The good news first: people who invested in bonds issued by newly listed mainland developers are getting record high interest rates. But the bad news is that the risk of losses on these bonds is mounting as the housing market shows signs of slowing.
Last Friday, Fujian-based Powerlong Real Estate Holdings became the latest mainland developer to launch a US$250 million bond, paying investors a 13.75 per cent annual coupon over five years. The developer said the proceeds from the bond would be used to fund new and existing property projects.
Hong Kong-listed mainland developers are regular offshore bond issuers, constituting half of the size of the Asian high yield bond market.
In the past two months, a total of US$1.3 billion was raised from bond issues by mainland developers Renhe Commercial Holdings (SEHK: 1387, announcements, news) , KWG Property Holding, Shimao Property Holdings (SEHK: 0813) and Powerlong, paying investors annual coupons ranging from 9.65 to 13.75 per cent.
Property sales took a hit in May after the government acted to curb speculation in the sector. Land supply for housing construction rose and banks were told to cut back on lending, making it harder for individuals to get mortgages for second homes.
Credit analysts said that prices of China property bonds plunged in May, especially the newly listed property developers, although many have since rebounded from their lows to par or above par in recent weeks.
Another newly listed developer, Shanghai-based Glorious Property Holdings, had to call off the launch of a bond in April because the high-yield bond market was too volatile as a result of the government's cooling measures, according to chief executive Cheng Lixiong.
Bond investors demanded higher interest from newly listed developers due to their low rankings and short track records, said Bei Fu, an analyst at Standard & Poor's.
It might take years for these developers to establish relations with banks, which are less inclined to lend to companies that are highly geared and offshore bonds offers a good funding channel for these firms, but they have to be prepared to pay a high price.
Although Glorious Property was not willing to pay the high price that bond investors demanded, Shenzhen-based Kaisa Group Holdings and Fantasia Holdings wanted to cash in on investors' interest before funding costs soared to a level that they could not afford.
Fantasia's US$120 million five-year bond in May pays an annual coupon of 14 per cent, while Kaisa's US$350 million five-year bond in April offers 13.5 per cent.
Fantasia chairman Pan Jun admitted that the company had paid a high price to borrow.
"But our net profits will not fall if we use the money raised to buy cheaper land sites," he said in May, adding that Fantasia had probably got on the "last train" to tap the international bond market with credit becoming tight.
Many newly listed developers such as Evergrande Real Estate Group (SEHK: 3333) and Kaisa Group had borrowed heavily before their flotations, and chose to repay a portion of their debt using just a small proportion of the net proceeds, while allocating the remaining to fund land acquisitions, construction and projects. Following listings, these developers have chosen to use proceeds of these bonds to partially fund debt payments.
Fu at Standard & Poor's said mainland property developers tended to be more aggressive after gaining a Hong Kong listing, launching bonds to fund projects and land acquisitions, hence they may overlook risk management in favour of expansion.
Both Moody's Investors Service and Standard & Poor's said they had no plans to downgrade any developers or their bonds that they had rated over the last few months.
Although property sales have since recovered from May's slump, for bond investors, the outlook is not rosy, especially if they have holdings in the bonds issued newly listed mainland property firms.
There are strong signs that the mainland property market has started to cool down. China's property prices rose at the slowest pace in eight months in August from a year ago, according to Vince Chan, a credit strategist at Amias Berman & Co.
Property values in 70 major cities climbed 9.3 per cent year on year - less than the 10.3 per cent year-on-year gain in July, Chan said.
CCBI Research said that an uncertain policy outlook remained the key risk for mainland developers, which are expected to launch more projects at discounts of between 10 and 20 per cent in order to boost sales.
While Powerlong's bond made a promising debut on Friday and had been trading above par, Kaisa's bond fell below par yesterday.
Mainland property bonds with weaker fundamentals such as Kaisa are much more vulnerable to macroeconomic and policy risks than their stronger peers, according to Chan.
And mainland property bonds track their issuers' listed shares closely. Shares of Kaisa, Powerlong and Fantasia have been trading below their respective offer prices since their listings last year.
The weak macroeconomic conditions together with a slowdown in sales has prompted fears that weakness in the property market will trigger bond investors to sell off their holdings in lower quality bonds such as those issued by the newly listed property developers.
