道德風險幾錢斤？

7月24日，周日。Make or break，你賭邊瓣？上星期六答應過大家，為歐羅區「救市基金」升格為「護市基金」涉及的成本計計數。在數銀紙前，老畢想先講講對歐羅區峰會後的一些見解，make定break、buy定sell，玄機或在其中。

有兩點值得一提：①西方主流媒體過去評論歐債危機，最常用的不離kick the can down the road、 extend and pretend、plaster up the wounds一類嘲諷大國不求治本但求止血的句語，惟此次峰會聯合公報發表後，主流媒體不論左中右，由《金融時報》到《華爾街日報》到《經濟學人》，立場罕見地一致，讚多彈少，縱有微詞，皆從善意出發，擔心歐羅區領袖虎頭蛇尾，白白浪費得來不易的好開始之情，洋溢於字裏行間；②歐豬債息上周最後兩個交易日「大插水」，惟德法債息卻微升。這也許是資金從避險性強的核心國債券重新流入風險較高的邊緣國債券有以致之，並非什麼不尋常現象。然而，值得注意的是，核心國信貸違約掉期（CDS）價格並沒有隨着這份「有口皆碑」的聯合公報面世而回落，意味邊緣國與核心國債息收窄這個表面上反映恐慌紓緩的迹象，暗裏可能埋藏殺機。

德國負責近半擔保

兩點意見表過，是時候替歐洲金融穩定設施（EFSF）「加強版」計計數。歐羅區峰會成果令市場「側目」，EFSF今後將身兼多職，包括一發現有成員國勢色不對，馬上提供信貸防患未然；干預二手債市抗衡炒家；以折讓價在公開市場回購債券，以及向有需要的成員國提供貸款協助銀行重整資本。然而，歐羅區領袖定下眾多目標，惟對擴大EFSF規模卻隻字未提。每個人都在問，要一一滿足上述功能，成本到底多高？

獨立證券分析公司Bernstein Research在逐個項目點算後，開列了一張「清單」，初步估計，EFSF規模要從目前的4400億（歐羅．下同），擴大至1.45萬億；計入20％「超額抵押」（overcollateralization）要求後，總數是1.7萬億。

條數怎樣計出來？按照峰會聯合公報並考慮到擴大後的EFSF必須包括意大利、西班牙和比利時，始能有效發揮穩定歐羅區功效，Bernstein按希臘、葡萄牙、愛爾蘭、西班牙、意大利、比利時未償債務全數延期至2013年，而銀行則按7％比率重整資本，有效期同樣至2013年，得出擴大後的EFSF規模接近2.4萬億這個估算【表1】。

拯救歐羅區成員國一直是歐盟和IMF的協作工程，有鑑於此，在2.4萬億這條數中，必須扣除IMF承擔的金額，同時將「已出之數」（希臘的1100億）和2013年後代替EFSF擔當穩定基金的EFSM「將接之數」減除；得出的餘額，便是EFSF需要承擔的數目。經過七除八扣後，剛好是前面提到的1.45萬億【表2】。

由於已接受援助（在這個例子中包括意大利）國家無法為EFSF提供有效擔保，為了創造一個融資能力達到1.45萬億的金融設施（發債體），德國須提供約7910億的擔保，佔擴大後的EFSF（連同20％「超額抵押要求」，總數1.7萬億）整體規模近半。這個數字，約相當於德國去年GDP的32％！

7月22日，老畢在〈弱國多籮籮　EURO三條路〉一文中，提出歐羅要維持一體化，選擇不離「北水南調」（富國以不同形式向窮國提供財政補貼）和歐洲央行「印鈔」購債（實行歐洲版債務貨幣化）。換句話說，道德風險不是由政府便是由央行承擔。照目前情況判斷，「北水南調」大勢已成，德國騎虎難下，擴大EFSF事在必行，炒家跟政府對賭，短期風險甚高。然而，長貧難顧，投機者和評級機構重整旗鼓後，下一輪攻勢矛頭可能直指歐羅區核心國！

蘋果撐起IT板塊

蘋果威水，係人都知。有幾威？資訊科技是標普500指數十大板塊中純利率最高的行業，在各板塊大都調低今年下半年邊際利潤預測之際，資訊科技卻例外，下半年純利率估計擴大0.36個百分點。不過，那主要拜蘋果所賜，剔除該公司，資訊科技板塊賺錢能力馬上要打個折扣【圖】。

