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2011年8月30日 星期二

監管收緊 A股ETF要100%抵押品

合成交易所買賣基金(ETF)涉及複雜結構,多個市場的監管機構最關注這類產品的交易對手風險。證監會昨天公布,13隻A股合成ETF必須由100%的抵押品支持,如果以股票為抵押品,更要達到120%的水平,今年10月31日起實施。

證監會一直要求單一對手風險不能超過產品資產淨值10%,現在從抵押品方面着手。證監會署理行政總裁張灼華相信,提高抵押品水平,可更有效減輕本地合成ETF的交易對手風險。

根據新措施,本地合成ETF基金經理必須提高每隻本地合成ETF的抵押品水平,最少相等於ETF交易對手風險總額的100%,確保合成ETF為模擬指數表現而進行的所有金融衍生工具交易,均備有抵押品,從而抵銷交易對手風險。

證監會表示,相關合成ETF基金經理還要訂立審慎的抵押品扣減(haircut)政策,尤其是當抵押品屬於股本證券,這類抵押品的市值,要相等於交易對手風險總額120%。

以全球最普遍的抵押品美國國債為例,本月初標準普爾調低美國主權評級後,理論上其作為抵押品的價值便會下跌,收取抵押品的一方可能要求更多抵押品,或減低倉位水平。

證監會要求,基金經理於未來兩周後開始提高抵押品水平,並要在可行情況下盡快作出全數抵押安排,最遲須於10月31日前完成。

至今本港的ETF共76隻,實物資產和合成的ETF分別各佔27隻和49隻。不過,新措施只限於受證監會規管的本地合成ETF,僅13隻,全部屬於A股ETF,其餘36隻屬於在港跨境上市的海外合成ETF,則不受新措施影響。

本港最大ETF發行人之一的貝萊德,其安碩(iShares)亞太區主管高磊(Nick Good)回應說,集團將繼續利用多個交易對手,以分散這方面的風險,同時,各安碩基金的抵押品在獨立的保管賬戶上單獨保管。

目前ETF基金經理需要在產品網站披露整體抵押品水平和其他抵押品資料,配合新措施,合成ETF基金經理需要持續地在產品網站公布最新的抵押品管理政策。

2011年8月29日 星期一

監管收緊 A股ETF要100%抵押品


合成交易所買賣基金(ETF)涉及複雜結構,多個市場的監管機構最關注這類產品的交易對手風險。證監會昨天公布,13隻A股合成ETF必須由100%的抵押品支持,如果以股票為抵押品,更要達到120%的水平,今年10月31日起實施。

證監會一直要求單一對手風險不能超過產品資產淨值10%,現在從抵押品方面着手。證監會署理行政總裁張灼華相信,提高抵押品水平,可更有效減輕本地合成ETF的交易對手風險。

根據新措施,本地合成ETF基金經理必須提高每隻本地合成ETF的抵押品水平,最少相等於ETF交易對手風險總額的100%,確保合成ETF為模擬指數表現而進行的所有金融衍生工具交易,均備有抵押品,從而抵銷交易對手風險。

證監會表示,相關合成ETF基金經理還要訂立審慎的抵押品扣減(haircut)政策,尤其是當抵押品屬於股本證券,這類抵押品的市值,要相等於交易對手風險總額120%。

以全球最普遍的抵押品美國國債為例,本月初標準普爾調低美國主權評級後,理論上其作為抵押品的價值便會下跌,收取抵押品的一方可能要求更多抵押品,或減低倉位水平。

證監會要求,基金經理於未來兩周後開始提高抵押品水平,並要在可行情況下盡快作出全數抵押安排,最遲須於10月31日前完成。

至今本港的ETF共76隻,實物資產和合成的ETF分別各佔27隻和49隻。不過,新措施只限於受證監會規管的本地合成ETF,僅13隻,全部屬於A股ETF,其餘36隻屬於在港跨境上市的海外合成ETF,則不受新措施影響。