"There is policy tightening risk in the fourth quarter, which together with bonds trading at historical highs, could lead to some corrections in bond prices," said Keith Chan, a corporate credit analyst at HSBC (SEHK: 0005, announcements, news) .
2010年9月14日 星期二
Reforms to make SOEs world class, Li says
The mainland's state-owned enterprises would be among the world's best companies in seven to 10 years, Li Rongrong said yesterday in his first public appearance since retiring as the head of the country's SOEs last month.
Reforms to hold managers more accountable for their decisions and a greater emphasis on the efficient use of capital and resources had improved the performance of SOEs, the former head of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (Sasac) said at the World Economic Forum in Tianjin.
Li admitted that SOEs had an advantage over many private companies, given the government policy preference in market access and procurement contracts.
"I don't deny that unfairness exists in competition," he said, but added that SOEs had their own unique problems. "What I suffered from the most was the irresponsible attitude of managers."
When a company was owned by everyone, he said, no one took responsibility for decisions.
Remnants of the centrally planned economy, many SOEs were weak and on the verge of (接近於; 瀕於) collapse until a major effort in the 1990s thinned their numbers by closures, mergers and acquisitions.
Sasac was set up in 2003 to represent the state, as the largest shareholder, in the SOEs. During his seven years as the first head of Sasac, Li helped set up governance systems and tripled the assets of 123 central government-owned enterprises to 21 trillion yuan (HK$24.1 trillion).
The combined profits of those SOEs more than tripled to 815.1 billion yuan from 2002 to 2009.
This year, 30 central companies jumped into the ranks of the Fortune 500, including oil refiner Sinopec (SEHK: 0386) Group, ranked the seventh with US$187.5 billion in operating revenues, followed by State Grid Corp of China, China National Petroleum Corp and China Mobile (SEHK: 0941, announcements, news) Communications. In 2003, there were just six on the list.
Despite the improvement in the SOEs, criticism always surrounded Li.
When they do well, SOEs are attacked for winning contracts by taking advantage of their ties to government and their often monopolistic status. When profits are poor, they are scorned for their inefficiency.
"SOEs are different from private companies," Li said. "We have to hire more people than we need to in order to prevent unemployment leading to social unrest. When oil prices surged in 2008, we had to order refiners to cap their prices, otherwise retail oil prices would rise to a level unbearable to the national economy."
Government ownership had been declining in SOEs with their stock market listing in the past few years, which would put more pressure on managers to improve profits and investment returns, Li said. However, he also said it was not good if the shareholding was too diversified.
He expected SOEs to become more important economic stabilisers, especially as the mainland was still "at the primary stage of socialism construction".
Reforms to hold managers more accountable for their decisions and a greater emphasis on the efficient use of capital and resources had improved the performance of SOEs, the former head of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (Sasac) said at the World Economic Forum in Tianjin.
Li admitted that SOEs had an advantage over many private companies, given the government policy preference in market access and procurement contracts.
"I don't deny that unfairness exists in competition," he said, but added that SOEs had their own unique problems. "What I suffered from the most was the irresponsible attitude of managers."
When a company was owned by everyone, he said, no one took responsibility for decisions.
Remnants of the centrally planned economy, many SOEs were weak and on the verge of (接近於; 瀕於) collapse until a major effort in the 1990s thinned their numbers by closures, mergers and acquisitions.
Sasac was set up in 2003 to represent the state, as the largest shareholder, in the SOEs. During his seven years as the first head of Sasac, Li helped set up governance systems and tripled the assets of 123 central government-owned enterprises to 21 trillion yuan (HK$24.1 trillion).
The combined profits of those SOEs more than tripled to 815.1 billion yuan from 2002 to 2009.
This year, 30 central companies jumped into the ranks of the Fortune 500, including oil refiner Sinopec (SEHK: 0386) Group, ranked the seventh with US$187.5 billion in operating revenues, followed by State Grid Corp of China, China National Petroleum Corp and China Mobile (SEHK: 0941, announcements, news) Communications. In 2003, there were just six on the list.
Despite the improvement in the SOEs, criticism always surrounded Li.
When they do well, SOEs are attacked for winning contracts by taking advantage of their ties to government and their often monopolistic status. When profits are poor, they are scorned for their inefficiency.