蘋果另一強項是現金多，最新數字顯示，該公司坐擁762億（美元．下同）現金、與現金相等的短期和長期投資，比標普500指數內38.9％（不包括金融機構）合共163家公司加起來的現金都要多。這163家公司合計擁有761億現金，比蘋果少1億，但加起來負債4120億。蘋果負債幾多？答案是零！

歐央行愈來愈似「垃圾站」

畢者推介

‧常識告訴我們，不斷吹脹氣球，總有爆的一刻，即使歐美恃着「大得不能倒」瘋狂發債，也只是把倒下的末日推遲而已。羅家聰在39 頁「一名經人」分析國庫券供求數據，預測美國債市爆煲之時。

‧國人對奢侈品趨之若鶩，令專門零售及分銷名表的東方表行（398）受惠。該行主要以佣金計算工資，且最貴租金的商店剛剛續租，成本控制短期內問題，但研究部卻認為目前並非吸納時機。詳見28 頁「信研Express」。

‧比亞迪（1211）挾着畢非德入股之勢，一度成為股民的「膜拜」對象；奈何業績一直令人失望，導致股價一年以來急挫53%。在汽車融資合作告吹及券商一面倒唱淡之下，比亞迪會否成為股神的「遺憾」？詳見28 頁「冷熱財庫」。

7月7日，周四。昨天引用美國共和黨「政壇老薑」保羅（Ron Paul）解決國債上限的「出位」方案，跟大家探討了一些非常時期的非常手段。讀者兩碇銀君在《信壇》回應老畢，指普羅大眾的債務重組，一般是在債權人與負債人「協商」下進行的。既然雙方有商有量，意味債主債仔已有各讓一步謀求共識的意向，最終結果是各取所需皆大歡喜，還是談判破裂不歡而散，取決於債權人如何評估達成協議的誘因、抵押品市值以至負債人的議價能力，不能一概而論，協商只是債務重組的第一步。在本港樓價暴瀉負資產滿街時，不少業主正是由於跟銀行「協商」無果，或被迫或自願走上破產之路。

德法各有盤算

普羅大眾的債務重組，成敗尚且牽涉眾多變數，國家層面的債務重組複雜困難千倍萬倍，不言而喻。法國銀行業為阻止希臘違約提出的方案，據聞過去兩天遭遇重大挫折。假設此說屬實，老畢認為，標準普爾「插科打諢」雖是一個不容忽視的因素，惟法德對如何在不觸發違約的前提下「實質」重組希臘債務，一直各有盤算，標普「揸正來做」，對主催其事樂見其成的法國、歐盟和歐洲央行來說，固如悶棍一記，但評級機構這番擾攘，卻為先於法國提出另一債換債方案（年期較短、利率較低）的德國提供了一個契機，以「評級事件」（rating event）為口實，力爭解決希債危機應按照德國建議辦事。

然而，不論法國還是德國提出的計劃，根據評級機構的定義，都是一種以「延期」為名賴債為實的安排，任何一國的方案最終「跑出」，投資者的權益無可避免將受到損害。那等於說，不管德法哪一方的建議最終獲採納，亦會立下先例，歐羅區若再有成員國陷入希臘一樣的困境，歐盟不得不伸出援手，私營部門投資者就得有心理準備，債券本金不一定可得到十足保障；這個先例一旦確立，持有歐債風險大增，不在話下。葡萄牙已獲歐盟／IMF提供巨額援助，惟本周債息一飆再飆，意大利西班牙亦難獨善其身，市場對上述可能出現的先例有所預期，也許比葡債信貸評級降至垃圾級別影響更大。

德法僵持不下，作為債權人的銀行、保險公司和其他私人投資者，在本金得不到保障、「削髮」無可避免下，參與救助希臘的意欲到底有多大？假如債券持有人早已把資產脫手，寧可「壯士斷臂」也不拖拖拉拉，德法耗盡心血炮製的債換債方案，到頭來會否枉費心機？

金融機構減持希債

據《華爾街日報》報道，去年5月，德國的銀行和保險公司曾許下「不受約束」（non-binding）承諾，於未來三年繼續持有約80億歐羅的希臘債券和貸款。然而，《華日》引述知情人士的說法，指不少銀行和保險公司「食言」，目前持有的希債比一年前大幅減少，實際數量雖不詳，惟見微知著，從德國最大保險公司安聯（Allianz）透露，仍然持有的希債總值約13億歐羅，只及去年同期33億歐羅的三分之一，足見歐洲金融機構為免夜長夢多，選擇盡早脫手者數不在少。

