s $67bn share issue byPetrobras, the national oil company.

“There’s a real gap between the rhetoric and the action,” said Tony Volpon, head of emerging market research for the Americas at Nomura Securities in New York.

Japan: Hold the ‘Kan can’ jokes please

So the fat lady has sung – or rather, the sumo wrestler has grunted – and Japan’s latest political circus is over (for now).
Naoto Kan has retained his somewhat battered position as the country’s prime minister, defeating the “shadow shogun” of his party — but only narrowly by 206-200 in the crucial vote among parliamentarians in the ruling DPJ. And, as the FT reports, all eyes are on the yen.
The big question among other pressing issues, as we noted earlier, is whether Kan and his crew will make good on their interminible pledges to act to curb the strong yen.
As the FT noted in an earlier report, concern about the strength of the yen, which hit a 15-year high of Y83.35 to the dollar last week and reached Y83.09 after Tuesday’s voting result, played a crucial role in the battle between Kan and his challenger, Ozawa — who had stated he would take “all possible action” to weaken the currency.
Bloomberg adds that Kan’s win “removes concern that an Ozawa-led government would drive bond yields higher by increasing borrowing to fund stimulus spending”.
While Kan easily won the popular vote among DPJ local members and delegates, the report adds, the narrowness of his win among party members in the Diet, or parliament, highlights the challenge he faces in uniting the party and enacting legislation to lower corporate taxes after losing control of the upper house in July.
Many observers predict that Kan will be forced to give Ozawa a key role in his government — although it’s highly doubtful he would offer any role that handles economic or financial policy.
On the issue of yen intervention threats, Kan, for his part, had repeatedely assured (ad nauseum) that he would act “decisively”. But despite a hyperactive rumour mill that picked up on any small sign of government preparation for a possible foray (進行突襲) into the currency markets, scepticism prevailed on Kan’s willingness — and ability — for bold action in the absence of US support for such a move.
Analysts were divided on Tuesday about the prospects for currency intervention.
RBS Securities said in a note that the chances of intervention following Kan’s victory “have somewhat declined” although the administration is likely to “maintain its stance in taking immediate and appropriate action if necessary”. That to us sounded rather — well, Japanese, rather like Kan’s own pronouncements.
On the government’s relationship with the Bank of Japan, however, RBS is clearer: government pressure on the central bank for additional easing measures “will be relatively mild compared” to that which would have come from an Ozawa administration.
In further points to those made in our earlier post, Steve Englander, head of G10 FX strategy at Citi, and his team noted:
On the surface the implications for USD/JPY are clear. PM Kan has seemed very reluctant to intervene, whereas Mr. Ozawa has made his view of intervention very clear. The FX market is focusing on intervention risk… If PM Kan wins … USDJPY is likely to start another round of decline.
And they added:
Our view so far has been that the MoF [Japanese finance ministry] would not intervene until USDJPY breaks down to 80, the historical low on USDJPY…<<--> SO WRONG~! On the next day Kan admitted the intervention of yen tos upport Export and Recovery, 82 would be the bottom line, yen immediately reached 85 >>
Even if PM Kan remains in power it is very possible that the view on JPY intervention will shift — especially if USDJPY breaks through its recent low of around 83. Recent comments from (prime minister) Kan and [finance minister] Noda have turned in a more hawkish direction, saying Japanese government will take decisive action including FX intervention when FX market gets too volatile. What’s more, last week the Japanese government decided an economic [simulus] package which has three steps to stimulate Japanese economy – and the first step is to address JPY appreciation and deflation. In this package Japanese government also mentioned it will take a decisive action including FX intervention.
Of course, USDJPY has had a strong correlation with US-Japan rate differentials in recent years and US rates have been trending up since the end of last month. If US rates keep on rising USDJPY would be held up above 83 by market forces. But without further US yield moves, and assuming that Mr. Kan wins, the odds are that we will pressure downward pressure on USDJPY to break the recent lows. But given the recent stance change from the MoF we would not rule out a more active response from the MoF than is currently priced in.
Two additional factors note the Citi team:
1) USDJPY has not reacted to the move in US interest raters and gap between what a standard rates based model would predict for USDJPY and the current price has widened. This opens the possibility that long yen positioning is bigger than the market believes. Certainly JPY longs on CFTC are at close to record highs and if anything our indications that model funds are long JPY have strengthened in recent days.
2) … we continue to think that the market overestimates the risk that US officials will have concerted opposition to Japanese intervention, given the deflationary implications of yen appreciation, and the extent to which Japan has slid out of the picture on trade issues. Co-ordinated intervention is off the table, but given the positioning and the degree to which rate differentials have diverged from spot, unilateral (一方的, 單邊的; 單方面的) intervention may have more impact than commonly believed.