"SOEs are different from private companies," Li said. "We have to hire more people than we need to in order to prevent unemployment leading to social unrest. When oil prices surged in 2008, we had to order refiners to cap their prices, otherwise retail oil prices would rise to a level unbearable to the national economy."
Government ownership had been declining in SOEs with their stock market listing in the past few years, which would put more pressure on managers to improve profits and investment returns, Li said. However, he also said it was not good if the shareholding was too diversified.
He expected SOEs to become more important economic stabilisers, especially as the mainland was still "at the primary stage of socialism construction".
Geely chief aims high with Volvo
Li now planned to set up three new Volvo plants on the mainland with a combined capacity of 300,000 cars per year, he told The Wall Street Journal in an interview.Li also said he planned to develop more luxury models under the Swedish marque. "Current Volvo cars like the S80 sedan could go up against the BMW 5-series but they have not reached the sophistication of the [more upscale] BMW 7-series or the Mercedes S-Class," Li told the paper." Li now planned to set up three new Volvo plants on the mainland with a combined capacity of 300,000 cars per year, he told The Wall Street Journal in an interview.Li also said he planned to develop more luxury models under the Swedish marque. "Current Volvo cars like the S80 sedan could go up against the BMW 5-series but they have not reached the sophistication of the [more upscale] BMW 7-series or the Mercedes S-Class," Li told the paper.These hugely ambitious targets would kick both the Swedish firm and its Chinese parent company into overdrive, pitting privately held Zhejiang Geely against the likes of Volkswagen's Audi, Daimler's Mercedes-Benz and BMW, the three German carmakers that have come to dominate the increasingly competitive high end of the mainland's roaring vehicle market."Compared to these German companies, Volvo's brand equity is lagging in the mainland market," said one industry analyst who declined to be named. "It is also hard to say whether Chinese consumers would take to buying luxury cars made by a company that is locally owned."Volvo sold only about 17,000 cars in China in the first seven months of this year, up 56 per cent on a low base from a year earlier, according to data from JD Power and Associates. About half of the Swedish brand's sales were imports, the rest were assembled locally from kits by a joint venture between Changan, Ford and Mazda.By contrast, Audi, Mercedes and BMW accounted for nine of the top 10 selling luxury cars in the year so far. Combined sales of the three German brands rose about 74 per cent in the first seven months to more than 271,000 cars.Li's 300,000-car target would be a lot of Volvos for China, and for Zhejiang Geely. Worldwide, Volvo sold only 324,000 cars last year and booked an adjusted pre-tax loss of US$662 million, according to Ford's stock exchange filings. Zhejiang Geely sold 329,000 cars last year under its homegrown Eagle, Maple, Englon and Emgrand brands. Li told the Journal he was considering building new plants to make Volvos in Daqing city in the northeast, Jiading in suburban Shanghai, and would also likely take over an existing car factory in Chengdu, Sichuan province, confirming months of mainland press speculation.The local governments of Daqing, an oil-producing town in Heilongjiang province, and Jiading district together contributed 4 billion yuan (HK$4.6 billion) in financing to help Zhejiang Geely foot the bill for the Volvo buyout, according to Ford's filings to the US Securities and Exchange Commission.Li did not mention a timeline for launching production at the new Volvo plants or say how their construction - which some analysts reckon could cost more than 5 billion yuan - would be funded."
Mainland car tycoon Li Shufu's ambitions come in two sizes - big and bigger. It was a big move when Li's Zhejiang Geely Holding Group bought Volvo from Ford Motor last month for US$1.5 billion in a deal partly financed by local mainland governments. The next step, if Li gets his way, will see Zhejiang Geely making more Volvos in China than Geelys.
Li now planned to set up three new Volvo plants on the mainland with a combined capacity of 300,000 cars per year, he told The Wall Street Journal in an interview.
Li also said he planned to develop more luxury models under the Swedish marque. "Current Volvo cars like the S80 sedan could go up against the BMW 5-series but they have not reached the sophistication of the [more upscale] BMW 7-series or the Mercedes S-Class," Li told the paper.