老畢感興趣的是，這些債券給誰買下？我想，在危機期間不斷透過信貸違約掉期（CDS）「曲線」沽空歐豬國債的對沖基金，在希臘債息急升（價格急跌）後，也許重新發現其「價值」，接貨者估計不乏此輩。然而，不可能所有買家都是對沖基金。

執筆時，歐洲央行剛開完定期會議，加息四分一厘（基準利率上調至1.5厘），早在市場意料之中。令人大感意外的是，歐洲央行宣布暫停葡萄牙政府發行或擔保的債券作為抵押品的最低評級要求。

歐洲央行愈來愈似「垃圾收集站」，難怪老畢在Twitter上看到諸如Kleenex廁紙、嘉漢林業股票也可用作抵押品，攤大手板向歐洲央行要錢一類「抵死」笑話。金價企硬【圖】，誰說無理？

港股是日先升後回，收市牛皮，恒指微升12點。美股卻繼續有勢，其中納指更連續七個交易日高收。聽落好威猛，惟自1971年納斯特市場面世以來，納指連升七天或以上，頭尾合共一百二十五次之多。這還未夠「巴閉」，納指連漲十天或以上，次數亦達二十九次，當中最長的一次發生於1979年，創下「十九連升」的紀錄。

附表顯示納指1971至2011年「七連升」之後一天、一周及一月的回報，有興趣者不妨望兩眼。

評級機構貶歐踩中「良心發現」？

畢者推介

‧雨潤食品（1068）被市場傳聞及周刊狙擊，股價跌個四腳朝天。其實，周刊的指控大都來自公開資料，散戶做足功課不應被殺個措手不及。阿梅在37 頁「財經DNA」提醒大家，聽消息炒作只屬不良嗜好，不算投資。

‧投行推銷員實際上是高級打雜，金融知識一知半解，平常工作不外乎整合研究報告及聯絡；看家本領是拍馬屁，務求跟客戶打好關係。雖然花紅不低，但如此工作有意義嗎？筆銘在27 頁「筆聞集」談推銷員之死。

‧在中央連番出招調控樓市下，京滬廣深等大城市今年首五個月的住宅銷售面積與去年同期比較下跌近一成，不過，躋身銷售榜十大的內房公司的銷售金額卻勁升八成。鐘林在28 頁「中國股市」探討一眾領跑者的抗調控之道。

7月5日，周二。在美國次按危機引發軒然大波後，評級機構的專業性和獨立性受到強烈質疑。在眾多論者眼中，評級機構為了自身利益（收入來自客戶支付的費用），不惜隱惡揚善，給予垃圾不如的信貸產品極高評級，為環球金融災難種下禍根，「元兇」之罪即使可免，「幫兇」之罪決計難逃。

錯誤評級陰影常在

也許「鐵證如山」，評級機構百辭莫辯，與其講多錯多，標普、穆廸以至惠譽選擇以行動洗脫污名，過去年多兩年下調發債體信貸評級，每見手起刀落，取態遠較次按危機前積極。然而，自歐債風暴爆發以來，評級機構針對歐羅區邊緣國的downgrade行動接二連三，非但惹來「矯枉過正」的批評，更令歐洲當局拯救弱國的努力節外生枝，不少決策者因此建議在歐洲另起爐灶，跟美國「三大」分庭抗禮。評級機構「良心發現」，新鮮滾熱辣的事例有二，其一針對希臘，其一針對中國；在中歐「同坐一船」的今天，評級機構貶歐踩中，影響絕不限於借貸成本這些微觀層面。

在希臘國會通過新一輪緊縮預算計劃前後，發生了兩件足以影響歐債發展路向的事，一為標準普爾把希臘主權債務評級降至CCC的全球最低級別，一為法國政府和銀行背後發功，全力促銷一個結構複雜的希臘債務延期（debt rollover）方案【圖】。

「攔途截劫」法方案

自希臘資不抵債無法自救路人皆見以來，德國一直主張包括金融機構在內的希臘債權人承擔部分責任，惟法國的想法不一樣，巴黎以私營部門參與救希意味銀行必須為昔日貸款撇賬減值，拒絕認同柏林的主張。就在雙方僵持不下之際，法國銀行業扭盡六壬，提出上述債務延期方案，據說在希臘債權人中反應不俗。那等於說，私營部門債權人參與救希這個一直困擾德法的死結，在這個折衷方案下，頗有解決之望。