Related links:FX intervention day? (Sept 08) – FT Alphaville
The politics of (yen) intervention (Sept 03) - FT Alphaville
The yen conundrum - CreditWritedowns
Japan, China and the intervention two-step (Sept 09) – FT Alphaville

Yuan hits high since revaluation in 2005

The yuan closed higher after hitting a fresh post-revaluation high against the US dollar yesterday, with Beijing seen conceding to let the yuan rise as US lawmakers call for a vote on a bill to get tough with China over its slow exchange rate reform.
The People's Bank of China fixed the yuan's mid-point to the dollar at its highest level since the yuan's revaluation in 2005. The yuan has risen 0.8 per cent in four trading days as measured by the fixing, the biggest four-day gain since records of the reference rate started to be kept in 2007.
But dealers said China's looser grip on the yuan might have limits, possibly up to a maximum rise of 3 per cent by the end of the year from June 19 when the PBOC announced a depegging of the yuan to the dollar, in particular as the yuan has already risen more than 20 per cent since 2005.
"China has its own calculations of the yuan's value," said a senior dealer at a state-owned bank.
"US politicians are talking about a yuan undervalued by up to 40 per cent many years ago and they are saying the same [thing] while the yuan has already jumped more than 20 per cent since 2005."
The PBOC set the mid-point, or its reference rate from which the yuan can rise or fall 0.5 per cent each day, at US$6.7378 yesterday, up from Monday's US$6.7509. That guided spot yuan to close at US$6.7463 after touching a post-revaluation high of US$6.7435, up from Monday's close of US$6.7618 and rising 1.18 per cent since the mid-June depegging.

Single currency bloc plays ‘beggar-my-neighbour’

By Martin Wolf

Published: May 18 2010 20:24 | Last updated: May 18 2010 20:24

Might the eurozone break up? Until recently I would have answered: absolutely no. This is not because I thought the currency union a wise idea. I thought it a risky idea, made more so by the decision to accept member countries so different from those of the zone’s northern core. But the commitment to make it work seemed fundamental to the policies of Europe’s principal powers. Is that still true? I do not know.

So what has gone wrong? What is happening now? What happens next? What does it mean for both the eurozone and the world economy?

On the first question, the European orthodoxy is that the crisis is, at root, fiscal. Marco Annunziata of UniCredit summarises it in a recent note: “In hindsight, it seems obvious that the flaw in the eurozone’s institutional setup is both extremely serious and extremely simple: first, a currency union cannot work without sufficient fiscal convergence or integration; second, the eurozone has been unable to create incentives for fiscal discipline.” Mr Annunziata’s chart shows that this view is wrong. Just consider the frequency of breaches of the rules requiring fiscal deficits of less than 3 per cent of gross domestic product. Greece is a bad boy. But Italy, France and Germany had far more breaches than Ireland and Spain. Yet it is the latter that are now in huge fiscal difficulties.

The fiscal rules failed to pick up the risks. This is no surprise. Asset price bubbles and associated financial excesses drove the Irish and Spanish economies. The collapse of the bubble economies then left fiscal ruins behind it.