These hugely ambitious targets would kick both the Swedish firm and its Chinese parent company into overdrive, pitting privately held Zhejiang Geely against the likes of Volkswagen's Audi, Daimler's Mercedes-Benz and BMW, the three German carmakers that have come to dominate the increasingly competitive high end of the mainland's roaring vehicle market.
"Compared to these German companies, Volvo's brand equity is lagging in the mainland market," said one industry analyst who declined to be named. "It is also hard to say whether Chinese consumers would take to buying luxury cars made by a company that is locally owned."
Volvo sold only about 17,000 cars in China in the first seven months of this year, up 56 per cent on a low base from a year earlier, according to data from JD Power and Associates. About half of the Swedish brand's sales were imports, the rest were assembled locally from kits by a joint venture between Changan, Ford and Mazda.
By contrast, Audi, Mercedes and BMW accounted for nine of the top 10 selling luxury cars in the year so far. Combined sales of the three German brands rose about 74 per cent in the first seven months to more than 271,000 cars.
Li's 300,000-car target would be a lot of Volvos for China, and for Zhejiang Geely. Worldwide, Volvo sold only 324,000 cars last year and booked an adjusted pre-tax loss of US$662 million, according to Ford's stock exchange filings. Zhejiang Geely sold 329,000 cars last year under its homegrown Eagle, Maple, Englon and Emgrand brands.
Li told the Journal he was considering building new plants to make Volvos in Daqing city in the northeast, Jiading in suburban Shanghai, and would also likely take over an existing car factory in Chengdu, Sichuan province, confirming months of mainland press speculation.
The local governments of Daqing, an oil-producing town in Heilongjiang province, and Jiading district together contributed 4 billion yuan (HK$4.6 billion) in financing to help Zhejiang Geely foot the bill for the Volvo buyout, according to Ford's filings to the US Securities and Exchange Commission.
Li did not mention a timeline for launching production at the new Volvo plants or say how their construction - which some analysts reckon could cost more than 5 billion yuan - would be funded.
Mainland car tycoon Li Shufu's ambitions come in two sizes - big and bigger. It was a big move when Li's Zhejiang Geely Holding Group bought Volvo from Ford Motor last month for US$1.5 billion in a deal partly financed by local mainland governments. The next step, if Li gets his way, will see Zhejiang Geely making more Volvos in China than Geelys.
Li now planned to set up three new Volvo plants on the mainland with a combined capacity of 300,000 cars per year, he told The Wall Street Journal in an interview.
Li also said he planned to develop more luxury models under the Swedish marque. "Current Volvo cars like the S80 sedan could go up against the BMW 5-series but they have not reached the sophistication of the [more upscale] BMW 7-series or the Mercedes S-Class," Li told the paper.
These hugely ambitious targets would kick both the Swedish firm and its Chinese parent company into overdrive, pitting privately held Zhejiang Geely against the likes of Volkswagen's Audi, Daimler's Mercedes-Benz and BMW, the three German carmakers that have come to dominate the increasingly competitive high end of the mainland's roaring vehicle market.
"Compared to these German companies, Volvo's brand equity is lagging in the mainland market," said one industry analyst who declined to be named. "It is also hard to say whether Chinese consumers would take to buying luxury cars made by a company that is locally owned."
Volvo sold only about 17,000 cars in China in the first seven months of this year, up 56 per cent on a low base from a year earlier, according to data from JD Power and Associates. About half of the Swedish brand's sales were imports, the rest were assembled locally from kits by a joint venture between Changan, Ford and Mazda.
By contrast, Audi, Mercedes and BMW accounted for nine of the top 10 selling luxury cars in the year so far. Combined sales of the three German brands rose about 74 per cent in the first seven months to more than 271,000 cars.
Li's 300,000-car target would be a lot of Volvos for China, and for Zhejiang Geely. Worldwide, Volvo sold only 324,000 cars last year and booked an adjusted pre-tax loss of US$662 million, according to Ford's stock exchange filings. Zhejiang Geely sold 329,000 cars last year under its homegrown Eagle, Maple, Englon and Emgrand brands.
Li told the Journal he was considering building new plants to make Volvos in Daqing city in the northeast, Jiading in suburban Shanghai, and would also likely take over an existing car factory in Chengdu, Sichuan province, confirming months of mainland press speculation.