本港最大ETF發行人之一的貝萊德,其安碩(iShares)亞太區主管高磊(Nick Good)回應說,集團將繼續利用多個交易對手,以分散這方面的風險,同時,各安碩基金的抵押品在獨立的保管賬戶上單獨保管。

目前ETF基金經理需要在產品網站披露整體抵押品水平和其他抵押品資料,配合新措施,合成ETF基金經理需要持續地在產品網站公布最新的抵押品管理政策。

2011年6月28日 星期二

Too much of a good thing The risks created by complicating a simple idea

Exchange-traded funds


ANY industry would be proud of an average annual growth rate of 34% over ten years and of a global reach from Austria to Taiwan. But the headlong expansion of exchange-traded funds (ETFs), which by May this year controlled almost $1.5 trillion of assets (not far short of the $2 trillion in hedge funds), has become a matter for concern among financial regulators. Could ETFs be the next source of financial scandal, or even of systemic risk?

ETFs have been around since 1990, when the first fund was launched in Canada. The original idea was to create portfolios of shares replicating a stockmarket index, such as the S&P 500. Index-tracking funds had been available to institutional investors since the 1970s. Companies such as Vanguard offered them to individuals in the form of mutual funds. However, as the name suggests, the key feature of an ETF was that it was itself listed on a stockmarket, so that investors could buy and sell it easily. Unlike units in a conventional mutual fund, ETFs can be traded all day long.

Most people still regard these plain-vanilla ETFs as a benign invention that allows small investors to own a diversified portfolio at a low cost. State Street’s $88 billion SPDR fund, which mimics the S&P 500, has a total expense ratio of just 0.09%.

But fund managers quickly elaborated on the basic design. The number of ETFs has swelled to 2,747 (see chart 1). Within equities, there are ETFs based on small-cap companies, value shares, individual industries and every conceivable combination of countries and regions. In bonds, there are ETFs linked to government, corporate and high-yield debt and paper of varying maturities. Some ETFs are based on commodity indices and property markets, others are designed to appeal to the environmentally conscious or to devout Muslims. There are leveraged ETFs which offer a geared return on a given index, inverse ETFs which aim to go down when a benchmark goes up (and vice versa) and, inevitably, leveraged inverse ETFs.

For some, this is a worrying trend, with echoes of the subprime housing crisis, in which financial innovation went out of control. That crisis, too, had its origins in invention with a benign aim: the packaging of mortgages for use as securities for bonds was intended to reduce borrowing costs and disperse risk. Eventually, however, that simple idea transmuted into complex collateralised debt obligations and lower lending standards.

Exotic traded funds

Similarly, the new types of ETF no longer offer the cheapness and diversification of the early varieties. Instead they have become a means for hedge funds to speculate on the market throughout the trading day, allowing them to make complex bets on illiquid asset classes. And the portfolios of some ETFs consist not of a broad range of stocks but of a derivative position with an investment bank as a counterparty.

Official concern is growing. In April three international bodies set out their worries. The Financial Stability Board (FSB), a committee of financial supervisors, issued a report on ETFs. The IMF devoted part of its global financial-stability report to them. And the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) published a paper entitled “Market Structures and Systemic Risks of Exchange-Traded Funds”.

One risk is a lack of liquidity. On May 6th 2010 trading in the American stockmarket seemed to go haywire: the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by almost 1,000 points in the session and some stocks lost almost all their value. This “flash crash” prompted the authorities to cancel a bunch of trades made at unusual prices. Between 60% and 70% of those trades were in ETFs, far above their actual weighting in the market.

Some investors use ETFs as a quick way of expressing their overall view on the market, while high-frequency traders use the funds as part of their complex arbitrage strategies. But such strategies work only as long as there is someone willing to take the other side of the trade. In chaotic conditions, there may be sellers but no buyers. As the IMF points out, “While most ETFs are supported by one or two marketmakers, there is no guarantee of active trading under illiquid conditions.”