It was the bubbles, stupid: in retrospect, the creation of the eurozone allowed a once-in-a-generation party. Some countries had vast asset price bubbles; many had soaring relative wages. Meanwhile, Germany and the Netherlands generated huge current account surpluses. The union encouraged a flood of capital to the surging economies, on favourable terms. When private spending imploded, fiscal deficits exploded.

Where are we now? The eurozone politicians’ response to the crisis has been predictable: blame speculators; provide financing of shaky sovereign debtors (thereby rescuing creditors); rule out debt restructuring; and insist that fiscal discipline be tightened in countries with large deficits. The European Central Bank has also invested €16bn in riskier eurozone government bonds – a small sum by the standards of recent interventions, but a powerful signal. The euro has fallen, though it remains high by historical standards (see chart). At best, the eurozone has bought a bit of time for adjustment.

What happens next? Greece is likely to restructure its debt at some point, as John Dizard has argued in the FT. That would not be the worst outcome. Once a country is in the “junk bond” category, no reputation is left. In such circumstances, the benefit of a lower debt burden for creditworthiness is likely to offset the cost of a default. The logical moment is when the primary fiscal deficit (that before interest) is eliminated, supposedly in 2012.

Yet there will be no return to fiscal stability in peripheral countries without a return to growth. For countries with large current account deficits, much of this growth will have to come from net exports. The alternative to higher net exports – a resurgence of private spending and huge ongoing capital inflows – is unlikely and undesirable.

The question is whether peripheral countries, which have lost so much competitiveness since entry into the eurozone, can generate a large structural – not just a cyclical – improvement in net exports. Historically, countries that have suffered debt crises have almost always been helped by a collapse of the exchange rate (see chart). Peripheral eurozone members do the bulk of their trade with one another. So the modest decline in the external value of the euro is little help. Inside the currency union, the way out is through falling prices (more precisely, falling costs). Ireland is on the way; others are far behind (see chart). But this is a drawn-out process and, not least, also raises the real value of debt. Proponents of structural reform ignore these facts.

What does this all mean?

First, markets are right to doubt fiscal resolve. Debt restructuring is quite likely, at least for Greece. But such restructuring cannot remedy the lack of competitiveness.

Second, the eurozone has bought itself time. Among the things it must do with that time is make its financial system credibly solvent and so able to stand a round of private and public debt restructuring.

Third, when analysing the woes of the eurozone, people persistently fail to recognise the private sector’s instability. It has saved too much in some places and spent, lent and borrowed too much in others. This has been a hugely destabilising force, inevitably exacerbated by the “one-size-fits-all” monetary policy.

Fourth, while the peripheral countries wriggle, the fisherman is determined to keep them on the hook. Thus the fundamental proposition in all discussions of eurozone reform and policy is that fiscal policy must be disciplined. Indeed, Mr Annunziata argues that “fiscal limits should be hard-coded into each country’s legislation in the form of automatic, binding and unchangeable rules”. Such rules do apply in US states. But the US has a federal budget, as well. The eurozone has not. The world’s second-largest economy is on the way to adopting the pre-Keynesian fiscal orthodoxy.

Fifth, tension is bound to remain between a Germany determined to impose such fiscal constraints and countries that deny the primacy of such discipline (notably, France) or may prove incapable of sticking to it. Given the big adjustments ahead, it is no longer evident that the eurozone will manage these tensions. German patience could be stretched beyond breaking point.

Finally, the eurozone is moving towards fiscal tightening, with the offset, at least for the moment, of a weaker exchange rate. Americans will see this as a “beggar my neighbour” policy, unlikely to help global rebalancing. How much it will detract from world recovery is unclear. But it will not help.

Despite today’s gloom and doom, the eurozone will probably survive. But the view that everything would now be fine had fiscal rules been followed is wrong. The private sector’s irresponsibility was the biggest failing. Now, the emphasis is again on fiscal tightening. If this is to work, there must also be growth. Will the austerity itself deliver the growth, as some hope? I doubt it. The hair shirt alone will wear badly.