The local governments of Daqing, an oil-producing town in Heilongjiang province, and Jiading district together contributed 4 billion yuan (HK$4.6 billion) in financing to help Zhejiang Geely foot the bill for the Volvo buyout, according to Ford's filings to the US Securities and Exchange Commission.
Li did not mention a timeline for launching production at the new Volvo plants or say how their construction - which some analysts reckon could cost more than 5 billion yuan - would be funded.
CKI still in race for high-speed rail
Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings (SEHK: 1038) (CKI), controlled by Li Ka-shing, had made it past the first round of bidding for the only operational British high-speed railway, High Speed 1, a person close to the deal confirmed.
The Hong Kong-listed firm would not partner any company in bidding for the 30-year lease of the 109-kilometre rail link from London to the Channel Tunnel, the person said.
The first round of bidding was completed last week, said another person familiar with the deal, based in Britain. "Given that the bidding process is expected to be completed by the end of this year, I don't expect there'll be many more rounds."
The British government had set a deadline of March 31 next year for the completion of the deal, the British source said. The expected price range was £1.5 billion (HK$1.73 billion) to £2 billion, the person added. The successful first-round bidders have been asked to submit binding offers by October 29, according to a Reuters report.
At least four parties passed the first round. They include a consortium comprising Eurotunnel, Goldman Sachs Infrastructure Partners, M&G's Infracapital, Britain's Universities Superannuation Scheme and the infrastructure arm of France's Caisse des Depots et Consignations, as well as another consortium comprising Morgan Stanley Infrastructure, 3i Infrastructure and the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, according to Reuters. A third consortium includes the Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System and the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan.
At the Infrastructure Investment World Asia conference earlier this month, CKI group managing director Kam Hing-lam had declined to say whether his firm was bidding for High Speed 1.
However, he said: "[Britain] is a country where we have investments. We like to invest in a country where we have investments."
In July, Cheung Kong (SEHK: 0001) Infrastructure, with other companies and organisations controlled by Li, emerged as the preferred bidder in its proposed £5.775 billion acquisition of the British electricity assets of French energy conglomerate EDF.
The Hong Kong-listed firm would not partner any company in bidding for the 30-year lease of the 109-kilometre rail link from London to the Channel Tunnel, the person said.
The first round of bidding was completed last week, said another person familiar with the deal, based in Britain. "Given that the bidding process is expected to be completed by the end of this year, I don't expect there'll be many more rounds."
The British government had set a deadline of March 31 next year for the completion of the deal, the British source said. The expected price range was £1.5 billion (HK$1.73 billion) to £2 billion, the person added. The successful first-round bidders have been asked to submit binding offers by October 29, according to a Reuters report.
At least four parties passed the first round. They include a consortium comprising Eurotunnel, Goldman Sachs Infrastructure Partners, M&G's Infracapital, Britain's Universities Superannuation Scheme and the infrastructure arm of France's Caisse des Depots et Consignations, as well as another consortium comprising Morgan Stanley Infrastructure, 3i Infrastructure and the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, according to Reuters. A third consortium includes the Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System and the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan.
At the Infrastructure Investment World Asia conference earlier this month, CKI group managing director Kam Hing-lam had declined to say whether his firm was bidding for High Speed 1.
However, he said: "[Britain] is a country where we have investments. We like to invest in a country where we have investments."
In July, Cheung Kong (SEHK: 0001) Infrastructure, with other companies and organisations controlled by Li, emerged as the preferred bidder in its proposed £5.775 billion acquisition of the British electricity assets of French energy conglomerate EDF.
2010年8月26日 星期四
Developed economies could get trapped in a limbo land of zero inflation
August 19, 2010 7:35am |
The battle to avoid deflation in the developed world could prove to be a long one, with twists and turns which could last for many years. In July, the core CPI data in the eurozone were somewhat firmer than expected, as were the core PPI data in the US. This has led some economists to suggest that underlying price pressures are beginning to rise again, and that the deflation scare is over. Would that that were true. Some interesting new evidence from the IMF suggests that while outright deflation might be avoided, at least for a time, the developed economies could soon get stuck in a kind of limbo land, with inflation remaining unhealthily close to zero for a very long period.