然而，正當法國總統薩爾科齊面露笑容，看似胸有成竹之際，早前將希臘主權評級降至CCC的標普「攔途截劫」，以法國提出的債務延期計劃涉及的兩個關鍵——債券交換和疑似債務重組——皆符合標普定下的拖債定義，警告計劃一旦落實，標普將把希臘信貸評級降至「選擇性違約」（selective default, SD）。

由於評級機構再度出手，原以為希臘問題已不足為患的投資者，對歐債風波疑雲再起，歐羅、股市周二回軟。

按照標普的聲明，即將到期而符合法國銀行業延期方案的希臘國債，將被給予等同於違約的評級。老畢感興趣的是，標普打算何時「動手」？假如現在就做，那無異於把仍在還本付息的債券評作「違約」；假如在國債到期時才採取行動，債券持有人已收回本金且不再持有現存（existing）債券，其評級是A還是D，對投資者有何影響？基於標普並未說清楚，在法國提出的債務延期計劃下，債權人持有的「新」希臘國債將得到什麼評級（CCC ? SD? D?），本周發出的「選擇性違約」警告，不僅無助釐清希臘債務的實況，還為本已複雜的局面增添煩亂。

在美國次按危機釀成大禍之後，評級機構面對的最大質疑，是為了自身利益，對信貸產品質素眼開眼閉，給予跟其違約風險全不相稱的評級。然而，把仍在還本付息的債券列作「違約」（D）或「選擇性違約」（SD），對評級機構提高聲譽改善形象，是否真的有幫助？這個問題，值得學者、監管機構以至在金融海嘯期間深受錯誤評級之害的投資者來一次全方位的探討。

與標普針對希臘的行動相比，另一信貸評級機構穆廸7月4日圍繞中國債務發表的報告，對本港投資者也許更具「實用」價值。上周，老畢曾談及國家審計署對全國地方債務的檢討，其數字與人民銀行上月初的估算大有出入。

穆廸：中國低估地方債

周一，穆廸在一份報告中指出，審計署公布的10.7萬億元（人民幣．下同）全國地方債務總額，多達8.5萬億元由銀行融資；這一點，審計署的報告有所提及。然而，穆廸發現，該署在報告中並未提及的地方債務，數額可能高達3.5萬億元。

關於地方債的確實規模，連人行與審計署兩大國家機構亦各自表述，當中存在「低估」的情況，何奇之有？穆廸在這個時候針對審計署的數字發話，似有不列入報告之內的地方債,實際上已變成壞賬之意。那就計計數吧：以中國去年GDP約40萬億元為準，這筆潛在壞賬（3.5萬億元），約相當於GDP 8.75％。這條數，中央「孭」一點、國有商業銀行「孭」一點；在中國，天大的事，再爛的賬，總有辦法拆掂。

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If Greece goes… The opportunity for Europe’s leaders to avoid disaster is shrinking fast

THE European Union seems to have adopted a new rule: if a plan is not working, stick to it. Despite the thousands protesting in Athens, despite the judders in the markets, Europe’s leaders have a neat timetable to solve the euro zone’s problems. Next week Greece is likely to pass a new austerity package. It will then get the next €12 billion ($17 billion) of its first €110 billion bail-out, which it needs by mid-July. Assuming the Europeans agree on a face-saving “voluntary” participation by private creditors to please the Germans, a second bail-out of some €100 billion will follow. This will keep the country afloat through 2013, when a permanent euro-zone bail-out fund, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), will take effect. The euro will be saved and the world will applaud.

Time to stop kicking the can

That is the hope that the EU’s leaders, gathering in Brussels as The Economist went to press, want to cling to. But their strategy of denial—refusing to accept that Greece cannot pay its debts—has become untenable, for three reasons.
First, the politics blocking a resolution of the euro crisis is becoming ever more toxic (see article). Greeks see no relief at the end of their agonies. People are protesting daily in Syntagma Square against austerity. The government scraped through a vote of confidence this week; the main opposition party has committed itself to voting against the austerity plan next week and a few members of the ruling Socialist party are also doubtful about it. Meanwhile, German voters are aghast at the prospect of a second Greek bail-out, which they think would merely tip more money down the plughole of a country that is incapable either of repaying its debts or of reforming itself. As the climate gets more poisonous and elections approach in France, Germany and Greece itself, the risk of a disastrous accident—anything from a disorderly default to a currency break-up—is growing.