A linked problem is the tendency for ETFs to be the main way in which investors seek exposure to some asset classes, notably gold. Once upon a time gold bulls had to pay a hefty markup to buy coins or had to purchase shares in gold-mining companies and hope that the management was competent. But gold ETFs have been hugely popular, seeing inflows of $12 billion in 2009 and $9 billion in 2010. The largest gold ETF holds more bullion than all the world’s central banks except those of America, France, Germany and Italy. The IMF also has more. The surge of interest in gold ETFs has been encouraged by (and may have in turn contributed to) a rise in the bullion price. If investors lose faith, the market may become disorderly as they scramble to take their profits.

Some ETF managers also top up their income with fees for lending the securities in their portfolios. There is a risk that, in a period of market disruption when ETF investors want their money back, managers would be forced to recall such loans, adding to liquidity pressures.

Another problem lies in the existence of leveraged ETFs, where losses as well as profits can be magnified. Were a leveraged ETF to suffer huge losses, the reputation of the entire industry might be affected, particularly among private investors. Inverse ETFs offer a way for investors to bet on a fall in an asset class but they may not always deliver such a return over an extended period. “It isn’t hard to give examples in which investors would lose money on a leveraged long ETF if the market went up over a period of significant volatility, or in which they lost money owning a short ETF and the market went down over a period in which there were some sharp rallies,” says Terry Smith, chief executive of Tullett Prebon, a money broker.

Perhaps the biggest concern, and the one with the clearest echoes of the subprime crisis, surrounds “synthetic” ETFs and linked products known as exchange-traded notes (ETNs) and exchange-traded vehicles (ETVs). An ETN is a debt security issued by an index provider or a bank and traded on the market; an ETV is similar, but the debt issuer is a special-purpose vehicle. Collectively these offshoots are known as exchange-traded products (ETPs).

The rationale for concocting this alphabet soup is the desire to create funds linked to illiquid asset classes. It may be too costly or impractical to replicate the targeted index completely. To synthesise it, the ETF provider usually enters into a transaction known as a total return swap with a bank. The bank agrees to pay the provider an amount equal to the return on the chosen benchmark, say an emerging-markets index; the provider hands over cash in return. The bank now has to manage the risk of replicating the index; the provider faces the risk that the bank might go bust. So the ETF provider requires the bank to provide collateral (see diagram).

The financial laboratory revisited

Here’s the rub. The collateral is usually unconnected with the index. The BIS cites the example of an emerging-markets ETF offered by a firm called db x-trackers. The collateral was in the form of equities and bonds. Most of it had nothing to do with emerging markets. Around half of the equity portion was in Japanese shares; another 30% consisted of American and German ones. Of the bonds, three-quarters were American, many of them unrated. Were the bank counterparty to fail, the index provider would be left with assets that were unrelated to the target portfolio.

Worse, the BIS points to a potential conflict of interest when the fund provider is owned by an investment bank. When a bank acts as a marketmaker, it needs to keep an inventory of bonds and stocks so that it can deal with clients’ demands to buy and sell. These positions have to be funded, which can be costly, especially if the securities are illiquid. “By transferring these stocks and bonds as collateral assets to the ETF provider sponsored by the parent bank, the investment banking activities may benefit from reduced warehousing costs for these assets,” the BIS warns.

That raises the danger that an ETF could act as a dumping ground for the unwanted securities on an investment bank’s books. “The synthetic ETF creation process may be driven by the possibility for the bank to raise funding against an illiquid portfolio that cannot otherwise be financed,” says the FSB report. Again, there are parallels with the subprime crisis, where mortgage-backed securities were warehoused in off-balance-sheet ventures.

If doubts emerged about the health of the bank involved in the swap, investors might be inclined to sell their holdings in the ETF or the ETN rather than take their chances on the exact value of the collateral. After all, as the crisis of 2008 showed, when banks are collapsing the value of all kinds of assets takes a battering.

The structure of synthetic ETFs is not a secret. Anyone who reads the documentation carefully should be aware of the nature of a fund and the type of collateral. It is also worth noting that in America these concerns apply only to ETNs and ETVs. In products labelled as ETFs, at least 80% of the portfolio must comprise securities matching the fund’s name.