The standard theory of the inflation mechanism, used by all the major central banks, assumes that the rate of inflation is driven by the size of the output gap in the economy (i.e. the extent of spare capacity) and by expected inflation. (In some formulations, the change in inflation appears on the left hand side of the equation - see this useful and accessible summary by John Duffy at the University of Pittsburgh.) When the output gap rises, we would therefore expect the inflation rate to decline. At present, most estimates of the output gap in the developed economies are historically very high at around 4 per cent, so it would appear to be fairly certain that core inflation will continue falling from the 1 per cent now reached in the US and Europe. Deflation, here we come?
It is important to ask how this apparently strong conclusion could be proved wrong. Maybe we have over-estimated the output gap, but surely not by as much as 4 per cent. Maybe expectations of inflation have risen in response to the printing of money by central banks, but none of the direct sources of expectations data confirms this. Maybe high commodity prices have been over-riding the effects of the large output gap, but oil prices have been stable or falling recently.
That leaves the heart of the matter, the relationship between inflation and the output gap itself. The key question is whether this is sufficiently reliable to support the strong conclusion that deflation is now a severe threat. The econometric evidence on this is voluminous, but my 10 cent summary would be as follows. Yes, the predicted relationship does emerge from the data, but it has been much weaker in the past decade than it used to be. And at very low rates of inflation, it may break down altogether.
Andre Meier at the IMF has just published a paper examining all of the episodes in the past 40 years in which developed economies have experienced persistently large output gaps (which he calls PLOGs). This is an extremely useful exercise, in the spirit of quantitative economic history, rather than full blown econometrics, and probably all the better for that. Meier identifies 25 separate episodes (prior to the current examples, of which there are another 15) in which a national output gap has exceeded 1.5 per cent for at least 8 consecutive quarters. In shorthand, we can label these episodes as deep recessions.
As the standard theory would predict, inflation fell in virtually all of these episodes. Interestingly, Meier finds that the extent of the decline in inflation is proportional to the rate of inflation in the year before the deep recession starts (see graph).
This implies that countries which start out with a very high rate of inflation (e.g. the UK from 1980-83) see the biggest drop in inflation when a deep recession occurs. As a rough rule of thumb, the inflation rate seems to drop by about one fifth of the original rate for every year that the episode lasts, with much of the improvement coming in the first couple of years.
Since many developed economies, including the US, embarked on their present deep recessions with inflation at around 2-2.5 per cent, this rule of thumb would indicate that inflation should be dropping at about 0.5 per cent per annum, which is almost exactly what has been happening. So far, then, so bad.
But the really interesting thing is that this rate of decline in inflation appears to peter out altogether as inflation itself approaches zero. Admittedly, there are only two such episodes in the database - Japan in 2001-03 and Sweden in 1992-94. But they are nonetheless important, because we do not have much else to cling on to. These episodes of downward rigidity in inflation are probably explained by the fact that price and wage setters are extremely reluctant actually to cut prices or nominal wages in absolute terms, so a really massive shock (perhaps even bigger than the recent credit crunch) is needed to force the overall inflation rate below zero.
Here is my (highly) speculative conclusion. A recession as deep as the one we are experiencing will continue to put downward pressure on inflation, but this will get less and less obvious as we approach zero. There will be times when higher commodity prices, or declining exchange rates, will lead to temporary increases in inflation, counter to the dominant deflationary trend.
An even bigger recessionary shock might be needed to turn inflation meaningfully negative. This probably can be avoided, enabling some people to continue denying that deflation is a serious threat. Nevertheless, in this netherland of zero inflation, many of the adverse dynamics of debt deflation (identified by Irving Fisher in the 1930s) will be working away, insidiously, under the surface.
If deflationary forces go undercover, as they did in Japan, then they may become particularly difficult to defeat.