Second, the markets are convinced that muddling through cannot work. Spreads on Greek bonds over German bunds are eight points wider than a year ago. Traders know that Greece, whose debts are equivalent to around 160% of its GDP, is insolvent. Private investors are shying away from a place where default and devaluation seem imminent, giving the economy little chance of growing. The longer restructuring is put off, the more Greek debt will be owed to official lenders, whether other EU governments or the IMF—so the more taxpayers will eventually suffer.

The third objection to denial is that fears of contagion are growing, not receding. Early hopes that Greece alone might need a bail-out were dashed when Ireland and Portugal also sought help. The euro zone has tried to draw a line around these three relatively small economies. But the jitters of recent weeks have pushed Spain and even Italy back into the markets’ sights again. The belief that big euro-zone countries could be protected from attack has been disproved. Indeed, far from fears of contagion ebbing, the talk is of a Greek default as a “Lehman moment”: like the investment bank’s bankruptcy in September 2008, it might unexpectedly bring down many others and devastate the world economy.

While the EU’s leaders are trying to deny the need for default, a rising chorus is taking the opposite line. Greece should embrace default, walk away from its debts, abandon the euro and bring back the drachma (in a similar way to Britain leaving the gold standard in 1931 or Argentina dumping its currency board in 2001).

That option would be ruinous, both for Greece and for the EU. Even if capital controls were brought in, some Greek banks would go bust. The new drachma would plummet, making Greece’s debt burden even more onerous. Inflation would take off as import prices shot up and Greece had to print money to finance its deficit. The benefit from a weaker currency would be small: Greece’s exports make up a small slice of GDP. The country would still need external finance, but who would lend to it? And the contagion risk would be bigger than from restructuring alone: if Greece left, why not Portugal or even Spain and Italy? If the euro zone were to break up it would put huge pressure on the single market.

The third way

There is an alternative, for which this newspaper has long argued: an orderly restructuring of Greece’s debts, halving their value to around 80% of GDP. It would hardly be a shock to the markets, which have long expected a default (an important difference from Lehman). The banks that still hold a big chunk of the bonds are in better shape to absorb losses today than they were last year. Even if Greece’s debts were cut in half, the net loss would still represent an absorbable proportion of most European banks’ capital.

An orderly restructuring would be risky. Doing it now would crystallise losses for banks and taxpayers across Europe. Nor would it, by itself, right Greece. The country’s economy is in deep recession and it is running a primary budget deficit (ie, before interest payments). Even if Greece restructures its debt and embraces the reforms demanded by the EU and IMF, it will need outside support for some years. That is bound to bring more fiscal-policy control from Brussels, turning the euro zone into a more politically integrated club. Even if that need not mean a superstate with its own finance ministry, the EU’s leaders have not started to explain the likely ramifications of all this to voters. But at least Greece and the markets would have a plan with a chance of working.

No matter what fictions they concoct this week, the euro zone’s leaders will sooner or later face a choice between three options: massive transfers to Greece that would infuriate other Europeans; a disorderly default that destabilises markets and threatens the European project; or an orderly debt restructuring. This last option would entail a long period of external support for Greece, greater political union and a debate about the institutions Europe would then need. But it is the best way out for Greece and the euro. That option will not be available for much longer. Europe’s leaders must grab it while they can.

Papandreou Budget Hole Threatens to Swallow Europe, Defies Debt-Crisis Fix

George Papandreou was staring into a 20 billion-euro ($29 billion) hole.

It’s common for freshly minted leaders to discover that there’s not enough money to pay for their campaign promises. So when Papandreou’s new Greek government woke up to a looming budget disaster within days of taking office in October 2009, the alarm bells were slow to ring in European capitals.

Don’t “overrate” the problem, said German Chancellor Angela Merkel, later to play a pivotal role in the debt saga that continues to rock the 17-nation euro area. “There are deficits in other parts of the world as well.”

That initial reaction foreshadowed European leaders’ failure to tame a crisis that is entering its 21st month and has world leaders growing anxious over the prospect of a new financial tsunami as they shake off the effects of the last one. On June 7, President Barack Obama told Merkel it was her job to stop an “uncontrolled spiral of default.” China’s central bank warned on June 14 of a “major risk” incubating in Europe.