In Europe synthetic funds make up around half of the ETF sector by assets. However, the European Fund and Asset Management Association, a trade body, points out that the vast majority of them trade under the UCITS (Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable Securities) rules, which limit some of the risks outlined by the BIS and the FSB. For example, rules on conflicts of interest restrict the choice of counterparties, a fund cannot have an exposure to any one counterparty that comprises more than 10% of its value, and the chosen collateral is subject to liquidity and credit-quality criteria.


Nevertheless, the rapid trading of ETFs is an area of concern, especially when the underlying assets are illiquid. Creating a synthetic ETF does not eliminate this illiquidity risk, but merely transforms it into a bet on the creditworthiness of a bank. One day that bet will go wrong.

Despite some eerie parallels, it is hard to conclude that ETFs yet pose a systemic risk on the same scale as mortgage-backed securities. Leveraged funds have around $40 billion of assets, less than 3% of the industry total, according to BlackRock, a fund-management group that, under its iShares brand, is the biggest provider of ETFs. Synthetic ETFs had more than $140 billion of assets in May. Though ETPs have been growing rapidly (see chart 2), their total value is less than $200 billion, less than one-seventh of that of conventional ETFs. It seems unlikely that banks have the same kind of exposure to collapsing ETFs as they did to the subprime market.

Even some in the industry are nervous about the profusion of new vehicles. A failure might diminish the appeal of ETFs as a whole. “There are products that are not even funds which are being called ETFs,” reports Deborah Fuhr of BlackRock. “The risk of confusion, disappointment and disillusionment among investors would be very negative for the ETF industry.”

That would be a shame. Fund managers’ fees have always eaten into investors returns; ETFs were a splendid way of letting investors keep more of their money. But like a hyperactive child, the finance sector can never leave a good thing be.


2011年5月18日 星期三

港股ETF採用「T+2」避風險


「港股直通車」的計劃於2007年泡湯後,市場一直寄望,通過內地引入追蹤港股的交易所買賣基金(下簡稱港股ETF)刺激港股交投。上海證券交易所產品開發部總監趙小平表示,為了把風險降至最低,港股ETF將按照港股「T+2」的交收制度,期望於今年內正式推出。

上交所與港交所(388)昨天在港舉辦「ETF及其他指數產品發展」研討會,與會的兩地官員、監管機構及發行人都異口同聲表示,期待港股ETF的出現。可是,兩地的市場結構、系統等差異引起的技術性問題,多年來未能解決。

上交所期望今年內推出

例如港股ETF按照內地股票一樣即日交收(「T+0」),但其追蹤的資產卻於兩天後才交收(「T+2」),內地投資者便須承擔期間的風險。近日內地當局決定港股ETF跟隨香港的做法,為港股ETF的推出掃除一大障礙。

「港股ETF要做到『零』風險,只能放棄效率,即按照香港『T+2』的交收制度。」趙小平強調,在「風險管理第一」的前提下,不能堅持以即日交收。「期望港股ETF能夠於今年內推出,但最終要待中國證監會、甚至國務院作決定。」

趙小平說,港股ETF等於用人民幣配置國際資產,會用「QDII」(合格境內機構投資者)的額度,同時,國家外滙管理局承諾,不能因為「QDII」的額度影響港股ETF的定價,換言之,倘若不夠額度,外管局會馬上批出。

市場盛傳,首批港股ETF將是跟蹤恒生指數或國企指數的產品,目標是分別在上海和深圳證券交易所掛牌,並將由嘉實、華夏、易方達等內地規模較大的基金管理公司發行。

華夏基金管理數量投資部總監王路表示,恒生指數是比較簡單、有效率的指數,相信內地首隻追蹤恒指的ETF很快出台。

趙小平指出,內地ETF沒有莊家制,股票由中央託管,ETF每天的轉換率高達930%,是港股的11倍,估計至2013年下半年,內地ETF的數目將增加至100隻。

ETF於2004年11月才在內地出現,至2009年只有5隻,之後發展加快,截至今年3月底,上交所已有17隻ETF,是亞洲第二大市場。期內香港以72隻排名亞洲首位,在全球則排名第八。