谢国忠：香港的一切苦难来自对房地产的迷恋
香港梦想内地客会来买楼，加上不负责任的低利率，令其楼市充满泡沫；高楼价是影响香港竞争力的根本障碍
【财新网】(专栏作家 谢国忠)1997年房地产泡沫破灭后，香港经济便停滞了。过去13年里，香港人均的名义GDP(即未经通胀调整)上升了百分之十几。但因港币兑人民币的汇率跌了五分之一，而香港的生活用品大多来自内地，生活成本其实由人民币决定，因此，说香港经济“停滞”其实已算客气。事实上，若都用人民币衡量，自亚洲金融[3.00 -5.66%]危机以来，香港人的生活标准降的比日本人多。
此外，若没有中央的支持，香港的经济表现还要差许多。例如，香港实行零关税，内地客人去香港购买奢侈品，这是香港经济的一大亮点。但是，大陆其实完全可以取消奢侈品的进口关税，因为大陆并没有相应的竞争行业。大陆的高关税仅是帮助把需求导向了香港。
香港股市是另一个经济亮点。它其实只是中国股市的国际板。上海其实可以很轻松地抢它的生意，只要把QFII(合格境外机构投资者)额度提高到5000亿美元。没有中央的支持，很难想象香港的经济会是今天的样子。
香港所有的苦难，可归咎于它对房地产的迷恋。经过1997年的泡沫破灭，照理说，香港应当能够永远戒掉对房地产的痴迷。日本就是这样的。然而事实恰好相反。香港人最新的梦想，似乎就是等一个土土的大陆佬来敲他的门，掏出几百万美元来买他的公寓，然后他的下半辈子就有着落了。这样的梦想，加上低利率，支持着香港楼价，令其比1997年的高峰期仅低了十分之一。
“香港的房地产是无价的，”当地一名炒房老手告诉我， “这就像一个宋朝花瓶或毕加索的画，内地有13亿人等着收藏它们，你说标什么价好呢？”
内地人提着成袋的现金到香港买楼，这样耸人听闻的故事在香港时有耳闻，但支持这个城市泡沫的真正原因是债务。这是老生常谈了。相比其经济增速，香港 的债务上升速度是前者的三倍。事实上，香港私人部门的杠杆率甚至比1997年更高。经过1997年的崩盘，还能在这么短的时间内把杠杆率拉的如此之高，这 也算是香港特色。
香港金融业完全不负责任的行为助长了泡沫。普通的按揭贷款与香港银行同业拆息挂钩，还不到1%。只要利率提高至3%，许多借款人就会陷入麻烦。难道 这样的金融产品比美国的次级抵押贷款要强？香港政府如何能容忍这样的金融产品？一旦泡沫破裂，香港政府又将被迫通过限制供应来支撑楼价。每经过一轮这样的 周期，香港经济就会变得更小。
另一方面，内地城市则在不断追求规模最大化。目前的楼市泡沫为地方政府提供了融资，让其最大化地促进发展。当泡沫破裂，它们会任由房价下跌，吸引新的资金接盘。
相反，每经过一轮周期，内地城市就变得更大。广州和深圳的人口都将超过2000万。北京和上海会是前者的两倍。香港的人口仅700万，要在中国的超级大城市中脱颖而出何其难矣。
香港20世纪90年代的房地产泡沫，部分原因是人们对未来充满乐观。名义GDP和工资以两位数的增速上升，楼价上升更快。人们说，楼价比收入上升领 先了若干年，应该提前用收入买楼，这也能自圆其说。相比之下，目前的泡沫是一场闹剧。未来10年，工资不会迅速上升，香港的根本挑战是来自北部的竞争压 力。过去10年，尽管香港经济停滞，上海快速增长，但香港的平均工资仍然是上海的2.5倍。
如前所述，香港的竞争对手已不再是上海，而是像广州和深圳这样的邻居。香港如果不改变增长战略，它有可能失去在粤语世界的领先地位。
高楼价是影响香港竞争力的根本障碍。它的住宅市值可能超过GDP的4倍，而仅仅一半人口拥有自己的住宅，其余居住在政府的“公屋”，或政府补贴带福利性质的“居屋”。香港经济以房地产为中心，在全世界独此一家。
中央对香港的政策优惠，其实以抑制上海为代价。但这样的政策能持续多久？上海人口仅占全国的1.6%，而上缴的财政收入是全国各省份中最多的。另一方面，香港贡献的财政收入是零。忽视最能干的儿子，补贴最懒的儿子，这样的局面能持续多久？