“This has unravelled badly,” said Paul de Grauwe, an economics professor at the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium and a two-time candidate for a European Central Bank post. “The most favorable scenario is that we can bridge the next six months. The less favorable scenario is this gets out of control.”

The 256 billion euros in aid committed to Greece, Ireland and Portugal have done little more than buy time against a looming default, saysAndrew Balls, Pacific Investment Management Co.’s head of European portfolio management. The cost to insure senior debt of 25 banks and insurers has climbed to 162 basis points from 120 on April 8, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co. prices. Insurance against a sovereign default, the most expensive in the world, indicates a chance of more than three in four that Greece will be forced to restructure its debt.

‘Pretty Hopeless’

“If you just look at the economics, it looks pretty hopeless for Greece. It would make you think that a default would already have happened,” Balls told Bloomberg Television June 21. “If you can quarantine Greece, Ireland and Portugal, take these countries out of the market, have them do their adjustments, then you can buy time for Spain, buy time for banks to recapitalize.”

At a Brussels summit tonight and tomorrow, the stewards of the world’s second-largest economy will have another go at the Greek dilemma, debating the size of new loans to the Athens government and how to get holders of Greek bonds to chip in.

Already, European Union leaders are playing down the prospects of a lasting fix at the summit -- and this, three months after proclaiming a “comprehensive” solution to a crisis that, for all the angst, has been limited to countries with a combined 6 percent of the euro area’s gross domestic product.

‘Reform Fatigue’

“Times are difficult,” EU Economic and Monetary Commissioner Olli Rehn said on June 20. “Reform fatigue is visible in the streets of Athens, Madrid and elsewhere, and so is the support fatigue in some of our member states.”

Police in Athens used tear gas to break up protests against austerity measures last week. Demonstrators who have camped in front of the Greek parliament for four weeks have labelled a poster of Papandreou as the International Monetary Fund’s “employee of the year.”

Europe’s debt chain reaction exposed what Romano Prodi, who as Italian prime minister shepherded Italy into the euro, called a “half-baked” setup. The monetary half run by the European Central Bank has delivered low inflation. The fiscal and economic management half has been all over the map.

North-South Split

Another split is emerging, between the wealthier, more export-driven and fiscally restrained north and the poorer south, now facing years of subpar growth, according to the Centre for Economics and Business Research.

“Euro to break up -- not this week but probably by 2013,” the London-based CEBR headlined on June 20, adding a voice to those who have been wrong so far. Greece will be the first to go, opting for growth and jobs over euro-mandated austerity, the research firm predicted.

The accident that Merkel didn’t see coming -- and the EU still sees as a cash squeeze, not an existential matter of solvency -- intruded on the EU leaders’ agenda for the first time on Feb. 11, 2010, in the century-old Solvay Library in Brussels at what was billed as a brainstorming session on a 10- year economic strategy, focused on productivity and innovation.

At the time, Greek 10-year bonds yielded 6.03 percent. The extra yield over German bonds, a measure of the risk of investing in Greece, was 283 basis points.

Emergency Lender

Three months later, with the risk spread nearing 1,000 basis points, jousting among Merkel, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet yielded a decision to establish an emergency lender to prop up debt-wracked states. In so doing, the leaders set aside a core euro principle that each country was the master of its own finances.

At 2 a.m. on May 10, as markets opened in Asia, the details were set. Europe created two funds, of 60 billion euros and 440 billion euros, and the IMF put up 250 billion euros. The ECB went into the bond-buying business.

The first phase of the crisis was over and the markets settled down.

In October, they awoke with a clatter. In an Oct. 18 tete- a-tete in Deauville, on France’s English Channel coast, Merkel and Sarkozy decided it was time to shift the costs of saving the euro from taxpayers to bondholders. Merkel won French backing for a permanent rescue fund with the option of putting states into default.

Investor Flight

Investors didn’t like what they heard. While Merkel’s “private investor participation” provisions wouldn’t kick in until mid-2013, the mere floating of the idea made bonds of deficit-plagued states such as Ireland, Portugal and Spain less attractive.

Phase two of the crisis was under way, with a front opening over how creditors would contribute to the rescues.

From the latter half of October into November, investors dumped bonds of countries on Europe’s periphery. Ten-year Irish yields rose from 6 percent on Oct. 18, the date of the Merkel- Sarkozy beachside promenade, to 9.2 percent on Nov. 26, prompting Ireland’s capitulation. The yield is now 11.7 percent.