內地發展跨境ETF陷兩難


內地拓展追蹤境外市場資產的交易所買賣基金(跨境ETF)是配合國情的做法,讓上海盡快發展成國際金融中心。然而,ETF的結構複雜,涉及的系統性風險,甚至被形容為後金融海嘯時代的「魔鬼」,遭歐美監管機構緊盯。現時內地發展跨境ETF,隨時引狼入室。對於應否引進這項產品,內地陷入兩難局面。

ETF在全球急速發展,發行人「複製」一籃子資產,發明合成ETF,應記一功。香港發展ETF只有十多年,至今合成ETF已佔65%。

全球最大ETF發行人貝萊德、環球ETF研究及策略主管德博拉.菲爾(Deborah Fuhr)指出,美國的互惠基金足足用了66年,市場規模終突破1萬億美元,ETF僅需18年!

抵押品組合缺監管

近日國際組織金融穩定委員會(FSB)發表的報告,為大行其道的合成ETF大潑冷水。一方面,由於監管規例沒有要求合成ETF的抵押品組合須與基金聲稱追蹤的指數成分股脗合,基金持有人對抵押品非但一無所知、更無控制權,一旦出事,或會損失慘重。

另一方面,當市況逆轉,基金持有人急於贖回,ETF發行人在出售流通性低的抵押品時,將相當困難,假如發行人及其交易對手,屬於同系的金融機構,基金贖回壓力便極有可能引發流動資金短缺危機。

財經事務及庫務局局長陳家強亦強調,不容忽視合成ETF的訊息披露風險,以及潛在的系統性風險。

既然合成ETF這樣可怕,內地可以避免涉足嗎?答案是否定的。上海交易所總經理張育軍明言,按照去年訂下的十年戰略發展計劃,目標於2020年讓基金、衍生產品、股票及債券四大業務得到均衡發展。

2009年12月4日 星期五

ETF traders, the new hot financial commodity?

Posted by Izabella Kaminska on Dec 01 16:20.

Whereas it could be said that commodity experts were the most sought after traders just a few years back, a new industry trend is definitely emerging.
Behold the industry grab for exchange-traded-fund traders.
Banks, trading houses, hedge funds and even high frequency trading outfits are all increasingly seeking out personnel who are familiar with trading the diverse and ever-growing investment universe of exchange traded funds.
As Bloomberg reported on Monday, one of the latest firms to get in on the game is Newedge:
Nov. 30 (Bloomberg) — Newedge Group, the brokerage joint venture of Societe Generale SA and Credit Agricole SA’s Calyon unit, has hired three exchange-traded fund traders in New York, according to Bill Ahmuty, head of U.S. ETF sales and trading. Briton Ryan, an ETF trader from Macquarie Group Ltd., Matt Koop, director of ETF trading at Van der Moolen Holding NV, and Kevin Nichols, a former Morgan Stanley trader and Dow Jones & Co. columnist, are based in New York, Ahmuty said. They’ll report to Ahmuty, who was hired in July from Morgan Stanley, where he was head of U.S. ETF trading.

…

Newedge’s hires follow the June departure of 13 ETF traders and salespeople who moved to Knight Capital Group Inc., the largest trader of U.S. stocks by volume. Jersey City, New Jersey-based Knight said in a June 23 statement that it hired Reginald Browne, Eric Lichtenstein and Darren Taube, the three co-heads of Newedge’s ETF Index Group.
The trend, however, has been going on for at least a year.
As Chris Sevenoaks, a headhunter who specialises in the ETF market, told eFinancialCareers back in August:
“There’s still a relative shortage of real experts in this field, meaning a lot of people are being swayed to move between companies,” he says. “There’s a big demand for product structurers, particularly on the fixed income side.”