香港必须以地产政策平衡数量和价格，保持相关性。首先，政府应该制止疯狂的按揭产品，否则下一次衰退到来时，政府会吃尽苦头。对于高风险的抵押贷款，应要求银行作出更高的拨备。
其次，香港政府目前的主要收入来自卖地，应考虑物业税，以此取代前者。税率可以从百分之二开始，最终达到百分之五。这样一来，政府可降低支持地价的动力。考虑到香港人口老化，福利开支上升，这样的政策无可避免。
第三，香港目前的商业集中在维多利亚港周围的狭小地带，政府应规划替代性的更大的商业中心。新址可考虑设在大屿山。香港投资建设港珠澳大桥要花一笔巨款，若无战略扩张，花这笔巨资不值当。
香港人梦想把房地产卖给内地投资客，到头来这可能也就是一场梦而已。人口老化，经济不振，仰仗中央，香港正痛苦地滑向边缘化。该醒醒了。
2010年8月11日 星期三
匯豐：減持股票增持企債
| 8月 11日 星期三 05:05 更新 | ||
【明報專訊】7月初以來，環球股市一洗頹氣，主要指數普遍升至3個月高位，傳統智慧「五窮六絕七翻身」似乎得到印證。 匯豐環球投資管理環球投資策略師及匯豐組合── 環球智選基金經理Simona Paravani，對股市前景則持審慎態度，始終歐美減赤措施如何影響經濟增長，實在難以估計，相信下半年股市持續大幅波動，目前會減持股票及增持企業債 券。
歐美削開支 影響將浮現導致上半年金融市場大上大落的源頭，主要是歐豬五國衍生的主權債務危機。隨著歐洲央行向銀行提供無上限資金，以及5月10日承諾購買區內政府債券 （見表1），投資者對國債違約的憂慮稍見紓緩，但Simona認為宏觀經濟存在著不確定性，只是市場焦點轉移至發達國家的財赤狀及經濟增長持續性而已， 股市亦順理成章地跟隨這些未知數反覆。她稱：「高負債相對GDP比率及巨額財赤不僅是歐豬五國獨有，美國、英國、部分歐元區成員國亦如是，換言之，普遍廣 泛發達國家正面對債務問題。今年上半年環球經濟增長，有賴寬鬆貨幣政策所支撐，下半年又如何呢？發達國家已明言要削減政府開支，到了下一階段切實執行時， 到底措施牽涉的層面有多廣？成效有多大？歐美經濟增長能否持續下去？這些疑問都是無法一下子解答，最快都要明年才見真章。正因如此，年底前環球股市很可能 出現與上半年相若的波動。」
拉美股票更勝亞洲股票
經濟增長前景不明朗，企業盈利的可預見度自然大打折扣，這是Simona對環球股票的看法審慎、減持股票在投資組合比重之原因。她解釋：「分析員所 作的2010年盈利預測過於樂觀，尤其是成熟市場股票，預測更屬於歷史高水平，似乎未有計及經濟放緩的因素。現在直至2011年，我相信企業公布的業績或 會教市場失望，屆時股價將出現調整。」事實上，基金自今年初以來，一直減持股票投資比重，目前股票投資比重約82.7％。她表示基金策略亦以買入防守性股 份為主，例如公用股及健康護理股份，因為兩類股份的盈利不被過分高估，業績遜預期的機會頗低。新興市場方面，她認為拉丁美洲股票較亞洲股票更具投資價值， 因為包括巴西(新聞 - 網站 - 圖片)在內的主要國家，經濟增長預測有機會被調升，有利市場氣氛，惟基金沒有增持個別行業股份。
企業資產負債表良好 可買企債
儘管歐美復蘇之路顛簸難行，但Simona強調，目前環球股市雖不及08、09年般廉宜，但與歷史平均水平相比，估值亦不算十分高昂（MSCI世界 指數12個月預測市盈率為12倍，較過去平均值17.4倍折讓31%）。此外，聯儲局及歐洲央行今年內欠缺加息條件，在低息環境下，股票仍具一定的吸引 力，所以對股票前景不會過分悲觀。
宏觀經濟反覆難測，Simona認為當下分散投資更形重要，除了在組合加入股票外，債券投資亦不可或缺。她覺得企業債券較政府債券吸引，故基金組合 同時增持了投資及非投資級別企債。「信貸差價無疑是收窄了許多，但估值尚算吸引，加上企業資產負債表良好及市場流動性充裕的因素，企債有條件再做好一 點。」
訂閱：
文章 (Atom)