Ireland’s 67.5 billion-euro bailout package on Nov. 28 came along with what Trichet called a “useful clarification”: chastened by the plunge in Irish, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian and Belgian securities, Germany diluted demands for a future “orderly default” procedure.

Armistice

What at first looked like peace with the bond markets turned out to be a short-lived armistice. In Brussels and European capitals, work proceeded on upgrading the temporary rescue fund, setting up the permanent one and tightening the “stability pact” that had proven toothless in enforcing the euro area’s deficit and debt rules.

Politics in Germany and Finland delayed agreement on the strengthened rescue mechanism until June. Each country now plans to boost its guarantee, enabling the fund to tap the full 440 billion euros promised on the dramatic May weekend, and to buy bonds directly from straitened governments.

“Crises thrive on uncertainty, and the officials are providing that in large doses,” Alessandro Leipold, a former acting director of the IMF’s European department, said on Bloomberg Television. “The decisions are too politicized. It really is time for once for them to surprise us on the upside and actually anticipate the market.”

All the while, there was a slow burn in Portugal, the originator of Europe’s “Lisbon agenda” of 2000 that set the goal of turning the EU into the world’s most competitive economy by 2010.

Portugal’s Miss

Few countries landed wider of that mark. Portugal’s GDP per capita, a measure of wealth and productivity, was 81 percent of the EU average in 2010, the lowest in western Europe and barely ahead of the ex-communist Czech Republic, at 80 percent.

Portugal’s implosion ended the taboo against European authorities intervening in national politics. With the crisis triggering early elections, the euro area and IMF forced both main parties to sign up to budget cuts in the heat of the campaign as a condition for 78 billion euros in loans.

By then, Germany and the bond market were falling out. It began April 14 when Finance MinisterWolfgang Schaeuble hinted at the need for a Greek debt restructuring in a Die Welt newspaper interview. A day later, Deputy Foreign Minister Werner Hoyer told Bloomberg News that a restructuring “would not be a disaster.”

Germany’s thrust came with Greece’s 10-year yield premium at 948 basis points, virtually unchanged since New Year’s Day. It quickly deteriorated. By May 16, the day of Portugal’s bailout, it was 1,250 basis points. It peaked last week at 1,503 basis points.

Germany Yields

German musings about shoving Greece into default met pushback from the ECB and France, the country most exposed to Greek debt. A new confrontation over bond contracts and market psychology played out, ending in a German climbdown.

Merkel blinked on June 17. With Sarkozy at her side, she dropped the idea of a compulsory Greek debt exchange that would lead rating companies to place Greece in default. “Let me make that perfectly clear,” Merkel said. The ECB now had a veto over the method for getting bondholders to roll over Greek debt.

It was the squabble and not the agreement, though, that raised eyebrows.

“It’s very hard for people to invest in Europe, within Europe and outside Europe, to understand what the strategy is when you have so many people talking,” U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner said June 21. “It would be very helpful to have Europe speak with a clearer, more unified voice.”

Falling Short

In the meantime, Greece was failing to keep up its end of the bargain. While Papandreou delivered 20 billion euros of EU- and IMF-ordained budget cuts in 2010, the resulting 4.5 percent economic slump squeezed tax revenue, leaving the deficit above target and debt on an upward trajectory.

Already at a European record of 142.8 percent of GDP, Greek debt is set to rise to 157.7 percent this year and 166.1 percent next year, the EU predicts. It prodded Greece to get serious about selling 50 billion euros of state assets to pay off creditors, pushing the government to the breaking point.

Unable to lure the opposition into a unity coalition, Papandreou, 59, the Minnesota-born scion of a political dynasty, replaced his finance minister last week, stiff-armed an inner- party rebellion and staked his future on a confidence vote.

Papandreou Hangs On

The interim climax came early yesterday. As 10,000 protesters besieged the parliament in Athens, hurling bottles and fruit at riot police, the Socialist convert to spartan economics warned the assembled lawmakers that Greece had run out of alternatives.

The government survived, by a margin of 155 to 143. Votes next week will determine the fate of 78 billion euros in budget cuts, the price demanded by the EU and IMF in exchange for a 12 billion-euro loan installment to banish the specter of default, at least through August.

Risks are rising of “a Lehman-esque event rippling out from Europe,” said Carl Weinberg, chief economist at High Frequency Economics Ltd. in Valhalla, New York. “Things are out of control. We’ve been reduced to a game of chicken between Greece and the governments of Europe to see who blinks first.”

6月20日，周一。上星期五，德國總理默克爾與法國總統薩爾科齊拍拍膊頭握握手，市場滿以為希臘「講掂數」，煲雖然遲早要爆，惟不在今天，美股周五升住嚟收。

老畢上周講過，國內政局愈亂，希臘與歐盟周旋的空間便愈大，總理帕潘德里歐以退為進，改組內閣威脅辭職雙管齊下，既做給反對派看，亦覷準德法不敢「瓷器撼缸瓦」，任由希臘失救，違約潮拖垮整個歐洲金融體系。

直至上周五，老畢仍認為帕潘德里歐這招見效。然而，德法亦非省油的燈，此例一開，歐盟日後豈非有求必應，得不斷向希臘供應「免費午餐」？不要忘記，德法手上有「援助」（aids）這張皇牌，可以用來反制雅典，歐盟豈有任由對方挾內亂得其所哉之理？如此這般，德法首腦握過手拍過膊頭，人人以為援希塵埃落定，歐盟卻突來一記反擊。要錢？可以，但得付出代價。就這樣，原定7月發放的120億歐羅撥款，一半hold住，畀唔畀足，要睇希臘減開支售資產削財赤做得夠不夠。

政治博弈結果難料

希臘資不抵債，實際上早已破產，歐盟和IMF千億歐羅千億歐羅地「掟」出去，填完一個氹又一個氹，說什麼也不容該國自生自滅，點解？

希臘（不用說葡萄牙、西班牙）倒下，不少揸重歐豬國債的銀行就要「陪葬」。然而，正如雷鼎鳴教授昨天在其專欄所言，要從根本上改變福利優厚國家的社會制度，促使過慣休閒生活工作意欲偏低的人民由豐入儉，十年八載恐亦難以為功。希臘當下水浸眼眉，奢求治本不切實際，退而求其次「放水」治標，能否成事亦要看國內外連串政治博弈的結果，第一道關卡是本文見報日希臘國會對政府的信任投票，其結果若非市場所願見，帕潘德里歐下台，勢必為國際社會二度救希增添莫大變數。

在民主國家，政客權力來自選票，當選民意願與市場意願相違背時，政客往往會作出在市場眼中「不理性」的決定，政治博弈結果因此十分難料。希臘政府信任投票開大開細，老畢無意亂猜。然而，近日市場尤其銀行同業拆息出現的變化，似在發出重要訊息，投資者必須留神。

先看資金成本指標。從【圖1】可見，三個月倫敦銀行同業拆息（LIBOR）與聯邦基金利率三個月平均息差（LIBOR-OIS spread），2008年金融危機期間一度逼近200基點，目前離「海嘯價」仍甚遠，跟去年歐債危機相比亦大有距離。再看【圖2】，LIBOR-OIS息差今年以來升得最急是3月日本天災核洩期間，之後隨市場焦點離開福島而大幅回落。不過，近日此指標又見抽升，目前已重返「福島價」，意味希臘違約風險已促使銀行不敢輕信同業，於交易對手的償付能力戒心大增。

同業「安全至上」

英國多份報章周末報道，港人熟悉的渣打銀行，近月在同業市場抽走了數以10億英鎊計的資金，過去數周更大削對歐羅區銀行的借貸，收縮幅度達三分之二，意味渣打不願在無抵押的短期同業市場承受風險。跟渣打一樣「安全至上」的金融機構，據說還有巴克萊等英資大行。這些財政相對健全的銀行，對法國等持有大量「歐豬」國債的區內銀行疑心尤重，巴克萊近期就大幅縮減在同業市場中對西班牙和意大利銀行的拆借業務。

所謂一葉知秋，同業間互不信任，有錢不借，此情此景，大家可有似曾相識之感？博反彈，還是留待心口掛住個「勇」字的諸君一試身手吧。

5月以來，環球股市在risk off潮下大幅調整，美股上周雖結束「六連跌」，惟弱勢未改。不過，跟其他市場相比，美股已算硬淨。

計計數，以本幣為準，標普500指數年初至今上升0.9％，表現優於德國以外的所有G7成員；與金磚四國相比，美股全勝。

然而，計入美元貶值因素，美股回報要打個折扣。即使如此，標普500指數仍然跑贏所有金磚四國股市，只是計入滙率變化後，美股跑贏英國、加拿大和日本，卻輸給法德意三個G7成員國【圖3】。

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